ISIS takes the war back to Iraq

By Elizabeth Kendal

source map date 10 June 2014

A state of emergency has been declared in Iraq, where the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) has seized control of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul (the capital of Nineveh Province in Northern Iraq) as well as several areas in hotly-contested oil-rich Kirkuk.

WHAT IS ISIS?

The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) [also known as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)] is the rebel force presently in control of Syria's Al-Raqqa Province and Iraq's Anbar Province.
See, Raqqa, Syria: Christians in the lion's den.
Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin (RLPB) 250, 5 March 2014

The group split from al-Qaeda primarily over the issue of cooperating with Iran (i.e. with Shi'ites). For al-Qaeda, despite being Sunni and neo-Salafi, has long cooperated with Iran in theatres as diverse as the Balkans and West Africa. For Iran's  "Axis of Resistance" stretches beyond the Shia Crescent to include Sunni groups such as Hamas, the Government of Sudan and elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. [Hence Morsi's rapprochement with Iran, which triggered Saudi Arabia's support for al-Sisi.] The jihadist ideologues of ISIS regard this cooperation / alliance with Shi'ites as error and a betrayal of the Salafi-jihadist cause. According to ISIS's Abu-Muhammad al-Adnani, "the leaders of al-Qaida have deviated from the correct path [of anti-Shi'ite zeal]. They have divided the ranks of the mujahedin in every place".

The debate actually commenced a decade ago, between Al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI's) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, over the jihad in Iraq. Zarqawi's penchant for killing Shi'ites was turning the Muslim masses away from al-Qaeda, which in turn created a problem for al-Zawahiri. While US and Iraqi forces killed many AQI jihadis, a remnant recovered to become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which subsequently expanded into Syria to become the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS) under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

As terrorism analyst Yossef Bodansky explains, the issue of contention is whether the Sunni jihadist movement -- being neo-Salafist, and thus inherently anti-Shi'ite -- should "uncompromisingly confront all apostates and Shi'ites, or cooperate with some of them in the expedient pursuit of such higher goals as the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate in the greater Middle East." (Defense & Foreign Affairs, Strategic Policy, issue 4, 2014 - available here, via ISN)

The matter was brought to a head in February, after ISIS jihadists assassinated a leading al-Qaeda figure.

ASSASSINATION

Sometime between late December 2011 and early January 2012, Abu Musab al-Suri -- long regarded as "the most important ideologist of the global jihadi movement" (Bodansky) -- was released from his Syrian prison cell. A leading figure in international jihad, Abu Musab al-Suri had been captured in Quetta by Pakistani Intelligence Services on the night of 31 October 2005. A few weeks later he was handed to the CIA and reportedly transferred to "phantom prison" on Diego Garcia where he was subjected to "intense interrogation". Divulging nothing, al-Suri was fast-tracked for "special rendition" and in March 2006 was "rendered" to Assad's Syria with the expectation that Syrian Intelligence officers would extract something from him.

Assad's release of Abu Musab al-Suri came at the request of Iran, specifically the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp. The plan was that al-Suri would help end the fratricidal in-fighting in Syria by co-opting more jihadis into al-Qaeda's Axis of Resistance-aligned al-Nusra Front which would adopt the al-Suri strategy of attracting and securing local support.
See: Jabhat al-Nusra’s New Syria Strategy
January 2013

[Confused? The fact is, as far as Iran is concerned, nothing and no-one (including Assad) is more important than the strategic objective of maintaining Syria as an integral part of the Axis of Resistance. And remember, Iran had al-Suri released from prison in around Jan 2012, when Assad was under immense pressure and the jihadists were ascendant. Al-Suri's job was to turn the jihadis on the ground away from Sunni Arab but US-Israel-allied Saudi Arabia, towards the Axis of Resistance, in line with Zawahiri.]

Then in late February 2014, ISIS jihadis assassinated Abu Khaled al-Suri, who was Abu Musab al-Suri's closest companion and al-Zawahiri's personal emissary to Syria.  From that moment, Zawahiri's al-Nusra Front and Baghdadi's ISIS parted ways, with al-Nusra continuing its fight in Aleppo, and ISIS seizing control of Raqqa (in Syria) and then Fallujah (in Iraq).

THE KHORASAN PLEDGE

In April 2014, ISIS escalated the ideological/theological dispute by introducing the Khorasan pledge; there would be no reconciliation. Nine prominent al-Qaeda emirs from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran declared their allegiance to the new emir of the faithful, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi -- the head of ISIS -- in what is being termed as the "Khorasan pledge".
See: The Khorasan Pledge
Yossef Bodansky, April 2014 (via ISN)
ALSO
Khorasan pledge splits al-Qaeda
By Radwan Mortada, for Al-Akhbar,  23 April 2014

The defecting emirs have published a lengthy theological thesis in which they outline their position and urge others to follow suit.

Bodansky explains: "The emirs allude to the al-Qaida affiliates which were guided by Abu Musab al-Suri into secret cooperation with the Quds Forces in order to sustain their jihad. They [the emirs] refused to accept the excuses of al-Qaida leaders that 'the groups did not have any courage to enforce judgements over those who disobey Sharia, under the pretext of avoiding a clash with the people or due to their inability and incapacity, although they enforced in secret more than did out in the open'.

"On the contrary, the nine emirs stressed, the tacit and expedient cooperation with Shi'ite Iran was not limited to the jihadists under duress in Syria but was rather a new trend in the Islamist movement. The most glaring example of the theological corruption of the Islamist-jihadist creed was 'former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, who was proven to be an apostate, even for those who had a semblance of comprehension. Or was it an indication of a new kind of jihad?' The emirs emphasize that Morsi's rapprochement with Iran and other apostate states, as well as his refusal to launch jihad against Israel . . . was a conscientious betrayal of the Islamist creed.

"It was, the emirs believed, because of this deviation from the right and righteous path that the Islamists lost power in Egypt."

ISIS is not some little "off-shoot" of al-Qaeda. ISIS is a branch of al-Qaeda that is committed to takfiri orthodoxy; and it has considerable and growing support. [Takfiris are Muslim 'purists' who deem 'lesser' Muslims -- particularly Shi'ites -- to be infidels and apostates.]

Bodansky writes: "The inner-Sunni vicious fighting over takfiri orthodoxy verses cooperation with Quds Forces effectively self-neutralises the Sunni jihadist forces in the greater Aleppo area . . . [Meanwhile] Shi'ite Baghdad is desperately trying to stem the tide. . . Further south, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are increasingly vulnerable to the Shi'ite ascent  . . . The Saudi Ikwhan [Saudi Muslim Brotherhood] is a takfiri creed. . ."

There is little doubt that the split over takfiri orthodoxy is likely to spread to all theatres of jihad.

The split will cause sectarian tensions to skyrocket. It will also cause persecution to escalate as the two jihadi branches seek to prove their Islamic credentials for the purpose of recruiting fighters. Considering ISIS is willing to kill anyone and everyone in defence of 'true Islam', al-Qaeda / al-Nusra may well have to escalate its killing of Christians and burning of churches to compensate for its al-Suri-inspired strategic unwillingness to kill Muslims.

ISIS SEIZES CONTROL OF MOSUL

On Friday 6 June some 3,000 ISIS jihadis in technical vehicles (pickup trucks mounted with machine guns) overran the west bank of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city and the capital of Nineveh Province in Northern Iraq.

Stratfor Intelligence reports (10 June): "Resistance seems to have ended quickly, with Iraqi army and police units abandoning their equipment and positions. The militants now control the provincial government headquarters, security bases and the airport, along with equipment that was left behind. They also were able to free as many as 1,500 prisoners [figure could be as high as 3,000] who could swell the group's ranks rapidly or at least add to the current chaos."

On 10 June, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of high alert in Iraq and asked parliament to approve a state of emergency.

