The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Persecuted Church.

Persecuted Christians in the developing and non-free world will find themselves increasingly at risk as the COVID-19 pandemic takes hold.

Firstly, there is the problem of systematic discrimination. As “unclean” infidels Pakistani Christians can’t get hospital treatment in the best of times, let alone in the worst of times. This will not change during a global pandemic, not in Pakistan or any place where Christians suffer systematic discrimination and persecution.

Likewise, Christian prisoners in Iran, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt, Eritrea and beyond are unlikely to be treated if infected with COVID-19 while in the prison system.

Then there is the likelihood that the COVID-19 crisis will provide hostile state and non-state actors with an opportunity to exploit security vacuums to advance their own agendas.

Christians most at risk on this count are:

• Assyrians Christians in Northern Iraq where Kurds (Sunnis) and Shabaks (Shi’ites; proxies of Baghdad and Tehran) might be eager to exploit the opportunity provided by COVID-19 pandemic to complete their land grabbing campaign in the Nineveh Plains (the Assyrian homeland for millennia) – even to complete the genocide.

• Christians in Nigeria and the Sahel (in particular in Burkina Faso) as well as Central Africa and the Swahili Coast – where jihadists groups and criminal enterprises could exploit the opportunity provided by the COVID-19 pandemic to expand, consolidate, establish bases and access resources.

Below are excerpts from several reports that support this view.

Elizabeth Kendal
24 March 2020

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Covid-19 sows Islamic trouble in Maldives paradise
Tourism-dependent island nation threatens to become a hotbed of religious extremism as economic desperation sets in.
By Bertil Lintner, Asia Times online 5 April 2020
(excerpts)

MALE – As tourism in Maldives plummets with the travel-restricting Covid-19 pandemic, forcing many in the globally-oriented industry into unemployment, the idyllic island nation could soon become more vulnerable than ever to extremist groups like the Islamic State.

That rising risk was apparent on February 4, when three foreigners were stabbed on the outskirts of Male, the island nation’s capital. Muslim militants later took responsibility for the attacks, the first seen in years. Rising economic desperation, some suggest, could cause more.

If upshots from a previous seismic crisis – namely the one caused by the calamitous 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami – remain relevant, Maldives could see a Covid-19 driven uptick in Islamic radicalism.   [. . .]

Terrorist groups may conduct attacks with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and local government facilities.”

As ex-president Nasheed pointed out, radicalization is not confined to disgruntled youths: “Radical Islam is getting very, very strong in Maldives. Their strength in the military and in the police is very significant. They have people in strategic positions within both.”

On March 28, Maldives reported its first local Covid-19 case, raising the total number to 16 with the others being foreign tourists and raising the risk of more local transmission.

As elsewhere, the island country is now in an economy-strangling lockdown, one that will contribute to the desperation and frustration of many young Maldivians and unemployed migrants.

As they inevitably seek comfort and refuge in religious beliefs, fears are rising they will be easy prey to hardline imams and extremist groups looking for new young recruits to their radical causes.

UPDATE: 
Islamic State claims first attack in island nation of Maldives
BY CALEB WEISS | April 16, 2020
for FDD's Long War Journal

Earlier today, the Islamic State claimed its first-ever attack in the small island nation of Maldives. While the reported operation did little in terms of damage, it does represent the further spread of the group’s violence. . .

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Covid-19 restores Myanmar military’s lost powers
New military-steered Covid-19 task force has given cover to a wide-reaching clampdown in the name of national stability
By Bertil Lintner, Asia Times online, 2 April 2020
(excerpts)

CHIANG MAI – After weeks of implausible official denials, Myanmar is finally facing up to the reality of its Covid-19 outbreak.

The nation may also soon face a new political reality as the powerful military, or Tatmadaw, leverages the situation to roll back recently restored democratic rights and reimpose strict social and media controls harking to its previous junta rule. . .

In mid-March, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government formed a 21-member committee she now heads to broadly manage the country’s Covid-19 situation.

On March 30, in a move some see as a Tatmadaw power play, another ten-member Covid-19 task force was formed to investigate cases, trace contacts of confirmed cases and clamp down including through arrests on “fake news” and “disinformation” that could cause “panic among the people.” 

The newer and more powerful task force significantly does not include Suu Kyi or even her health minister, an oddity considering the body’s Covid-19 containing remit.

Rather, it is headed by First Vice President Myint Swe, former general known for his past record of arrests and crackdowns, including a lead role in the lethal clampdown on the 2007 Buddhist-monk led “Saffron Revolution” protest.

Other task force members include all three military-appointed members of Suu Kyi’s Cabinet, namely the ministers of defense, home affairs and border affairs, and Lieutenant General Mya Tun Oo, the powerful joint chief of staff of the defense services. Five civilian ministers are also included.

Although the government has not formally declared a state of emergency, the new committee’s sweeping powers and the fact that it is headed by a former powerful general means that the Tatmadaw effectively back in the driver’s seat and no longer restricted in exercising power from behind a quasi-democratic façade fronted by Suu Kyi.

[. . .]

[The Tatmadaw's] military actions are not likely to attract much attention or protest amid the global Covid-19 crisis, though rights groups are starting to clamor about the gathering Internet and media clampdowns.

The Tatmadaw, meanwhile, is settling into its new status as the undisputed defender of the nation in a health emergency, while Suu Kyi’s elected civilian government for the first time since it was formed in 2015 is being forced to make major concessions to armed forces instead of vice versa.

The Covid-19 crisis, while still incipient in Myanmar with unknown consequences ahead, is giving rise to a new military-dominant order that once established will be hard to roll back.

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Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin | RLPB 543 | Wed 1 Apr 2020
RLPB is published weekly to facilitate strategic intercessory prayer.

MOZAMBIQUE: JIHADIST THREAT ESCALATES
(excerpts)

Cabo Delgado is Mozambique's northern-most coastal province and the southern-most reach of the Swahili Coast. . .  An Islamic insurgency has simmered in the region since October 2017. [. . .]

On Monday 23 March jihadists conducted their most audacious and sophisticated terror attack to date. They invaded one of Cabo Delgado's largest towns, the strategic port town of Mocimboa da Praia, entering before dawn from land and sea. The jihadists fought, burned property, released prisoners, looted food and weapons 'sufficient for two battalions' and ultimately raised their black flag over police headquarters. Mozambiquan security forces were simply overwhelmed. The jihadists controlled the streets all day until military reinforcements arrived and the jihadists fled 'leaving behind a trail of blood, bodies, and missing persons'. Islamic State Central Africa Province has claimed responsibility. . .