See: In Iraq, a Militant Group Takes Mosul
Stratfor Global Intelligence, analysis 10 June 2014
ALSO
ISIS booty includes two airports, banks as it takes control of Iraq’s 2nd-largest city
By Mitchell Proothero, Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy
McClatchy Foreign Staff,  10 June 2014

According to the BBC, some 150,000 have fled Mosul.  World Watch Monitor (WWM) can confirm that up to a thousand Christian families have fled, for safer areas.

WWM reports: "Local media say militants took 70 female students hostage at the University of Mosul, and took 28 Turkish truck drivers hostage in the city. . . One Mosul citizen reported 'No water, electricity or food in the houses now' and "'t is dangerous to go out as there is random sniper shooting in the city'.

"Several sources in mainly Christian areas have confirmed that militants have entered their villages too. A local Christian reports that ISIS extremists are now in control of a well-known 'Christian' village in Qara Qosh, where the guards ran away. Another Christian declared that ISIS militants also entered the Mar Behnam Monastery.

"Some 200 families, many Christian, are now hosted at the Mar Mattai Monastery and about 50 families an hour are thought to be arriving in Al Qosh, 45km from Mosul, where there is another Monastery. Others have fled as far as Dohuk, 80km from Mosul.

"Several schools in mainly Christian villages also opened their doors. New arrivals are desperate for mattresses and blankets, having left carrying only a plastic bag with a few clothes. Some said they had to leave their cars behind at check points and walk for many hours to safer regions.

" 'When this goes on like this, Mosul soon will be emptied of Christians', said World Watch Monitor's source in Iraq, who will remain unnamed for security. 'This could be the last migration of Christians from Mosul'.

Full Report, see: Up to 1000 Christian families flee Iraq’s second city
World Watch Monitor, 10 June 2014

The Stratfor Intelligence report explains, indirectly, why the situation for Assyrian Christians in Nineveh is so precarious. While restive Sunni Anbar Province fell easily into the lap of anti-Shi'ite ISIS, "Iraqi security forces and Kurdish peshmerga have been fairly successful in protecting the core Shiite region and Kurdish territories." Nineveh Province, however, is a mixed Arab-Kurd "fault-line" region; it just happens to also be the ancient homeland of Iraq's indigenous Assyrian Christians. So who will defend it? Can Baghdad and Arbil (Kurdish capital) cooperate to fight ISIS? Or will Arab-Kurd rivalry get in the way? There is a lot at stake, for as Stratfor notes, "Mosul sits at the heart of the oil-centered territorial struggle between Baghdad and Arbil."

ISIS MOVES INTO KIRKUK

On Tuesday 10 June, ISIS seized several areas of hotly-contested, oil-rich Kirkuk, even managing to seize Iraq's biggest (310,000 barrels per day) oil refinery in Baiji. Kirkuk is contested by Arabs, Kurds and Turks.

See: ISIS seizes more towns in northern and central Iraq (with map)
By Bill Roggio and Patrick Megahan, 10 June 2014

By Wednesday 11 June, the ISIS has seized control of Tikrit, taking 80 Turkish citizens hostage. (link includes map and video)

The"stunning collapse" in security has led CNN to question Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to hold on to the country.

The war has returned to Iraq.

With the mother of all battles looming, al-Maliki is offering to arm any citizen who volunteers to fight ISIS.

If Christians had any security before, it has certainly all evaporated now.

May God have mercy . . .

BURMA (Myanmar): Interests, Smokescreens, Chemical Weapons & Ethnic Cleansing

By Elizabeth Kendal

Burma/Myanmar is indeed the Sudan of Asia and the regime's recent reforms are nothing more than the calculated steps of a brutal Burman-Buddhist-supremacist regime determined to advance its own interests and ensure its own survival. Through these token reforms, the regime hopes to pacify the Burman-Buddhist masses and create a smokescreen around the centre, behind which it can pursue its brutal policies of racial and religious hatred; policies aimed at the subjugation and even extermination of the non-Burman, non-Buddhist ethnic minorities that live around Burma's periphery.

----------------------------------

Burma's reforms: not 'democracy', just interests and smokescreens

Burma has been subject to Western political and economic sanctions for decades on account of its repression of democracy. However, since the mid-1990s ascendant China has been taking Burma into its embrace, supplying it with loans and commodities, trading freely and building infrastructure -- but not out of benevolence. China is pursuing its own interests, in particular its interest in gaining access to Burmese ports on the Bay of Bengal, where there has long been a power vacuum. Motivated by this threat, the US is now pursuing engagement with Burma. Consequently Burma's geo-strategic value is rising in line with China's economic and military ascendancy, which means Burma (like Indonesia -- RLPB 119) can now play geo-politics to its own advantage. To this end, the regime is welcoming the US overtures as they offer a way to counter the anti-China sentiment rising inside Burma.

[While China's largess might have neutralised the impact of Western sanctions, many amongst the junta's powerful elite are not happy to see Burma becoming a client state of their former enemy. Many of Burma's military elite fought and lost comrades in the war that raged from 1968 to 1978 between the Burmese nationalists and the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The fact that China continues to support the United Wa State Army (the successor to the CPB) is a sore point for many military elites; furthermore, it raises the spectre of Chinese duplicity. Further to this, Chinese goods have flooded the markets and Chinese firms are buying up the land, causing social tensions to escalate.]

The West is highly excited over Burma's recent reforms: the release of some 200 political prisoners (despite over 1000 still behind bars); talks held with Aung San Suu Kyi ; improvements in press freedom and the introduction of debate into its parliament.
See: Burma: At freedom’s gate
By Amy Kazmin, Financial Times, 24 October 2011

The Burmese, however, are more sceptical. The reforms really do need to be seen in the light of Burmese domestic realities. Domestically, the regime wants to lessen its dependence on China. It also wants to chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014 (which will be decided this month ).

The only reform that has really captured the imagination of the Burmese is the regime's 30 September decision to suspend until 2015 the immensely controversial Myitsone Dam Project in Kachin State. A joint project between the previous Burmese junta and the China Power Investment Corporation, the Myitsone Dam project was not only opposed by the Kachin -- a Christian people whose lands would have been decimated -- but by many Burmese. For not only would 90 percent of the output and 70 percent of the profits go to China, but the impact on the Irrawaddy River -- Burma's life source -- would be catastrophic. So even this move must be seen in the context of the regime's survival strategy amidst Burma's internal reality of high anti-China sentiment.
See: A Case of Mistaken Priorities
By Aung Zaw, Friday, October 21, 2011
AND
China behind Myanmar's course shift
By Bertil Lintner, Asia Times Online, 19 Oct 2011

DAM SUSPENDED YET WAR CONTINUES

Whilst the regime has suspended the Myitsone Dam Project, its war on the Christian Kachin -- a war triggered in part by the dam project (see Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin RLPBs 114 (28 June 2011), 115 (5 July 11), 118 (27 July 11)) -- continues unabated.

One can only hope that Lindsay Murdoch is right in his assessment: "Burma's armed forces have committed serious abuses against ethnic rebels in renewed fighting, setting back efforts by the country's leaders to convince Western nations they are serious about ending 50 years of brutal military rule." (emphasis mine)
See: Burmese military abuses cast doubt on leaders' reforms
Lindsay Murdoch, Bangkok, October 20, 2011

The trouble is, with the US working to bring Burma out of China's embrace into its own so as to secure strategic gains in the Bay of Bengal, it is quite likely that the US might be keen reward the tokens while ignoring the genocide, exactly as is happening in Papua, Indonesia.

ETHNIC CLEANSING

In its 18 October report, Human Rights Watch estimates that 30,000 Kachin are now displaced. Despite this, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has inexplicably downplayed the ethnic cleansing in Kachin , just as he downplayed the ethnic cleansing of Abyei, Sudan. In contrast, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Tomas Ojea Quintana, told the UN General Assembly on 19 October that recent fighting had resulted in more than 15,000 displaced Kachin being confined to a remote mountainous area on the Chinese border in conditions that can only be described as 'perilous'. According to Quintana, the UN informed the Burmese authorities that it was willing to help these Internally Displaced Persons but Thein Sein's government declined the offer.
See Quintana: Burma’s government failing to solve ethnic issues
Thursday, 20 October 2011 21:24 Thomas Maung Shwe

Further to this, Burma expert Zin Linn reports that China is blocking the delivery of food, emergency shelter and medicines, leaving some analysts wondering if Kachin State is being ethnically cleansed at China's behest.
See: Why does Burma want war in Kachin State?
By Zin Linn , for Asian Correspondent.com, Sep 26, 2011
and
Is Burma attempting to colonize Kachin state
By Zin Linn Jul 21, 2011

QUESTION: Is the suspension of the dam project just a smokescreen behind which Burma will have three years to ethnically cleanse Kachin State?

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

On 1 November 2011, Burma expert Zin Linn wrote to his blog The Democratic Question of Burma : "The Burma Army’s full-scale offensives are becoming greater than ever in Kachin State. The fighting seems vengeful as Burmese soldiers commit various crimes – such as looting, killing, raping and burning down the civilians’ villages – on the front line. [. . .] Kachin natives are singled out by the Burmese soldiers and they are not regarded as citizens of their own nation. It looks like the Burma Army has been launching a racial war. In frontline areas, Burmese soldiers are committing crimes freely as there are no effective or appropriate penalties set by senior authorities.

"The worst and concrete evidence is that the wicked Burmese Army has used a mysterious chemical weapon in the recent offensive against Kachin rebels in Northern Burma . . .

"For more than a week, Burmese soldiers used the unidentified chemical weapon in three war zones — Christian Prayer Hill and Lung Zep Kawng in Ga Ra Yang village, and Shwe Nyaung Pyin village — against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) on Myitkyina-Manmaw (Bhamo) Road in Waingmaw Township. Those events were narrated by KIA soldiers, who said they were under attack by poisonous gas.

"On October 29, Burma Army troops fired two mortar rounds of chemical weapons on the People’s Army fighters under the KIA in Prayer Hill, said civilian fighters. 'Two rounds of chemical weapons were fired at us in Prayer Hill. There were seven of us present. Dark smoke billowed from the areas where the mortar shells landed,' La Gun, a civilian fighter and a victim of the chemical weapon told Kachin News Group on Sunday. When the victims breathed the dark smoke, they felt extremely dizzy, found it hard to breathe, thirsty and vomiting for hours, according to one victim.

"The same chemical weapon was used during the week-long fighting in Lung Zep Kawng last week, La Gun said. The same day, the chemical weapon was used by the Burmese Army in Ntap Bum battle zone, near the KIA headquarters Laiza. Four KIA soldiers suffered dizziness, fell on the ground and began vomiting for a long time, said eyewitnesses.

"President Thein Sein’s government has to take responsibility for the use of such chemical weapons. . ." (emphasis mine)

See: Kachin fighters claim Burma Army using chemical weapons
By Zin Linn Nov 01, 2011

CHURCH DEEPLY IMPACTED

With the Kachin people being over 90 percent devout Christian, the Church is being hit hard. Churches in Kachin State have been attacked, seized, used as prisons and burned. The Christian Kachin are being raped, brutalised, enslaved, starved and slaughtered.
See Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin (RLPB) label: Burma
ALSO: Burma Army Targets Christian Civilians in War on Insurgents
Troops attack churches in Kachin state conflict.
Compass Direct News, 28 Oct 2011

Furthermore, Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported on 31 October, that in Maw Wan Ward, Phakant Township, the town administration is now requiring Christians to seek official permission to read the Bible, pray and fast, amongst other Christian 'cultural' activities. Requests must be accompanied by recommendations from other departments and must be submitted to the Township Administration Office 15 days in advance.

With war and repression escalating behind a smokescreen of token reforms from a Burman-Buddhist-supremacist regime operating from a position of increasing geo-strategic significance, the Christian Kachin need our prayers for God's intervention now more than ever.

For suggested prayer points:
RLPB 132. Burma: Interests, Smokescreens & Ethnic Cleansing

SUDAN: war spreads across 'new south' into Blue Nile

by Elizabeth Kendal

The Arab-supremacist, Islamist regime of President Omar el-Bashir has long systematically marginalised (politically and economically) all Sudan's non-Arabs and violently persecuted all those who dare resist Islamisation. Black African Muslims who oppose the racist regime are labeled apostate and targeted for elimination along with the infidels. Consequently, Khartoum has long been at war not only with the predominantly-Christian South, but with the entire non-Arab periphery. In fact anyone -- including Arabs -- who advocates religious liberty and ethnic diversity over Sharia and Arabisation is treated as an enemy. The most significant opposition has long been the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

Consequently, the secession of South Sudan was never going to bring peace to the Republic of Sudan, for while the South seceded, the problem -- the regime in Khartoum -- remained. As was inevitable, the secession of the South has only made Khartoum more determined to entrench its power and exert total control over coveted lands and resources.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) mandated that three regions -- Abyei (straddling the North-South border) along with South Kordofan and Blue Nile states (both in the north) -- be entitled to "popular consultations" through which the predominantly black African, largely-Christian, SPLM-allied tribes could determine their own futures. However, in total defiance of the CPA, the Government of Sudan (GoS) seized and ethnically cleansed Abyei in May 2011, before launching, on 5 June, an ethnic cleansing campaign in South Kordofan. As is their regular strategy, Khartoum is engineering famine in South Kordofan by means of aerial bombardments and denial of humanitarian aid, in order to use starvation as a weapon of mass destruction.
SEE
Sudan: Nuba genocide resumes, 24June 2011.
AND
Nuba Genocide: US House Committee hears testimony, 9 Aug 2011.

In June, as war raged in South Kordofan, President el-Bashir postponed Blue Nile's "popular consultations", prompting Blue Nile's elected governor, SPLM-North chairman Malik Aggar, to warn that war may indeed be imminent. For just as in neighbouring South Kordofan, the people of Blue Nile have no desire for Arab domination or Islamisation. In Blue Nile, just as in South Kordofan, the SPLA-North -- which has long defended the peoples of Blue Nile and South Kordofan from Khartoum's aggression -- is refusing to disarm, and Khartoum is labeling this refusal an act of rebellion justifying military intervention in the name of defending national unity.

[NOTE: This is exactly the same as the situation in Burma, where the Burman-supremacist Buddhist junta is demanding the disarmament of the long-persecuted ethnic-religious minorities, and citing their refusal as justification for war. (NOTE: in both cases -- Burma and Sudan -- the demand was preceded by fraudulent elections, rigged to deliver a majority in parliament and to give the impression of a popular mandate.)
see: http://rlprayerbulletin.blogspot.com/search/label/Burma ]

On 28 and 29 August, the GoS moved "significant military forces – comprised of Popular Defence Forces (PDF) [Arab militias] national security, and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – with heavy equipment into Blue Nile state." (source: Reeves / African Centre of Justice and Peace Studies)

On 1 September 2011, GoS forces attacked the home of Governor Malik Aggar in Al-Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State before launching a full-scale assault on SPLA positions. Heavy military equipment has been deployed inside civilian areas.

On 2 September, President Bashir declared a state of emergency in Blue Nile and, in what is being described as a "political and military coup", dismissed Governor Aggar, installing Major General Yahya Mohamed Khair as military ruler in his place.

Reports abound of massive GoS troop deployments, aerial bombardments and wide-scale displacement across the Blue Nile state. An estimated 50,000 people have been displaced, with some 16,000 having crossed the border into Ethiopia. Furthermore, as in South Kordofan, the GoS is refusing to allow humanitarian aid groups access to the region. As food supplies run out, starvation will set in and we will witness yet another GoS-engineered humanitarian crisis.

Not only is the GoS moving to secure valuable resources (oil in Sth Kordofan and water and hydroelectric power in Blue Nile), the GoS is doubtless acting preemptively to hamstring the SPLM-North.