Analysts surmise the day-long seizure of Mocimboa da Praia could mark a turning point in the insurgency. It comes just as Mozambiquan President Filipe Nyusi declares a state of emergency for the month of April, aimed at curtailing the spread of the COVID-19 virus. [. . .] (emphasis mine)

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COMMENTARY / The COVID-19 Pandemic and Deadly Conflict
Crisis Group, 31 March 2020

While the COVID-19 pandemic presents a potentially era-defining challenge to public health and the global economy, its long- and short-term consequences for deadly conflict are less well understood. Much remains uncertain, but it is already clear that the pandemic could cause enormous damage in fragile states, trigger unrest and undermine international crisis management systems. The disease is already disrupting humanitarian aid flows, peace operations and crisis diplomacy, and it could be catastrophic for civilians caught in the midst of conflict, particularly refugees and displaced people. Over the coming weeks and months, Crisis Group will offer special publications on the coronavirus and its effects on the conflict landscape.

Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus  
Crisis Group, 31 March 2020
excerpts

Even as COVID-19’s toll mounts, the world should brace itself for attacks by ISIS, which believes it can exploit the disorder the contagion is causing. This continuing jihadist threat requires the sort of international cooperation that militants hope the virus will sap. . .

. . . In a new editorial in its weekly newsletter, ISIS has told its membership that their globe-spanning war is to go on, even as the virus spreads. Moreover, it has told them that the national and international security regimes that help keep the group in check are about to be overloaded, and that they should take maximum advantage. [. . .]

ISIS published its editorial on COVID-19 in the 19 March edition of its weekly newsletter Al-Naba (the Dispatch). . .

The editorial, titled “The Crusaders’ Worst Nightmare”, reports approvingly on COVID-19’s effect on the many enemies whom ISIS collectively terms “polytheists”. “Fear of this contagion has affected them more than the contagion itself”, says Al-Naba, referring to how people across the world are shutting themselves in their homes as commerce grinds to a halt. Security forces are deploying in the streets to halt the virus’s spread, and imminent economic crisis seems likely to spark crime and social unrest. [. . .]

Al-Naba concludes from the foregoing that Muslims have a “duty” to protect themselves and their loved ones from COVID-19’s spread, but also to act. The editorial enjoins ISIS supporters to liberate Muslim captives from prisons and camps; to show no mercy to the “infidels” and “apostates” in their moment of crisis, and instead to attack and weaken them, rendering them less able to harm Muslims; and to bear in mind that the calamity befalling the West and its allies “will substantially undercut their ability to wage war on the mujahideen in the coming period”. The editorial closes by reminding readers that the best way to avoid God’s punishment – including coronavirus – is through obedience to Him, and that the act of obedience most beloved to God is “jihad” and inflicting pain on His enemies.

ISIS’s rhetorical line on COVID-19 has evolved as the virus’s geographic scope and human toll has become clearer. In January, Al-Naba reported that “a new disease spreads death and panic” in “communist China”. Then, as Iran suffered an outbreak, the newsletter gloated that the contagion was an exemplary punishment from God for Shiite Muslim “idolatry”. Now the group has apparently reconciled itself to the virus’s global spread, even as it hopes that God will specially afflict “polytheist” nations.

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COVID-19: How Pandemics Disrupt Military Operations
Sim Tack, Global Analyst , Stratfor, 25 March 2020
excerpts (Stratfor subscription required for full article).

Amid the escalating COVID-19 pandemic, countries around the world are facing widespread disruptions to not only the health of their populations and economies, but their militaries. Even if the virus itself doesn't leave key personnel severely ill (or worse), quarantine measures can still severely thwart military operations. Meanwhile, military powers such as the United States may increasingly be forced to deploy additional forces to the frontlines of unfolding COVID-19 outbreaks at home. The resulting fallout could, in turn, result in setbacks in the fight against multiple non-state actors abroad, and potentially even the long-term development of military capabilities. [. . .]

. . .In addition to military capacity geared toward balancing against other states, operations against insurgent groups and terrorist cells will be severely disrupted. Due to their asymmetric nature, these militant organizations will also not be facing the same kind of burden and responsibility of the state due to the pandemic. As troops are deployed in a COVID-19 response capacity, or have to cancel training exercises or operational preparations, the ability to rotate forces into the relevant theaters could temporarily grind to a halt. . .

[NOTE - doubtless this will have a huge impact on counter-terror operations in West Africa and the Sahel - EK.]

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Muslim Extremists Exploit Coronavirus to Promote Terrorism, Hate
by Bassam Tawil, Gatestone Institute, 25 March 2020
excerpts

As countries across the world are turning themselves inside out to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, Muslim extremists and terrorists have been expending their energy on promoting terror attacks against other Muslims as well as "infidels." . . .

As scientists and other "infidels" around the world, including Israel, are working around the clock to find a vaccine for the virus, the Muslim Brotherhood organization and some of its allies are issuing fatwas (Islamic religious opinions) that expose dangerous goals, a dangerous ideology, and a disregard for human life.  [. . .]

The Global Fatwa Index (GFI) organization, affiliated with Egypt's Dar al-Ifta and General Secretariat for Fatwa Authorities Worldwide, disclosed on March 16 that it had been monitoring and analyzing numerous fatwas on the coronavirus.

The group found that a large number of the fatwas related to the disease came from "unofficial" bodies and individuals.

The GFI Index concluded that "extremist organizations and terrorist groups are exploiting the outbreak of the virus to implement their ideology, spread chaos, terror and panic, and call into question the nation's institutions and leaders." [. . .]

An Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood fugitive, Bahjat Saber, has been using the outbreak of the virus to call for carrying out terrorist attacks against the Egyptian authorities. Saber urged Muslims who have the flu, or who are suspected of being infected with the coronavirus, to enter police stations and other government institutions in order to spread the disease.

The report noted that an intelligence document leaked by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior revealed that ISIS was seeking to recruit its coronavirus-infected members to act as "human biological bombs" in various parts of Iraq. So, ISIS wants to use its members to spread the virus among Iraqis.

The good news is that the rulings of the terrorists and extremists do not represent the views of the leading Islamic religious authorities in most Arab and Islamic countries. The bad news is that extremist Muslims and their allies are again exposing their contempt for human life, including the life of Muslims who oppose their ideology, terrorism and jihad. . .

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COVID-19 and Conflict: Seven Trends to Watch
SPECIAL BRIEFING  4 / THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND DEADLY CONFLICT
International Crisis Group, 24 March 2020
excerpts
The COVID-19 pandemic unquestionably presents an era-defining challenge to public health and the global economy. Its political consequences, both short- and long-term, are less well understood.
The global outbreak has the potential to wreak havoc in fragile states, trigger widespread unrest and severely test international crisis management systems. Its implications are especially serious for those caught in the midst of conflict if, as seems likely, the disease disrupts humanitarian aid flows, limits peace operations and postpones or distracts conflict parties from nascent as well as ongoing efforts at diplomacy. Unscrupulous leaders may exploit the pandemic to advance their objectives in ways that exacerbate domestic or international crises – cracking down on dissent at home or escalating conflicts with rival states – on the assumption that they will get away with it while the world is otherwise occupied. [. . .]