Now that South Sudan has seceded, Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile have become the "new south". Today conflict is raging right across this "new south" as well as in Darfur in the west. Should Sudan's other marginalised and persecuted peoples decided to fight -- such as the Nubia in the far North and the Beja in the east -- Sudan may well disintegrate.

Khartoum takes aim at the GoSS

Further to this, Khartoum has accused the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) of supporting rebel movements in the north. SPLM-N secretary general Yasir Arman, however, categorically denies that the GoSS is supporting the SPLA-North. (NOTE: As long-time civil war allies, soldiers of the SPLA-North carry weapons that have come from the South.)

GoS moves against the SPLM-North

The GoS has banned the SPLM-North, seized its offices and is arresting its members, not only in Khartoum but in all states across the North.

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) reports that perceived SPLM-North supporters are being arrested throughout Sudan. The ACJPS report provides a list of dozens known to have been arrested.

SPLM-N secretary general Yasir Arman has slammed the GoS for carrying out "arbitrary arrests" of SPLM-N members across the country and for the "closure of its offices and confiscation of vehicles and properties". He also scoffed at the GoS, saying its plan to crush the SPLM-N was little more than "wishful thinking" and an "impossible mission".

As Arman notes, the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile started long before the separation of South Sudan. "The current conflict," says Arman, "is a creation of [President Bashir's] NCP [National Congress Party] in that they sowed the seed of the problem when they voluntarily destroyed the CPA; attempted to disarm the SPLA/N and rejected the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement. The SPLM/N and other resistance movements and democratic forces are determined to put an end the illusive NCP program of the second Islamic Republic (see RLPB 117 ), a Taliban Republic that is based on heavy human cost and loss, denial of diversity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and terrorism."

The insufferable plight and bleak future of Iraq's indigenous Assyrian-Chaldean Christians

Iraq's last official census (1987) counted 1.4 million indigenous Assyrian and Chaldean Christians. As Islamic zeal and Arab nationalism rose in the wake of Gulf War 1 (1991), Christians with means emigrated. By the time of the March 2003 US invasion, the Christian population of Iraq was estimated to be between 1.2 million and 800,000. Today, after 7 years of war, sectarian conflict, ethnic-religious cleansing and terrorism, a remnant of around 400,000 Christians remain.

The Shi'ite south has been virtually "cleansed" of Christians and few remain in the Sunni-dominated centre. Those displaced have mostly fled to the historic Assyrian homeland of the Nineveh Plains in Northern Iraq. According to a new report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), figures verified by UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) report the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mosul, Nineveh, as 866 families (or 5,196 people) as of 4 March 2010.

However, the north of Iraq is not secure either. The Nineveh Plains is a fault-line region hotly-contested by Arabs (who invaded and occupied Mesopotamia in 630 AD) and Kurds (who invaded and occupied the Nineveh Plains in 1261 AD after King Salih Isma'il ordered them out of Turkey). Furthermore, terrorism targeting Mosul's churches and Christians has escalated ever since the US surge forced al-Qaeda elements out of the central provinces of Anbar, Baghdad and Diyala to relocate north.

In a programme entitled Heart And Soul -- Iraq's forgotten conflict, 25 April 2010, the BBC describes the systematic persecution of Iraq's religious minorities as "a campaign of liquidation".

The BBC reports that while US and British politicians refer to "the emergence of a pluralistic democracy", Chaldean Catholic Archbishop Louis Sako, of Kirkuk in Northern Iraq, begs to differ, contending that "200,000 Christians fleeing Mosul alone, in fear of their lives, and 1,000 murdered, is not much of a basis for pluralism or democracy".

And as the BBC notes: "It's not just Christians who suffer. Both Mandaeans, who speak Aramaic – the language of Christ – and the Yazidis, goldsmiths with a history going back further than Christianity or Islam, are fast disappearing, too. 'Does nobody care about what is going on here?' asks Archbishop Sako."

While Christians continue to flee Iraq, those who remain report being harassed and intimidated with threatening phone calls and letters. Many Christian women have taking wearing hijab to hide their Christian identity. Despite the pleas of church leaders, Iraqi Christian refugees are reluctant to return. Speaking in Damascus, Syria, Christian refugee Toma Georgees told Catholic News Service (CNS: 23 April 2010): "It's...impossible to turn back to Iraq. Our problem is not with the Iraqi government. Our problem is with Iraqi people…who want to kill us, who want to kill all the Christians."

See also:
On Vulnerable Ground
Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories
A report by Human Rights Watch, 10 November 2009

ALSO
http://christiansofiraq.com
and
http://www.iraqichristianrelief.org/
and
Incipient Genocide
The Ethnic Cleansing of the Assyrians of Iraq.
Assyrian International News Agency, June 2007, revised July 2009.

70 Christian college students wounded in targeted terror attack

Christians are so endangered in Northern Iraq that Christian students must travel to university in convoys with Iraqi military escorts. On Sunday morning 2 May, two bombs ripped through a convoy of buses transporting Christian college students from the mainly Christian town of Hamdaniya, 40km east of Mosul in the Nineveh Plains region of Northern Iraq, to the University of Mosul. According to reports, once the first buses had passed through the Kokjali checkpoint (which is manned by U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers) a car bomb parked on the shoulder of the highway exploded in their path, followed moments later by a roadside bomb. A local shopkeeper was killed and more than 100 people, including some 70 of the targeted Christian college students, were wounded; 17 critically.

See:
Iraq: Christian students bombed
News24, 2 May 2010

Christians targeted in Mosul blasts
Aljazeera, 2 May 2010

Bombs Hit School Buses in North Iraq
By Sam Dagher, New York Times, 2 May 2010

Attack Highlights Unrelenting Plight of Iraq's Christians
By Patrick Goodenough, International Editor, Cybercast News Service (CNS), 3 May 2010

NEW: Pictures Show the Horror of the Mosul Bus Bombings of Assyrian Students
Assyrian International News Agency, 16 May 2010

Jamil Salahuddin Jamil (25), a geography major who was on the first bus, told reporters that one of his classmates lost her leg in the attack and two others were blinded. "We were going for our education and they presented us with bombs," he said. "I still do not know what they want from Christians."

Of course Jamil knows exactly what the Islamic militant fundamentalists want from Christians, he just can't bear to contemplate it, let alone verbalised it. For the Islamic terrorists, and the Muslim fundamentalists who support them, want Christians driven out of Iraq, and for those remaining to be 'utterly subdued' (Qur'an, Sura 9:29. Translation: Dawood).

On account of ignorance, many in West grossly underestimate just how hostile fundamentalist Islam is to Christianity. Consider the teachings of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most senior Shia cleric. He is revered in Iraq and touted in the West as a moderate. Yet he maintains that along with corpses, dogs, pigs, alcohol, urine, animal sweat, semen and blood, people who are "kafir" (unbelievers), i.e. Christians, Jews, Mandaeans, other non-Muslim including Sunnis, are "najis" (unclean). See Sistani on "Islamic laws" and "Najis things » Kafir".

According to Sistani, a kafir can become "pak" (clean) only by professing Islam. However, under the heading "Mutahhirat » Subjection Taba'iyat", he asserts that the child of a kafir, "becomes Pak by subjection" if he/she is captured by Muslims.

Sunni fundamentalists believe the same except that they regard Shi'ites, not Sunnis, as kafir and therefore najis. Sunnis and Shi'ites are mortal enemies and Iraq is a fault-line state between not only ethnic rivals Arabs, Kurds and Persians, but between sectarian rivals Sunnis and Shi'ites. See: RL Trend (Feb 2007) Shiite Ascendancy.

Multiple wars loom

When it erupts (and it eventually will), the battle for the Arab-Kurd fault-line provinces of Nineveh and oil-rich Kirkuk will engulf northern Iraq and draw in regional players. Once again, the Assyrian-Chaldean Christians, the region's indigenous/first peoples, will be collateral damage.

Meanwhile, the dark smoke of sectarianism is rising again out of the volcano that is Baghdad.

As Mustafa El-Labbad, director of the Cairo-based Al Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies, notes in Egypt's Al-Ahram, Iraqi politics is entirely sectarian. "Today, Iraq's political parties and personalities are not from the left, the right or the centre. Rather, they are above all Sunni or Shia. From here, one has to proceed to the regional dimension, which must also be regarded in sectarian terms. On one side, there is Iran, which backs the Iraqi Shia groups, and on the other there is Saudi Arabia, which champions the Sunni forces. Somewhere in between are Syria and Turkey."

The March 2010 elections, through which Iraqis voted for representatives to fill Iraq's 325-seat parliament, have yielded the following results:

• former Prime Minister Ayad Alawi's secular Al-Iraqiya -- 91 seats
• the Rule of Law list headed by PM Nouri al-Maliki (Shia) -- 89 seats
• the Iraqi National Alliance (n Iran-backed Shi'ite coalition) -- 70 seats
• the Kurdish Alliance -- 43 seats
• the Iraqi Consensus Forum (comprising Sunnis and religious minorities) -- 32 seats

In line with Tehran's wishes, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition and the conservative Shiite Iraqi National Alliance have entered a coalition that leaves them only four parliamentary seats shy of a ruling majority.

The Iraqi National Alliance (INA) is a union of two parties with close ties to Iran: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Ammar al-Hakim, and the Al-Sadr Movement. While the Iraqi National Alliance is headed by al-Hakim, it is Muqtada al-Sadr who will be calling the shots. For of the 70 seats won by the Iraqi National Alliance, 40 were won by the Al-Sadr Movement.

The primary point of contention between al-Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance -- the issue that had been the primary obstacle to an alliance -- had been the choice of Prime Minister. As Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reports: "The State of Law maintains that Nouri Al-Maliki is the only candidate for the position of prime minister. This view is not necessarily shared by Al-Hakim, whose party demands that the next prime minister be selected either by a vote of the members of the coalition to be formed or by consensus."

How this issue was resolved is not yet known.

Further to this, Al Jazeera reports: "While the resulting combination of 159 seats is just short of the required majority, the Kurdish Alliance of the autonomous Kurdish region's two long-dominant blocs holds 43 seats and has previously said it would join the new grouping if the two main blocs allied."

See:
Maliki allies with rival Shia party
Al Jazeera 5 May 2010

Iraq's Shiites unite to try to form new government
By Qassim Abdul-Zahra (AP) 5 May 2010

also: Alliance-Making Toward Forming a New Iraqi Government – A Commentary (MEMRI)
and Muqtada Al-Sadr – The Voice of Iraqi Nationalism By MEMRI Staff

Al Jazeera reports: "The Iraqiya list of ex-premier Iyad Allawi took the most seats in the election with 91 but looks set to be squeezed out. . .

"Dhafir al-Ani, head of Iraqi Future Gathering, one of al-Iraqiya bloc components told Al Jazeera: 'It is a blow to the will of the majority of Iraqi people, who voted for Iraqiya. [Note: 91 of 325 seats is not a majority.] The new Shia merge that is backed by Iran, would pull Iraq back to sectarianism.'

"Allawi had warned that an alliance of the two major Shia blocs that attempted to exclude his coalition from government could result in a return to violence in Iraq, which was torn by sectarian bloodshed that killed tens of thousands in 2006-07."

The Washington Post notes: "Such an alliance threatens to undermine U.S. interests in two ways. It could exacerbate a sense of marginalization among Sunnis, prompting them to once again resort to violence. And it could give anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement, the biggest vote-getter within the Iraqi National Alliance, a dominant role in the government."

As Al-Ahram similarly notes, "Sectarian bloodshed" would play right into the hands of Iran and the Iran-backed Shi'ite parties. "In asserting its power in Iraq, it is likely that Tehran applied the following kind of cause-and-effect reasoning: eliminating and marginalising the Sunnis would provoke them into committing acts of violence; this violence would cause the collapse of the political process; this in turn would exacerbate the Iraqi quagmire for the US and, consequently, US forces, heavily embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan, would not be able to launch a military offensive against Iran. Logic of this sort, perhaps with some minor adjustments, has since proved an almost fool-proof formula in chalking up the many gains that Tehran has scored in Iraq."
See:
Seven fat years for Iran
Seven years after the US-led invasion of Iraq, everything points to the growing influence of Iran in Iraqi politics, writes Mustafa El-Labbad
Al-Ahram, 15 -21 April 2010, Issue No. 994

Enter Muqtada al-Sadr

According to Sami Moubayed, a Syrian political analyst writing for Asia Times Online, "Muqtada has been working hard for two years to transform the Mahdi Army into another Hezbollah, personally inspired by Hassan Nasrallah." This is, according to Moubayed, why Muqtada has been studying in the seminary in Qom, Iran. "He went back to the seminary, so he could elevate his academic credentials and rise from the rank of sayyed to that of an ayatollah (which enables him to issue fatwas) and grants him greater authority within the Shi'ite community at large. And that explains why, against all odds, he has insisted on refraining from any sectarian rhetoric, copying the Nasrallah model in Lebanon, who always speaks of Lebanon, not of Shi'ites.

"Muqtada also copied Hezbollah's massive charity network, monopolizing education, hospitals and fund-raising within the Shi'ite districts of Iraq to make sure that no family goes to bed hungry and all receive a monthly stipend from the Mahdi Army. Much like a modern Robin Hood, Muqtada is suiting himself to become spokesmen, defender and leader for the poor of Iraq.

"Now is the time to unveil the new Mahdi Army. It will look, sound and act like Hezbollah. No more street violence or sectarian tension triggered by the Sadrists. On the contrary, the Mahdi Army - this time with strong Iranian support - will replace the failed state of Maliki. It will extend an arm to the Sunnis and Kurds willing to work with it, making sure that no prime minister is brought to power, without full consent of Muqtada."

It is hard to see how the Saudis could tolerate a scenario that would essentially extend Iranian power right to the border of Saudi Arabia's oil-rich, Shi'ite-majority Eastern Province.

When ethnic and sectarian conflict resumes (as it eventually will) and Christians lose the state protection they are presently afforded, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadists will doubtless exploit the insecurity to advance the Islamist agenda and eliminate the Christian presence.

And Western Christians should not be tempted into thinking that such a horrific scenario could never eventuate. We must remember that Iraq's ancient Jewish community, which had roots dating back to the Babylonian captivity (587 BC) and had come to comprise the elite of Baghdad -- was eliminated through pogroms, killings and expulsion in the early 1950s. During that time, the newly-founded state of Israel rescued and then absorbed more 130,000 Iraqi Jews through Operation Ezra & Nehemiah. Now the indigenous Assyrian-Chaldean Christians are in the crosshairs, who will rescue them?

Sudan's elections: already totally compromised.

From Sunday 11 through to Tuesday 13 April, the volitile, ethnic-religious fault-line state of Sudan will hold general elections as mandated by the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

For a brief background, see: Sudan on the Brink
Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin | RLPB 050 | Wed 07 April 2010

The 11-13 April elections will not, however, herald the emergence of democracy. Rather, Sudan's already thoroughly compromised elections will merely demonstrate the regime's uncompromising determination and ability to maintain its grip on power and to continue its repressive Arab-Islamic domination of Sudan's vast and varied peoples. For instead of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the ruling National Congress Party (NCP, formerly the National Islamic Front (NIF)) has spent the past five years frustrating and stalling the peace process -- including by means of destabilisation through conflict -- and corrupting the electoral process at every level.

CENSUS CORRUPTED

The preparatory census, taken over a mere two weeks in 2008, is totally compromised. While the census results have been widely rejected as fraudulent, the National Elections Commission (NEC), which is dominated by former NCP/NIF officials, not only accepted the results but used the rigged census results to calculate power-sharing: i.e. to draw up electoral districts, apportion seats in the national and state legislative assemblies, and organise voter registration. It will use the same rigged results to calculate wealth-sharing between the North and South.