Some leaders may also see COVID-19 as cover to embark on destabilising foreign adventures, whether to deflect domestic discontent or because they sense they will face little pushback amid the global health crisis. . .
 . . . at a time when the pandemic is distracting major powers and multilateral organisations, some leaders may surmise that they can assert themselves in ways that they would otherwise deem too risky. A spate of attacks against U.S. targets by Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq may well be part of a pre-existing effort by Tehran to push the U.S. out of the Middle East. But with Iran’s leadership already under enormous domestic pressure, the toll taken by the coronavirus might also affect its calculus. As we wrote, “feeling besieged and with no obvious diplomatic exit ramp, Iran might conclude that only a confrontation with the United States might change a trajectory that’s heading in a very dangerous direction”.

Similarly, the crisis may create openings for jihadist groups to launch new offensives against weakened governments in Africa and the Middle East. . . As Crisis Group has previously argued, jihadist forces tend to “exploit disorder”, gaining territory and adherents where conflicts already exist or weak states face social turmoil. . . It is possible that social and political disorder may create similar openings for jihadist actors as the crisis goes on . . .

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COVID-19: Where Most See Crisis, Some See Opportunity
By  Thomas Abi-Hanna, Global Security Analyst, Stratfor, 19 March 2020
excerpts (Stratfor subscription required for full article)

As the coronavirus pandemic monopolizes more of the world’s time, money and attention, the latest surge of violence in Kashmir between India and Pakistan highlights the potential for countries to act more aggressively with less scrutiny. But state actors aren't the only ones who will be tempted to capitalize on the current chaos. As more governments become bogged down by the virus and the economic fallout from containment efforts, jihadist groups and other non-state actors will also have the opportunity to advance their positions in security hotspots around the world. This could not only raise the risk for military escalations in those areas in the short term, but could allow militias to resurge once the global health crisis eventually subsides. [. . .]

A Convenient Cover for Militants

The global coronavirus outbreak could also create opportunities for non-state actors, such as militant groups, to regroup and eventually resurge. A primary constraint on militant activity across various security hotspots has been constant pressure from security forces. But the diversion of resources and manpower from the frontlines of many of these fights toward containing the virus will ease pressure on these groups. Likewise, these groups face a lesser risk of being directly impacted by the virus, given that many of them operate in rural and isolated regions such as spacious deserts, rugged mountains and dense forests largely cut off from the outside world. These developments will afford these groups opportunities to regroup, reorganize and engage in more training, as well as plan new activity on both operational and strategic levels. . .

Examples of potential groups that could take advantage of these developments include, but are not limited to:

• Islamic State branches in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Nigeria (also known as Boko Haram), among others
• Al Shabaab in Somalia and other al Qaeda branches around the globe
• The Maoist Naxalites in India
• Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir

In the coming months or even years, long term economic impacts caused by the coronavirus crisis will weaken the governments' stances against these militant groups, potentially making the latter more dangerous. Governments will have fewer resources to allocate to security forces in the fight against these groups, especially in less developed countries that are already struggling to combat them. This may allow these groups to expand their areas of operations in light of decreasing pressure. In fact, economic downturn, scarce employment opportunities and dissatisfaction with governments may even make those in the population more susceptible to recruitment by these militant groups, who will be able to offer them money, a sense of belonging and a way of lashing back out at the government. . .

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Elizabeth Kendal is an international religious liberty analyst and advocate. She serves as Director of Advocacy at Canberra-based Christian Faith and Freedom (CFF) and is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Arthur Jeffery Centre for the Study of Islam at Melbourne School of Theology.

She has authored two books: Turn Back the Battle: Isaiah Speaks to Christians Today (Deror Books, Melbourne, Australia, Dec 2012) which offers a Biblical response to persecution and existential threat; and After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East (Wipf and Stock, Eugene, OR, USA, June 2016).

See www.ElizabethKendal.com 

How Much of a Threat is Islamic State Khorasan Province?

By Elizabeth Kendal

Christians Targeted in Quetta

In Pakistan’s south-western city of Quetta, the capital of sparsely populated Balochistan Province, the already vulnerable Christian community is under attack.

On Sunday morning, 17 December, at least nine people were killed and more than 50 injured when two suicide bombers blew themselves up at Bethel Memorial Methodist Church, as some 200 local Christians were participating in a special “Sunday School Christmas Program”. . [See RLPB 437 (19 Dec 2017)].

On the evening of Easter Monday 2 April, four members of a Christian family were travelling along Quetta’s Shah Zaman road when militants on a motorbike intercepted their rickshaw and open fired. A young girl was wounded and rushed to hospital. Her father and three cousins were killed.

Then on Sunday 15 April, four men on two motorbikes opened fire on Christians in Quetta’s Isa Nagri (City of Jesus; a Christian neighbourhood). Some of the victims were emerging from a worship service; others were just sitting in front of their homes. Two Christians were killed and three were critically wounded.

On each occasion, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK-P) claimed responsibility.

For more details see: Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin (RLPB) 451
Pakistan: Islamic State targets Christians in Quetta, 18 April 2018
by Elizabeth Kendal

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK-P)

Khorasan denotes a historical region covering all of Afghanistan along with parts of Iran, Central Asia, western China and Pakistan. ISK-P is Islamic State’s franchise in Khorasan Province / Wilayat-e-Khorasan.

After the death in 2013 of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban found itself wracked with internal conflicts and divisions. Meanwhile, internal conflicts and divisions were also emerging in the jihadist movement in Meopotamia (Syria-Iraq) between al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who had established an al-Qaeda franchise in Syria under the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Julani. The split in May 2013 left two jihadist factions fighting for dominance in northern Syria: Jabhat al-Nusra, which remained loyal to al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri and al-Julani, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Greater Syria / the Levant; ISIS/ISIL), whose members swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

In January 2014, ISIS expelled al-Nusra from the provincial capital of Raqqa (in northern Syria) and assumed full control of the city. In April 2014, al-Baghdadi escalated the ideological dispute by insisting that there would be no reconciliation with al-Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda. As far the vehemently anti-Shi’ite al-Baghdadi was concerned, al-Zawahiri’s willingness to cooperate with Shi’ite Iran was proof that al-Qaeda was on a divergent path. When al-Baghdadi threw down the gauntlet and demanded all Muslims recognise his authority, nine prominent al-Qaeda leaders from the region historically known as Greater Khorasan immediately declared their allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

In January 2015, a group of disgruntled Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban commanders produced a propaganda video in which they formerly pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Within days of the video’s release, the Islamic State announced its expansion into Khorasan Province and officially appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan as the Wali (Governor) of Khorasan and former Guantanamo Bay detainee and senior Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim as Khan’s deputy. The group would be based in Afghanistan.

For more information see:
Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan
By LWJ Staff, 5 March, 2015

After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East, by Elizabeth Kendal (Wipf and Stock, Eugene OR, June 2016). Chapter 8 ‘The Evolution of a War,’ from subheading ‘Raqqa and the Al-Nusra-ISIS split’ through ‘The Khorasan Pledge’ (pp 154 through 164).

In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, Islamic State has shown itself to be the enemy not only of Shi'ites, but of all minorities, Christians included.