Recommended reading:

• Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement
  Chatham House Report by Edward Thomas, January 2009
  
  
• Sudan Elections and Southern Self-Determination: At Growing Risk.
  By Eric Reeves, 28 June 2009
  
  
• Khartoum's strategic assault on Southern self-determination referendum.
  By Eric Reeves, 26 August 2009
  

The reality is that as many as 4-5 million southerners have been displaced by war, and those displaced into the North have been counted as Northerners for the purpose of inflating the Northern population so that the North can secure more electoral districts and more assembly seats. Of course this has also deflated the Southern population to the degree that Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM's) representation in the National Assembly has decreased from 28 percent to around 21 percent.

Likewise, some three million Darfuris have also been disenfranchised due to displacement and insecurity, thus reducing their representation. In fact, in Darfur, whole parts of states -- specifically southern regions under rebel control -- have been left out of any constituency. For example, in its comprehensive report of 30 March 2010 entitled "Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan" , International Crisis Group reports that: "The rebel-held Jebel Marra massif in Southern Darfur, with an estimated population of 1 million but only 35,000 according to the 2008 census, has no seats."

Despite the displacement, the population of Darfur has exploded with a reported 322 percent increase in nomadic Arabs! Investigators report that Darfuri towns ethnically cleansed by government-sponsored Arab janjaweed militias have been resettled with nomadic Arabs from neighbouring Chad and Niger and Mali who have been issued with Sudanese ID papers and registered to vote -- for the NCP.

Reeves stresses in his August 2009 report that it is "important that these results stand clearly revealed as fraudulent: otherwise the NIF/NCP will use these putatively 'national' elections to legitimize their continuing rule, and to de-legitimize both the SPLM and the Darfur rebels, as well as northern political opposition groups. . ." Reeves continues: ''it is hugely important that the NIF/NCP fraudulence be exposed because the rigging could result in the NIF/NCP gaining sufficient legislative power to re-write the CPA, or the terms of the SSDR."

Indeed, as noted by defense analyst Dr J. Peter Pham Ph.D., in a column entitled "Sudan's Elections and the Country's End Game" (6 April 2010) , the rigging of the census has already had a catastrophic impact. "As a result of this maneuver [rigging of the census], the ten states of South Sudan together have been allocated only one-fourth of the number of National Assembly seats awarded to the fifteen northern states. The shift is significant because South Sudan would no longer be able to block major legislation, much less changes to the country's constitution -- the former requires a two-thirds majority of parliament, while the latter three-quarters of the vote". (This is exactly what Reeves, in his June 2009 report, described as "a worst case scenario".)
See also: Elections, Making Sense of Sudan:
Sudan’s Census and the National Assembly Elections
posted by Marc Gustafson, 19 Dec 2009

BALLOTS

The International Crisis Group's comprehensive report comments on the recent discovery "that the NEC had diverted the tender for printing presidential ballots from a Slovenian printing house (for $800,000) to the government-controlled Sudanese Currency Printing Company (for $4 million). The NEC justified its decision to favour a Sudan-based firm on the fact that if a run-off vote is required there would only be 21 days to complete the printing and that the Sudanese Currency Printing House was accustomed to operating in secrecy, so the risk of fraud would be reduced."

Further to this, as Reuters reports, the ballots, which are already amongst the most complicated in the world, have been printed only in Arabic, when South Sudan is mostly English-speaking.

And as Pham notes, there can be no political legitimacy without electoral credibility.

NCP DIVIDES OPPOSITION (AGAIN). TOO EASY!

Several opposition parties had united in an SPLM-led coalition under the name, National Consensus (or the Juba Alliance), with the SPLM's candidate for the Presidential poll, Yasser Arman, viewed as the only serious contender to al-Bashir. Arman is a northern Arab Muslim, former Communist, and long-time supporter and high ranking member of the SPLM.

It now appears, however, that the NCP/NIF regime in Khartoum has struck a deal with the SPLM that will guarantee al-Bashir the Presidency in exchange for his guarantee that the referendum on Southern self determination will go ahead.
See: SPLM: Between the NCP and the National Consensus (30 March 2010)
For on Wednesday 31 March, Yasser Arman pulled out of the presidential race citing rigging, and insecurity in Darfur. Arman's pull out from the presidential race will almost certainly guarantee al-Bashir a first round win. Had Arman contested, he might have forced al-Bashir into a second round run-off, which al-Bashir might not have been able to win.

According to the Sudan Tribune (31 March) : "The Sudanese opposition reacted with anger and surprise after the ex-Southern rebel group decided to pull its presidential candidate leaving them feeling betrayed as speculations raged on a secret deal with the ruling party.

"'This is a betrayal by the SPLM of its agreement with the opposition forces,' said Kamal Omer from the opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP) to Reuters, adding the party would not be boycotting the polls.

"Sideeg Yousuf from the Communist Party said he was surprised by the unilateral announcement, which he called 'rushed'. 'The SPLM and all the political forces agreed that they would make their position in consensus at a meeting tomorrow [Thursday]," he told Reuters. But he added he hoped the parties would still all meet.

"Fouad Hikmat, from the International Crisis Group (ICG) think tank, said the SPLM had struck a deal with the NCP to allow Bashir to win the presidency. 'The SPLM have decided to not [fully] boycott the elections because they don't want to jeopardize the referendum -- that is very important to them.'"

According to Reuters: "People in South Sudan said they were disappointed the SPLM would not field a contender against Bashir, but that the referendum was more important to them.

"'Perhaps it was a deal between the SPLM and the NCP to protect the referendum,' civil servant Manong Thot said in the southern capital, Juba.

"Doctor Victor Jal said it was the right move. 'This election is not going to be free and fair -- the NCP is going to rig it, everyone knows this,' he said. 'What is important for us is just the referendum.'"

It absolutely beggars belief that the SPLM would value the word of the NCP/NIF regime over the solidarity of its allies. Once again, the NCP/NIF regime has managed to divide its opposition.

Here are two excellent news clips from Al-Jazeera that cover most of the points raised above:

• Boycott clouds Sudan election
  From: AlJazeeraEnglish | 31 March 2010
  
  
• Sudan poll boycott threatens peace
  From: AlJazeeraEnglish | 06 April 2010
  
  

"SOFT LANDING?" NOT LIKELY!

Meanwhile, optimists (particularly in the US administration) are still chattering away about progress in democracy and the need to prepare Sudan for a "soft landing" after the Southern self-determination referendum.

If there is a referendum (and remember, the NCP has rigged the elections specifically with the aim of controlling 75 percent of seats in the National Assembly so it can amend the constitution and re-write the terms of the CPA) then you can guarantee there will not be any "soft landing". Khartoum is never going to just let the oil-rich South secede.

In November 2009, Sudan expert Eric Reeves wrote a third report on the elections entitled (ominously) "Sudan: Election Crisis Reveals a Country Lurching Toward War." This too is recommended reading.

Reeves' introductory paragraph provides a summary of his thesis: "There is growing awareness that national elections scheduled for April 2010 will fail on many counts, with unpredictable consequences for the Khartoum regime's ambitions to retain its stranglehold on Sudanese national wealth and power. In turn, the prospect of an aborted or compromised Southern self-determination referendum (January 2011) looms ever closer, with the potential to trigger unfathomable destruction."

In my mind there is little doubt that Sudan is indeed "lurching towards war". I believe that this has been more or less the case ever since the untimely death of long-time SPLM leader Dr John Garan in the months after the signing of the CPA. As the South's most passionate advocate of the New Sudan vision (united, secular, democratic), Dr Garang was probably the only Southern leader capable of making that vision a reality. (For a more comprehensive report on this issue see my religious liberty news & analysis posting of 3 October 2007 entitled "Southern Sudan: On the path to war".)

Sudan: Jihad a tradition not stopped by peace

Date: Saturday 24 November 2007
Subj: Sudan: Jihad a tradition not stopped by peace agreements
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal


This posting provides an update to the World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis posting of Wednesday 3 October 2007 entitled: "Southern Sudan: On the path to war."

On Saturday 17 November 07 Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir addressed a rally organised by Sudan's Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to celebrate their 18th anniversary. The PDF, which is known for its atrocities, was created in 1989 as a government paramilitary to fight alongside the Sudan Armed Forces in the jihad against the Southerners. It has subsequently been deployed against Darfur, as it is widely accepted that the PDF and the janjaweed are often one and the same. President al-Bashir's words have sent a shock wave through South Sudan and Darfur.

The Sudan Tribune reports (17 Nov): "Addressing a mass rally this morning at the Wad-Medani Stadium (capital of Al-Jazeera State), some 200 miles south of Khartoum, celebrating the 18th anniversary of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), President al-Bashir ordered to the PDF to open its camps and mobilize troops and get prepared for any eventuality. 'Now we order the PDF, the legitimate son of the people, to open their camps and gather the Mujahideen [holy warriors] not to wage war but it is obvious that we should be ready.'" (Link 1)

According to an Associated Press report, al-Bashir also accused Western powers of lying about their motives in backing a 26,000-strong UN and African Union forces due in Darfur in January. "'Those Americans, those British, and those Europeans are not keen about the people of Darfur, or the people of Southern Sudan or the Sudanese people,' he said. 'They are all liars and hypocrites who are only interested in the riches and resources of Sudan.'" Al-Bashir also singled out Scandinavian countries ". . . where some media had reproduced a caricature of Islam's Prophet Muhammad last year, and said Khartoum wouldn't allow them to contribute troops. 'Anyone who spoke blasphemously about the Prophet will not set a foot on Sudanese soil,' he said." (Link 2)

Al-Bashir's belligerent words drew an immediate response from Darfurian rebel leaders who said al-Bashir's directive was nothing other than a declaration of war. Agence France Presse reports (18 Nov): "A Darfur rebel faction said Sunday that a call by Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir to reopen auxiliary training camps was 'a declaration of war' and that it was putting its troops on high alert. 'The Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity decrees a state of maximum alert for its troops following the Sudanese president's declarations about opening Popular Defence Force training camps,' the SLM-Unity said in a statement. 'We take this decision as a declaration of all-out war in Sudan.'" (Link 3)

Southerners have also moved to a state of high alert. The Sudan Tribune reports (20 Nov): Pagan Amumu, ". . . the Secretary General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), said that a state of mobilisation had begun in the south in reaction to the statements that were issued ordering the Popular Defence Forces to prepare and open camps.

"However, he stressed that war was not a favourable option for the SPLM but that it would defend itself if others began. He added that military capabilities had increased on both sides and that the SPLA's capabilities had developed a hundred times." (Link 4)

Amumu's boast (if it reflects truth) exposes the degree to which both sides have been violating the Comprehensive Peace Accord: as Al-Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP, formerly the National Islamic Front) rightly notes, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement prohibits the increase of military capabilities. (Link 4)

(For a copy of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's ceasefire arrangements, see link 5.)

MUJAHIDEEN MOBILISE

By Tuesday 20 November, Reuters news agency was reporting that young supporters of President al-Bashir were responding to his call. "The Youth Department Secretary of Bashir's dominant National Congress Party (NCP), Haj Majed Suwar, told state media that members had 'started assembling Mujahideen who (were) waiting eagerly to execute the president's order'.

"Suwar told the state-controlled Sudanese Media Centre the youth department was preparing to open training camps in response to the president's call. The news agency quoted Suwar as saying Jihad was a tradition that could not be stopped by signing peace agreements." (Link 6)

Elizabeth Kendal

Links

1) Sudan president orders paramilitary forces mobilisation, rejects Abyei report
18 November 2007 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24793
SEE ALSO
Sudan president "threatens war" -- former rebels
By Andrew Heavens in Khartoum,18 Nov 2007
http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN830929.html

2) Sudan President Criticizes Western Interference, Says Ready For War (AP)
18 Nov 2007 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/15550.html

3) Darfur rebel group calls Beshir move 'declaration of war' (AFP)
18 Nov 2007 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/15552.html

4) South Sudan army in state of mobilisation: SPLM SG
20 November 2007 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24826

5) Comprehensive Peace Agreement
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html

6) Sudanese respond to militia call-up -- state media
20 Nov 2007 http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN031531.html

The Battle for Pakistan.

Date: Tuesday 30 October 2007
Subj: The Battle for Pakistan.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal


THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN

On May 2007, WEA RLC released a News & Analysis posting entitled "Pakistan in Crisis: Situation Critical" (link 1), which examined Pakistan's escalating sectarianism (Sunni vs Shi'ite) and Islamisation (both of which fuel Islamic zeal and intolerance) and lawlessness (which facilitates criminal activity and intensifying religious persecution). The situation is most severe in the Taliban and al-Qaeda-administered and influenced tribal agencies and districts of North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). (Link 2)

WEA RLC's May posting also contained a section entitled "The Islamisation and Talibanisation of Islamabad" which focused on the stand-off at the radical Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the heart of the capital, Islamabad.

As was widely reported in mainstream news, rising tensions at the Lal Masjid mosque culminated on 3 July 07 in street battles between security forces and militants. On 4 July Pakistani security forces laid siege to the mosque, demanding an unconditional surrender and the release of hostages and human shields. The mosque's senior cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz was arrested as he tried to sneak out of the mosque dressed in a burqa and high-heels. (The government's televising of this image enraged Islamists!)

Aziz' brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, subsequently took over as mosque chief and the siege continued until 10 July when last-ditch negotiations failed and security forces stormed the mosque. Death toll estimates vary widely, from the official government estimate of around 100 dead to the Islamist claim that more than 2,000 were "martyred". Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed in the military operation.

As soon as the government forces laid siege to the Lal Masjid, jihadists in north-western tribal regions cranked up their terrorist actions against the Pakistani Army. On 16 July 07 the Taliban and al-Qaeda alliance in Waziristan terminated their "peace deal" with the government. The subsequent violence and terror has claimed hundreds of lives including those of at least 200 soldiers.

Army morale is low as this a very unpopular fight with many believing the army is fighting its own people at America's behest. Not only are the huge losses demoralising, but many soldiers find it difficult to feel motivated about killing fellow Pakistanis and Muslims. Several weeks ago 300 soldiers surrendered to a band of some 30 tribal mujahideen in South Waziristan without firing a single shot. Whilst a few have been released, virtually all of them remain captive.

Since the highly-organised bombing of Benazir Bhutto's motorcade on18 October the government has declared its intent to unleash all-out war on the militants.

A battle for Pakistan -- a nuclear armed state -- has commenced and the outcome is far from certain. Religious liberty and the security for Christians hangs in the balance and the prospects, especially in the short and medium term, are bleak.

WHAT WILL THE PAKISTAN ARMY BE UP AGAINST?
- the Taliban and al-Qaeda mujahideen of The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

Whilst the US bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 toppled the Taliban, most of al-Qaeda's core leadership survived and relocated to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

In 2003 the Pakistani Army was given the responsibility of eliminating al-Qaeda and Taliban elements from the border regions of Pakistan. Over the years however a soaring death toll has included the loss of at least 1,000 soldiers as well as the execution-style murders of around 150 anti-Taliban tribal leaders. All this has taken its toll on Army morale and weakened public resolve. (Unofficial estimates are that Pakistan has lost more soldiers in the FATA than the US has in Iraq, i.e. over 3,000).

In a short-sighted attempt to extricate himself from a sticky position, President Musharraf brokered a series of "peace deals" with the Taliban-al-Qaeda-tribal alliance. In February 2005, South Waziristan was ceded to the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance and on 5 September 2006, North Waziristan was ceded. While Musharraf's capitulation brought him some (temporary) peace, it also established the two Waziristans as the most secure Taliban and al-Qaeda-run terrorist sanctuary and administrative and training base in the world.