In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, the pro-Islamic State and pro-al-Qaeda Sunni Islamic jihadist factions clash over ideology, tactics, strategy and territory.

In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, most locals denounce Islamic State's zealous brutality and total disregard for history and local culture. 

In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, Islamic State exploits a prophetic hadith (alleged saying of Muhammad).

The Khorasan Hadith 

In Mesopotamia (Syria-Iraq) Islamic State rallied around a prophetic hadith concerning Dabiq (a town in north-western Syria) in which Muhammad is alleged to have said:

First issue of Islamic State's
magazine, DABIQ, July 2014.

“The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-A’maq or in Dabiq.” https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/44

The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi (killed in June 2006) sighted this hadith when he predicted that the war in Iraqi was but the first stage of an apocalyptic battle that would culminate with Muslim victory in Dabiq: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq and its heat will continue to intensify…until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq.”

Islamic State embraced the prophetic hadith and al-Zaraqawi’s prediction effectively exploiting it to recruit Muslim men and women from all over the world and every walk of life.

A similar dynamic potentially exists in “Khorasan” on account of another prophetic hadith:

“Black standards [flags] will come from Khorasan, nothing shall turn them back until they are planted in Jerusalem.” (Source: Sunan At-Tirmidhi 2269)

The fact that this hadith is widely regarded as weak and probably inauthentic is irrelevant to the jihadists who have exploited it for decades.

early propaganda video
“The Emergence of Prophecy:
The Black Flags of Khorasan” 

As writer Asif Ullah Khan explains, “The first time this hadith was used in the sub-continent was in 1980 when the US and Saudi Arabia cobbled up the biggest global jihad coalition to wage a guerrilla war against the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan.

“Brigadier Asad Munir, who commanded Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, in the tribal areas until 2005, says the Khorasan hadith was one of the main reasons why Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have become a rendezvous of sorts for Jihadists from all over the world.”

So, How Much of Threat is ISK-P?

On Friday 19 January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the UN Security Council that jihadists fleeing Syria were turning northern Afghanistan into “a main base for international terrorism with the Afghan wing of the Islamic State in the lead”. Lavrov added that 2017 saw an “unprecedented growth in Afghan drug production”, the funds from which are known to fuel international terrorism. He recommended "prompt measures . . . to curb this threat".

On 20 February,  Lavrov expressed his frustration that the US and NATO simply refuse to confront the reality of ISK-P:

“We are alarmed as unfortunately, the US and NATO military in Afghanistan makes every effort to silence and deny [the IS group’s presence in Afghanistan],” Lavrov told reporters after talks with his Pakistani counterpart Khawaja Muhammad Asif.

“According to our data, the IS presence in northern and eastern Afghanistan is rather serious, there are already thousands of gunmen. This increases the risk of the terrorists’ penetration to Central Asia and it is not that difficult to get to Russia.”

Contrary to this, the position of the US – which is eager to depart from Afghanistan with a semblance of dignity – is that ISK-P is insignificant and does not present a serious threat. According to the US,  Russia is merely “peddling a narrative” and “exaggerating” for political gain. Consequently, Russian efforts to forge security cooperation across Central Asia are being mocked and derided in the West.

According to the US, Russia exaggerates and exploits fears of Islamic State simply so it might further project itself across Central Asia. Further to this, Navy Capt. Tom Gresback, public affairs director at Resolute Support headquarters, told Military Times, “[U.S. Forces-Afghanistan] has no evidence of any significant migration of IS-K foreign fighters. We see local fighters who switch allegiances to join ISIS for various reasons, but the Russian narrative grossly exaggerates the numbers of ISIS fighters that are in the country.”

Gen. John Nicholson, the head of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, agrees. “This [Russian] narrative then is used as a justification for the Russians to legitimize the actions of the Taliban and provide some degree of support to the Taliban.”

Apart from the fact that Taliban is only a threat to Russia (or the US) if it is providing sanctuary to trans-nationalist jihadi movements such as al-Qaeda, as it did before 9/11,  Russia has no interest in supporting Islamic militancy in its own backyard. Not only does Russia deny that it is supporting the Taliban, so too does the Taliban which insists it has “not received assistance from any country”.

For more on this dispute see:

Is Russia arming the Afghan Taliban?
By Dawood Azami, BBC World Service, 2 April 2018

Is ISIS gaining ‘serious’ ground in Afghanistan? Russia says yes. The US says no.
By Kyle Rempfer, for Military Times, 26 March 2018

Why Russia Exaggerates Islamic State's Presence in Afghanistan
By Samuel Ramani, for The Diplomat, 10 April 2018

Islamic State seizes new Afghan foothold after luring Taliban defectors
Matin Sahak and Girish Gupta, for Reuters, 2 December 2017.

So, How Much of Threat is ISK-P?

ISK-P suffered numerous losses through 2016 – some at the hands of the Taliban, some at the hands of US-backed Afghan forces. This culminated in April 2017 when the US military detonated a Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) munition over an ISK-P tunnel complex in Nangarhar, eastern Afghanistan.

Despite this, ISK-P has not only endured but grown in strength and capability. ISK-P has gone on to commit horrific killings and even spectacular terror attacks, including against high-profile targets in the centre of Kabul such as the 25 December bombing of the National Directorate for Security, and the bombing on 22 April of a voter registration centre in which at least 57 people were killed and around 120 wounded.

A report published in January in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor gives credence to the Russian assessment that ISK-P is growing, consolidating and expanding and that this is indeed, “rather serious”.

Recommended:
Islamic State Gains Ground in Afghanistan as Its Caliphate Crumbles Elsewhere
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 2
By Animesh Roul, 26 January 2018

Roul’s opening assessment is blunt: “Wilayat-e-Khorasan, the Islamic State (IS) affiliate in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, is one of the terrorist group’s strongest franchises. Bolstered by defections from the Taliban and boosted further in recent months by an influx of foreign fighters fleeing defeat in Iraq and Syria, IS Khorasan Province (ISK-P) is growing in strength and influence.”

In Roul’s assessment, ISK-P has “expanded its influence beyond its operational headquarters in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, which borders Pakistan’s tribal regions”. Roul explains that ISK-P has been able to carry out “mass-fatality attacks in cities from Jalalabad and Kabul in Afghanistan, to Quetta and Lahore in Pakistan.

“Alarmingly,” he adds, “in September last year, an IS flag bearing the message ‘The khilafat (caliphate) is coming’ was even seen hoisted on a pedestrian bridge near Iqbal town in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital.”

As Roul explains, “The rise and consolidation of ISK-P in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been aided by intra-Taliban rivalry triggered by the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Recruitment has been aided elsewhere by the Deobandi seminaries, which have for decades propagated sectarian ideals in the tribal regions. Further, ISK-P – like its parent organization in Syria and Iraq – has gone beyond these more traditional support structures, using social media to attract more educated and tech-savvy city dwellers.”

According to Roul, “in early 2017, Pakistani agencies uncovered IS recruitment networks in Punjab and Lahore”.

As Roul explains, ISK-P’s ranks are increasingly being swelled by foreign fighters – French, Algerian, Uzbeks, Indians, Russians [mostly ‘Chechens’], Pakistanis and Tajiks etc -- including females, most of whom are fleeing the fighting in Syria. [This confirms the Reuters report of 2 December 2017 (linked above).]

Roul concludes, it is “certain that a safe haven for ISK-P militants has developed in the tribal lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The present situation suggests fleeing militants could find a new lease on life and win further sympathizers to the crumbling caliphate, allowing ISK-P to grow in stature in the region.”

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I make the case in After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East, that the dar al-Islam (house of Islam) has long exploited divisions in the dar al-harb (house of war). Indeed, it is a fact that Islam has mastered the art of inserting itself as a wedge between East and West, exploiting East-West completion and playing East and West off against each other for its own strategic purposes and geo-political gain.

See: After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East, by Elizabeth Kendal (Wipf and Stock, Eugene OR, June 2016). Chapter 11, ‘A House Divided’.

Until  East and West can cooperate against their common enemy – revived fundamentalist Islam – then the future remains dark, like a vision of endless war.

If East and West can not cooperate against revived fundamentalist Islam then the chaos in Mesopotamia and Khorasan – which includes nuclear-armed Pakistan – will continue to deepen and spread.

In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, this bodes ill for religious minorities, in particular for the region’s exceedingly vulnerable Christians who look to the West for help only to be betrayed and abandoned.

In what may prove to be prophetic utterance,  a Syrian Church leader predicted in April 2014 that the time is coming when Christians “will no longer look to the West for support . . . but to the East, to Russia, to India, to China” (After Saturday Comes Sunday, p165).

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Elizabeth Kendal is an international religious liberty analyst and advocate. She serves as Director of Advocacy at Canberra-based Christian Faith and Freedom (CFF), and is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Arthur Jeffery Centre for the Study of Islam at Melbourne School of Theology.

She has authored two books: Turn Back the Battle: Isaiah Speaks to Christians Today (Deror Books, Melbourne, Australia, Dec 2012) which offers a Biblical response to persecution and existential threat; and After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East (Wipf and Stock, Eugene, OR, USA, June 2016).

See www.ElizabethKendal.com

Understanding Islamic Terrorism as a Tactic of Asymmetric Conflict

On Saturday 19 November, I addressed the annual national conference of the Australian Christian Nation Association (ACNA). The Sydney-based organisation works to raise awareness of Australia’s Christian heritage and to preserve the Christian values on which the nation was founded.

Themed ‘Islamic Terrorism and Australia’s Response,’ the conference speakers covered areas including media, prison chaplaincy and policy.

My presentation – Understanding Islamic Terrorism as a Tactic of Asymmetric Conflict – draws heavily on material in my new book – After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle East (Wipf and Stock, Eugene, OR, USA, June 2016) – in particular, chapters 3 “Hasten to Success” and 7 “Myth-busting the Syrian Crisis.”

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Understanding Islamic Terrorism as a Tactic of Asymmetric Conflict 
By Elizabeth Kendal
Sydney, Australia, 19 November 2016

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and a leading scholar in the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. During an interview on Egyptian television in February 2013, he made a most incredible admission.

Defending Islam’s law mandating death for apostasy, Qaradawi said, “If they [Muslims] had gotten rid of the punishment [usually death] for apostasy, Islam would not exist today.”

His admission confirms what a Coptic missionary working in the Middle East once told me: “If there was ever true religious freedom in the Muslim world, it would not be long before there was barely a Muslim left.”

Islam is so philosophically weak that it can only retain its adherents through terror -- by threatening ‘death for apostasy’ and ‘death for blasphemy’.

Likewise, it is precisely because Islam is militarily weak that it resorts to terrorism. After all, what is a suicide bomber but “a poor man’s smart bomb”?

Of course, it has not always been this way; Islamic armies have not always been weaker than the non-Islamic armies.

For a thousand years – from the 7th to the 17th Century – Islam was militarily strong.

Sultan Mehmed II rides
into Constantinople, 1453.

First it was the Arabs, who conquered the Arabian Pen, the Holy Land, Mesopotamia and Persia, north Africa and Spain. Then it was the Turks, who, after invading Anatolia in the 11th Century, moved into the Balkans, conquering the Slavic holy land of Kosovo in 1389 and Constantinople – the capital of Eastern Christianity – in 1453.

By the time the Turks had arrived at the Gates of Vienna in 1529, the armies of Islam had devoured three quarters of the Old Christian World.

Crusade historian Thomas Madden writes:

“When we think about the Middle Ages, it is easy to view Europe in light of what it became rather than what it was. The colossus of the medieval world was Islam, not Christendom. The Crusades are interesting largely because they were an attempt to counter that trend. But in five centuries of crusading, it was only the First Crusade that significantly rolled back the military progress of Islam. It was downhill from there. (. . .)

“By the 15th century, the Crusades were no longer errands of mercy for a distant people but desperate attempts of one of the last remnants of Christendom to survive. Europeans began to ponder the real possibility that Islam would finally achieve its aim of conquering the entire Christian world.

“(. . .) Of course, that is not what happened. But it very nearly did.”

The defeat of the Ottoman Turks at the Gates of Vienna in 1683 is generally regarded as the pivotal moment when, after a millennium of advance, a millennium of success, Islam was finally stopped in its tracks. Subsequently, Islamic military and imperialist power began to fade and crumble beneath the rising industrial, military, scientific, technological, economic and imperial power of energised, post-Reformation Europe.

Islam might have been in retreat and in decline, yet five times a day, day after day, year after year after year, the call to prayer continued to ring out. And while the call to prayer is both a statement of faith and a call to faith, it also holds out ONE promise. Can you pick it?

Allah is the Greatest, Allah is the Greatest. 
Allah is the Greatest, Allah is the Greatest. 
I bear witness that there is none worthy of worship but Allah. 
I bear witness that there is none worthy of worship but Allah.
Hasten to the Prayer, hasten to the Prayer.
Hasten to success, hasten to success.
Allah is the Greatest, Allah is the Greatest.
There is none worthy of worship but Allah.

The promise is, come to Islam and you'll come to success – a success that is understood in purely worldly and material terms: prosperity and power.

As Palestinian-American Islamic philosopher Isma’il al-Faruqi explains, “Falah [success] – or positive achievement in space and time of the divine will – is the Islamic counterpart of Christian ‘deliverance’ and ‘redemption’.”

Islam and Christianity are NOT the same! They are, in fact, polar opposites.

Christianity teaches that humanity’s problem is sin, which separates us from God and results in eternal death. The only solution to which is forgiveness, which God provides through Jesus Christ. Through faith, the believer is rescued, saved, delivered – redeemed. Christians then are called to go into all the world and share the Good News of what God has done.

Islam, on the other hand, teaches that humanity’s problem is ignorance, the solution to which is guidance, which Allah provides in the Quran and through the example of Muhammad. Islam rejects the concept of original sin, and maintains that humanity does not need saving.
Rather: those who submit to Allah guidance are promised success.

For a 1000 years, Muslims were able to reach out and take what Allah had promised – success, power and privilege – because they had the military capabilities to do so.

From the 17th Century however, Islam went into retreat and in decline as an energised, post-Reformation Europe literally rode over its head.

For Muslims, this reversal of fortunes has been truly shocking – and indeed, totally unacceptable. The Islamic response has been two-fold:

(1) Islamic resistance. The 18th C, but especially the 19th C and into the early 20th C – was an era of especially bloody Islamic resistance as Muslims preferred to kill rather than accommodate those they believed were beneath them.

(2) Islamic Reformation.  From the mid 18th C Islamic reformers such as al-Wahhab called Muslims to return to traditional, fundamentalist, pure Islam and strict Sharia observance. This, they maintained, was the only way to reverse Islam’s fortunes so that Islam might be successful once again.

Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 1966) 

Naturally, the call for Islamic Reformation grew loader and more urgent after the crushing blow of WWI, the dissolution of Ottoman Empire, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the breakup of the Arab world under Western mandates. In the wake of these and other ‘catastrophes’, Islamic reformers such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb called for Islamic Reformation, while stoking the fires of grievance and victimhood and railing against the West’s never ending “international crusaderism.”

And all the while, five times every day, from mosque minarets all around the world, muezzins continued to sound the call: “hasten to success, hasten to success”.

And all the while, across the Middle East, global post war trends such as rapid population growth and rapid urbanisation were converging with economic distress and poor governance to produce mass disaffection – a trend that was picked up by the fundamentalist, reforming clerics in the slums of Tehran, Riyadh, Cairo, Homs etc who posited: “Islam is the Solution.” Eventually, in 1979, mass disaffection converged with Islamic reformation to produce – Islamic Revolution.

A successful Islamic revolution in Iran saw power transferred from the US-allied Shah to fundamentalist Shi’ite clerics. Later the same year, an attempted Islamic revolution in Saudi Arabia, though it failed to overthrow the US-allied House of al-Saud, succeeded in that it empowered fundamentalist Wahhabi, Sunni clerics who now pull the strings in Saudi Arabia, albeit covertly from behind the benign facade of the US-allied House of al-Saud. Islamic reformation had shifted into overdrive – globally.

The result: Islam is back!   
(Reading from After Saturday Comes Sunday, page 59)

“Today, after centuries of decline and decades of weakness, Islam is back, and back with a vengeance.

“Islamic expansion is back and with it, invasion, conquest and colonization, including predatory migration. Subjugation is back and with it, the repression and persecution of non-Muslims and the inequity and injustice of dhimmitude (subjugation) which includes the demand for jizya (tribute or protection money as mandated in the Qur’an in Sura 9:29). Sharia (Islamic law) is back and with it, barbaric, cruel and inhumane punishments, including death for blasphemers (be they in Pakistan or Paris) along with lashings, amputations, beheadings, crucifixions and burnings—all live-tweeted for our entertainment and edification. By July 2014 the Caliphate was back, and with it, the mass slaughter of men, the enslavement of women and children, ethnic-religious cleansing and even genocide.

“Islam is back, which means the sword is back above the necks not only of Christians but of all who will not yield—all who dare stand in the way of Islam’s success. None of what we are witnessing today is “unprecedented”, none of it!

“It is sobering to realize however, that the main reason Islam is back in the twenty-first Century is because, having forgotten history, having forgotten the threat of Islam, the West has sided with Islam, aided Islam, funded Islam, armed Islam, appeased Islam, romanticized Islam and protected Islam, all the while failing to confront the philosophical weakness of Islam, a weakness Islam counters through gross human rights abuses such as the cruel subjugation and persecution of unbelievers, denial of freedoms, and penalties such as death for blasphemy and death for apostasy.”


BUT – while Islam is back, it is still as yet militarily weak; not weaker than you and me, but weaker than any national army and any state that isn’t in chaos. And because Islam is military weak, it MUST fight asymmetrically.

Consequently, it is imperative that we understand how asymmetric conflict is prosecuted, not the least because we are integral to it.

ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

An asymmetric conflict is one fought between unequal forces: one weak, one strong. It might be a case of persecuted, repressed or occupied peoples (weak) taking on their oppressive overlords (strong) in a struggle for liberty. On the other hand, it might be a case of separatists, usurpers or even terrorists (weak) taking on the state (strong) in a grab for power.

Examples of recent asymmetric conflicts include the Vietcong (weak) versus the USA (strong); the Afghan mujahideen (weak) versus the Soviet occupation (strong); Bosnian Islamic-secessionists (weak) versus the State of Yugoslavia (strong); Muslim ethnic-Albanian separatists in Serbia’s Kosovo province (weak) versus the State of Serbia (strong); Muslim militias (weak) versus the State of Ivory Coast (strong); Benghazi Islamic-secessionists (weak) versus the   Libyan regime in Tripoli (strong); the Afghan Taliban (weak) versus NATO (strong).

In all the examples listed above, the weak prevailed against the strong. In fact, it seems to be becoming increasingly difficult in this technological age, for a strong force to prevail against a weaker foe that has perfected the art of asymmetric warfare.

Traditionally, a weaker force would not pick a fight with a stronger force unless it believed it stood a fair chance of winning. That is because traditionally, the only alternative to winning was losing, which usually meant dying.

Today however, there is an alternative to winning or losing. Today, political mileage is up for grabs. Today, militarily weak groups like Hamas achieve their goals precisely by picking a fight they know they cannot win and then making political mileage out of being weak and getting clobbered!


Lacking military might, weak forces must rely on Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). 

Psychological Operations can be aimed at convincing the enemy not to fight – i.e. to go home (as the Vietcong did with the US in Vietnam) or convincing the enemy to surrender on its own turf (as Islam is doing in the West today).

Psychological Operations can also be aimed at securing military aid from an even stronger power – a superpower.

You might ask: Why would a strong democracy want to get involved in a conflict far away against a state that is no threat to them? Answer: they don’t – at least not unless there is something to gain from it. Any intervention must serve the superpower’s economic and/or geo-strategic interests; it has been this way since wars began.

However, in today’s world, no democratically elected leader will intervene in a foreign conflict if they fear it might cost them their political life. Consequently, before they can intervene, an elected government must first undertake a massive campaign to saturate the electorate with propaganda, so as to establish that the weak force (often Islamic jihadists) are worthy victims, and the stronger force (often a market competitor) is an evil regime.

What’s more, the development of internet technologies, mobile phones and social networking has made disseminating propaganda easier than ever.  

We are drowning in propaganda.

Two of the most commonly used tactics that weak forces use to generate propaganda and establish narrative are the use of human shields, and the false flag operation.

Human Shields

When a weak force provokes the enemy from behind a line of unarmed civilians, they can be said to be exploiting human shields. The strong force must then decide whether it will withhold fire (so as to protect civilians), or return fire in which case civilian casualties are all but guaranteed. If they return fire, the “massacre” will then be reported, along with sensational (often staged) images, by eager, gullible journalists who accept the narrative unquestioningly in their rush for the exclusive scoop. The media disseminates the propaganda, and then, just as expected, a compassionate society will have an emotional response.

This is precisely why Islamic jihadists establish bases in, and fire rockets from, markets, hospitals, schools and kindergartens, UN posts and safe havens, even from behind pro-democracy rallies.


False Flags

A “False Flag” operation is one in which the weaker force perpetrates an appalling attack that is then attributed to the enemy. Generally this means acquiring enemy uniforms and then brutally slaughtering disposable civilians while making sure there are plenty of observers, especially reporters who are desperate to be first with exclusive stories and sensational images. The Houla massacre and the sarin gas attack in Ghouta are two examples of False Flag operations in Syria.

German war correspondent Jugen Todenhofer calls it “massacre marketing” – saying (referring to rebel activity in Syria): “It is among the most disgusting things I have witnessed in an armed conflict”.


Terrorism

Terrorism is a Psychological Operation (PSYOP): a weapon of the weak used to extract concessions from the strong. Though people die in a terror attack, they are not the actually targets of the operation. A terror attack is deemed successful when the public is so terrorized it is able to pressure the government to appease the terrorists so they (presumably) won’t do it again. Of course they always do ‘do it again’ escalating the terror and increasing the demands with each subsequent attack.

Every time we give in to Islamic terrorism, or fall for the PSYOPS of Islamic jihadist and propagandists, we strengthen and advance Islam.  We cannot afford to be doing that, for while Islam might be militarily weak today, there is no guarantee that it will stay that way. 

In Mesopotamia, transnational jihadists – Arabs, Africans, Europeans, Chechens, Uighurs, Turkmen and other Asians – already get around in tanks (including US Abrams Tanks) and have sophisticated automatic weapons. They already have access to US-made TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) anti-tank missiles; and increasingly to Man-portable air-defense systems (also known as MANPADS or shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles) which can shoot planes out of the sky.

Eventually Islamic powers and their jihadist proxies (including ISIS and al-Qaeda) will be able to conduct crippling cyber-warfare, and will have access long-range missiles, nuclear material and possibly even electro-magnetic pulse weapons.

If the West continues to side with Islam, aide Islam, fund Islam, arm Islam, appease Islam, romanticize Islam and protect Islam, all the while failing to confront the philosophical weakness of Islam – then eventually Islam will no longer be militarily weak and the West will be devoured.

Consequently, it is urgent that we understand exactly what is going on – so we can reject the propaganda, resist the terror, confront the ideology and turn back this battle.

ISIS takes the war back to Iraq

By Elizabeth Kendal

source map date 10 June 2014

A state of emergency has been declared in Iraq, where the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) has seized control of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul (the capital of Nineveh Province in Northern Iraq) as well as several areas in hotly-contested oil-rich Kirkuk.

WHAT IS ISIS?

The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) [also known as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)] is the rebel force presently in control of Syria's Al-Raqqa Province and Iraq's Anbar Province.
See, Raqqa, Syria: Christians in the lion's den.
Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin (RLPB) 250, 5 March 2014

The group split from al-Qaeda primarily over the issue of cooperating with Iran (i.e. with Shi'ites). For al-Qaeda, despite being Sunni and neo-Salafi, has long cooperated with Iran in theatres as diverse as the Balkans and West Africa. For Iran's  "Axis of Resistance" stretches beyond the Shia Crescent to include Sunni groups such as Hamas, the Government of Sudan and elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. [Hence Morsi's rapprochement with Iran, which triggered Saudi Arabia's support for al-Sisi.] The jihadist ideologues of ISIS regard this cooperation / alliance with Shi'ites as error and a betrayal of the Salafi-jihadist cause. According to ISIS's Abu-Muhammad al-Adnani, "the leaders of al-Qaida have deviated from the correct path [of anti-Shi'ite zeal]. They have divided the ranks of the mujahedin in every place".

The debate actually commenced a decade ago, between Al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI's) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, over the jihad in Iraq. Zarqawi's penchant for killing Shi'ites was turning the Muslim masses away from al-Qaeda, which in turn created a problem for al-Zawahiri. While US and Iraqi forces killed many AQI jihadis, a remnant recovered to become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which subsequently expanded into Syria to become the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

As terrorism analyst Yossef Bodansky explains, the issue of contention is whether the Sunni jihadist movement -- being neo-Salafist, and thus inherently anti-Shi'ite -- should "uncompromisingly confront all apostates and Shi'ites, or cooperate with some of them in the expedient pursuit of such higher goals as the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate in the greater Middle East." (Defense & Foreign Affairs, Strategic Policy, issue 4, 2014 - available here, via ISN)

The matter was brought to a head in February, after ISIS jihadists assassinated a leading al-Qaeda figure.

ASSASSINATION

Sometime between late December 2011 and early January 2012, Abu Musab al-Suri -- long regarded as "the most important ideologist of the global jihadi movement" (Bodansky) -- was released from his Syrian prison cell. A leading figure in international jihad, Abu Musab al-Suri had been captured in Quetta by Pakistani Intelligence Services on the night of 31 October 2005. A few weeks later he was handed to the CIA and reportedly transferred to "phantom prison" on Diego Garcia where he was subjected to "intense interrogation". Divulging nothing, al-Suri was fast-tracked for "special rendition" and in March 2006 was "rendered" to Assad's Syria with the expectation that Syrian Intelligence officers would extract something from him.

Assad's release of Abu Musab al-Suri came at the request of Iran, specifically the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp. The plan was that al-Suri would help end the fratricidal in-fighting in Syria by co-opting more jihadis into al-Qaeda's Axis of Resistance-aligned al-Nusra Front which would adopt the al-Suri strategy of attracting and securing local support.
See: Jabhat al-Nusra’s New Syria Strategy
January 2013

[Confused? The fact is, as far as Iran is concerned, nothing and no-one (including Assad) is more important than the strategic objective of maintaining Syria as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance. And remember, Iran had al-Suri released from prison in around Jan 2012, when Assad was under immense pressure and the jihadists were ascendant. Al-Suri's job was to turn the jihadis on the ground away from Sunni Arab but US-Israel-allied Saudi Arabia, towards the Axis of Resistance, in line with Zawahiri.]

Then in late February 2014, ISIS jihadis assassinated Abu Khaled al-Suri, who was Abu Musab al-Suri's closest companion and al-Zawahiri's personal emissary to Syria.  From that moment, Zawahiri's al-Nusra Front and Baghdadi's ISIS parted ways, with al-Nusra continuing its fight in Aleppo, and ISIS seizing control of Raqqa (in Syria) and then Fallujah (in Iraq).

THE KHORASAN PLEDGE

In April 2014, ISIS escalated the ideological/theological dispute by introducing the Khorasan pledge; there would be no reconciliation. Nine prominent al-Qaeda emirs from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran declared their allegiance to the new emir of the faithful, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi -- the head of ISIS -- in what is being termed as the "Khorasan pledge".
See: The Khorasan Pledge
Yossef Bodansky, April 2014 (via ISN)
ALSO
Khorasan pledge splits al-Qaeda
By Radwan Mortada, for Al-Akhbar,  23 April 2014

The defecting emirs have published a lengthy theological thesis in which they outline their position and urge others to follow suit.

Bodansky explains: "The emirs allude to the al-Qaida affiliates which were guided by Abu Musab al-Suri into secret cooperation with the Quds Forces in order to sustain their jihad. They [the emirs] refused to accept the excuses of al-Qaida leaders that 'the groups did not have any courage to enforce judgements over those who disobey Sharia, under the pretext of avoiding a clash with the people or due to their inability and incapacity, although they enforced in secret more than did out in the open'.

"On the contrary, the nine emirs stressed, the tacit and expedient cooperation with Shi'ite Iran was not limited to the jihadists under duress in Syria but was rather a new trend in the Islamist movement. The most glaring example of the theological corruption of the Islamist-jihadist creed was 'former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, who was proven to be an apostate, even for those who had a semblance of comprehension. Or was it an indication of a new kind of jihad?' The emirs emphasize that Morsi's rapprochement with Iran and other apostate states, as well as his refusal to launch jihad against Israel . . . was a conscientious betrayal of the Islamist creed.

"It was, the emirs believed, because of this deviation from the right and righteous path that the Islamists lost power in Egypt."

ISIS is not some little "off-shoot" of al-Qaeda. ISIS is a branch of al-Qaeda that is committed to takfiri orthodoxy; and it has considerable and growing support. [Takfiris are Muslim 'purists' who deem 'lesser' Muslims -- particularly Shi'ites -- to be infidels and apostates.]

Bodansky writes: "The inner-Sunni vicious fighting over takfiri orthodoxy verses cooperation with Quds Forces effectively self-neutralises the Sunni jihadist forces in the greater Aleppo area . . . [Meanwhile] Shi'ite Baghdad is desperately trying to stem the tide. . . Further south, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are increasingly vulnerable to the Shi'ite ascent  . . . The Saudi Ikwhan [Saudi Muslim Brotherhood] is a takfiri creed. . ."

There is little doubt that the split over takfiri orthodoxy is likely to spread to all theatres of jihad.

The split will cause sectarian tensions to skyrocket. It will also cause persecution to escalate as the two jihadi branches seek to prove their Islamic credentials for the purpose of recruiting fighters. Considering ISIS is willing to kill anyone and everyone in defence of 'true Islam', al-Qaeda / al-Nusra may well have to escalate its killing of Christians and burning of churches to compensate for its al-Suri-inspired strategic unwillingness to kill Muslims.

ISIS SEIZES CONTROL OF MOSUL

On Friday 6 June some 3,000 ISIS jihadis in technical vehicles (pickup trucks mounted with machine guns) overran the west bank of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city and the capital of Nineveh Province in Northern Iraq.

Stratfor Intelligence reports (10 June): "Resistance seems to have ended quickly, with Iraqi army and police units abandoning their equipment and positions. The militants now control the provincial government headquarters, security bases and the airport, along with equipment that was left behind. They also were able to free as many as 1,500 prisoners [figure could be as high as 3,000] who could swell the group's ranks rapidly or at least add to the current chaos."

On 10 June, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of high alert in Iraq and asked parliament to approve a state of emergency.

See: In Iraq, a Militant Group Takes Mosul
Stratfor Global Intelligence, analysis 10 June 2014
ALSO
ISIS booty includes two airports, banks as it takes control of Iraq’s 2nd-largest city
By Mitchell Proothero, Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy
McClatchy Foreign Staff,  10 June 2014

According to the BBC, some 150,000 have fled Mosul.  World Watch Monitor (WWM) can confirm that up to a thousand Christian families have fled, for safer areas.

WWM reports: "Local media say militants took 70 female students hostage at the University of Mosul, and took 28 Turkish truck drivers hostage in the city. . . One Mosul citizen reported 'No water, electricity or food in the houses now' and "'t is dangerous to go out as there is random sniper shooting in the city'.

"Several sources in mainly Christian areas have confirmed that militants have entered their villages too. A local Christian reports that ISIS extremists are now in control of a well-known 'Christian' village in Qara Qosh, where the guards ran away. Another Christian declared that ISIS militants also entered the Mar Behnam Monastery.

"Some 200 families, many Christian, are now hosted at the Mar Mattai Monastery and about 50 families an hour are thought to be arriving in Al Qosh, 45km from Mosul, where there is another Monastery. Others have fled as far as Dohuk, 80km from Mosul.

"Several schools in mainly Christian villages also opened their doors. New arrivals are desperate for mattresses and blankets, having left carrying only a plastic bag with a few clothes. Some said they had to leave their cars behind at check points and walk for many hours to safer regions.

" 'When this goes on like this, Mosul soon will be emptied of Christians', said World Watch Monitor's source in Iraq, who will remain unnamed for security. 'This could be the last migration of Christians from Mosul'.

Full Report, see: Up to 1000 Christian families flee Iraq’s second city
World Watch Monitor, 10 June 2014

The Stratfor Intelligence report explains, indirectly, why the situation for Assyrian Christians in Nineveh is so precarious. While restive Sunni Anbar Province fell easily into the lap of anti-Shi'ite ISIS, "Iraqi security forces and Kurdish peshmerga have been fairly successful in protecting the core Shiite region and Kurdish territories." Nineveh Province, however, is a mixed Arab-Kurd "fault-line" region; it just happens to also be the ancient homeland of Iraq's indigenous Assyrian Christians. So who will defend it? Can Baghdad and Arbil (Kurdish capital) cooperate to fight ISIS? Or will Arab-Kurd rivalry get in the way? There is a lot at stake, for as Stratfor notes, "Mosul sits at the heart of the oil-centered territorial struggle between Baghdad and Arbil."

ISIS MOVES INTO KIRKUK

On Tuesday 10 June, ISIS seized several areas of hotly-contested, oil-rich Kirkuk, even managing to seize Iraq's biggest (310,000 barrels per day) oil refinery in Baiji. Kirkuk is contested by Arabs, Kurds and Turks.

See: ISIS seizes more towns in northern and central Iraq (with map)
By Bill Roggio and Patrick Megahan, 10 June 2014

By Wednesday 11 June, the ISIS has seized control of Tikrit, taking 80 Turkish citizens hostage. (link includes map and video)

The"stunning collapse" in security has led CNN to question Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to hold on to the country.

The war has returned to Iraq.

With the mother of all battles looming, al-Maliki is offering to arm any citizen who volunteers to fight ISIS.

If Christians had any security before, it has certainly all evaporated now.

May God have mercy . . .