Tarique Niazi elaborated on the "peace deal" in Terrorism Monitor (5 Oct 2006): "The deal offers amnesty to Taliban militants and 'foreigners' (a reference to Afghan-Arabs who are members of al-Qaeda) in North Waziristan for a pledge that they would desist from mounting cross-border attacks into Afghanistan; assaulting Pakistani security forces, public servants, state property, tribal leaders and journalists; and carrying heavy weapons (DAWN, 6 September 2006). They will, however, be allowed to travel across the border into Afghanistan on a 'business trip' or a 'family visit' and carry 'light' weapons such as AK-47s.

"It binds the government to cease ground and air assaults against the Taliban and resolve all future disputes according to the Rivaaj (tribal customs). It further obligates the government to redeploy its troops from North Waziristan to their designated camps and forts, and dismantle all 12 checkpoints that were set up to hunt al-Qaeda and Taliban militants (DAWN, 6 September 2006)."

Niazi also reported that subsequent to signing the deal, the government set free 132 Taliban fighters who had been jailed for terrorist violence (Daily Times, 8 September 2006), returned their seized weapons (including 24 AK-47s), restored their impounded property and reinstated their forfeited privileges, including government allowances. Additionally, the government approved a cash compensation of 230 million rupees ($3.8 million) for the material losses suffered by tribesmen (DAWN, 9 September 2006). (Link 3)

Policy and military analysts Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio gave a bleak assessment to the Weekly Standard (2 Oct 2006): "Together, these events [ceding territory and releasing prisoners] may constitute the most significant development in the global war on terror in the past year." (Link 4)

Their article in the Weekly Standard describes the Waziristan Accord as the "unconditional surrender of Waziristan". Concerning the signing ceremony they write: "Taliban fighters searched government negotiators and military officers for weapons before allowing them to enter the meeting, which took place in a soccer stadium in the North Waziristan capital of Miranshah. According to three separate intelligence sources, heavily armed Taliban were posted as guards around the ceremony, and al-Qaeda's black flag hung over the scoreboard.

"Immediately after the Pakistani delegation left, al-Qaeda's flag was run up the flagpole of abandoned military checkpoints, and the Taliban began looting leftover small arms. The Taliban also held a 'parade' in the streets of Miranshah. Clearly, they view their 'truce' with Pakistan as a victory. It is trumpeted as such on jihadist websites."

Whilst President Musharraf and US President Bush portrayed the Waziristan Accord as a victory, it was in reality nothing less than the ceding of territory to a hostile enemy entity. As soon as the territory was ceded, al-Qaeda declared "The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan" and established a governing Shura council. The Waziristan Accord provided the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance an autonomous mini-state within a state, a safe-haven, a sanctuary from where they could consolidate, strategise, recruit, train, deploy, enforce their writ and expand their sphere of influence.

Eric Sayers, in a report for the Washington based Center for Security Policy, quotes Bill Roggio: "The destruction of al-Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan during Taliban rule has essentially been negated by the rise of Talibanistan in western Pakistan." (Link 5)

Sayers adds (writing in February 2007, link 5): "According to NATO statistics, since the signing of the Waziristan Accord in September 2006, attacks into Afghanistan along the border with Waziristan have increased by almost 300 percent. Consequentially, US military deaths in the region were almost double during this period, in comparison to what they were during the same period the previous year. Further emphasising the strategic importance of the sanctuaries, recent reports have indicated the al-Qaeda fighters wounded in Afghanistan are being treated for their wounds in Bajaur hospitals." [Bajaur, the suspected home of al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, has also been ceded to the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance. The Bajaur Accord was signed on 17 March 2007. (Link 6)]

Bill Roggio of Long War Journal subsequently reported (23 October 2007): "Within months the North Waziristan Accord was followed by agreements in Bajaur, Swat, and Mohmand agencies. News from the tribal agencies of Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber has gone dark. These tribal agencies are very likely under Taliban control. Open source reporting indicates all or portions of the settled districts . . . of Dera Ismail Khan, Laki Marwat, Tank, Khyber, Bannu, Hangu, Kohat, Charsadda, Dir, Mardan, and even the provincial seat of Peshawar are under Taliban influence to some degree or another." (Link 7 -- which includes a map showing degrees of Taliban control in NWFP.)

From its sanctuary in The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has been able to progress from a position of besieged weakness to one of organised strength. Not only are they now having a profound impact on international terrorism and the jihads in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are also now able to launch a genuinely threatening insurgency in Pakistan.

"COME TO JIHAD, to the people of Pakistan."
- Osama bin Laden beckons.

In late September 2007, Osama bin Laden released an audio message entitled "Come to Jihad, to the people of Pakistan". (Link 8)

Replete with Qur'anic quotations, it informs the people of Pakistan that it is their moral and Islamic duty to respond to the "Lal Masjid massacre" by joining with the Muslims following "true Islam" and waging jihad against the kuffaar (unbeliever) government of Pakistan, the Army and their supporters.

In his message bin Laden likens Musharraf's invasion of and "massacre" at the Lal Masjid to the destruction of and slaughter at the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, by Hindutva forces in 1992. He says the events at the Lal Masjid demonstrate that Musharraf is aligned with infidels against the Muslims. Therefore, he says, rebellion against Musharraf is obligatory. Bin Laden beckons those who have been "led astray" and are now supporting Musharraf or democracy or peace, particularly the Pakistani Army, which he says is supposed to be protecting the Muslims against the kuffaar (unbelievers), not allowing themselves to be tools and weapons in the hands of the kuffaar against the Muslims.

In his speech bin Laden condemns Muslims who spill the blood of fellow Muslims, warning that there is never any excuse: "Compulsion is not legally valid as the soul forced to kill is not better than the soul of the one killed." He appeals directly to soldiers, recommending they resign from their positions in the Pakistani Army, disassociate themselves from Musharraf and enter "true Islam", because, he says, "the government and army have become enemies of the Ummah [community of Muslims]. . . all of them have pledged to the cross worshippers to fight true Islam and its people. . . and permitted American cross worshipper forces to use the air, soil and water of Pakistan, the country of Islam, to kill the people of Islam in Afghanistan and then in Waziristan."

He concludes with an ominous promise: "We in the al-Qaeda organisation call on Allah to witness that we will retaliate for the blood of Maulana abd al-Rasheed Ghanzi. . ." and other slain Muslims, "champions of Islam in Waziristan".

THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN
- The prize: the Intelligence Services (ISI), the Army, the state, the nuclear arsenal.
- The outcome: that will depend primarily on Army and government resolve.

Mark Sappenfield writes for the Christian Science Monitor (22 October 2007): "Bowing to international pressure, President Pervez Musharraf has restarted an offensive in the remote tribal areas that are rapidly becoming a hub of global terrorism. Yet early indications are that, no matter who is in charge, the Pakistani Army is ill-suited -- and perhaps incapable -- of doing the job." (Link 9)

As noted by M K Dar (Former Joint Director of Intelligence Bureau, India (Link 10)) for more than two decades now powerful elements within the Pakistani Army and intelligence services have supported Sunni fundamentalist organisations and employed Islamic militants as proxies in their conflicts against India in Kashmir and against Soviet and now Western-backed forces in Afghanistan.

It must also be noted also that foreign forces with their own agendas have encouraged and assisted this for the purpose of fighting proxy wars, including the Saudis (to subdue the Shiites) and the US (to fight the Soviets). Consequently, over the past more than two decades, the well trained and supplied ISI, the rank and file military, the Mullahs and the militants have become very close knit.

Because the conflict in the north-western tribal regions is unpopular and a high casualty rate is guaranteed, many experts do not expect the government's renewed offensive in the north-west to continue long term. Sappenfield writes: "If it does, the Army 'will get divided vertically', with officers remaining loyal to headquarters and the rank and file becoming increasingly alienated, says Ayesha Siddiqa, author 'Military Inc.', a book about the Pakistani Army. 'Cracks are appearing,' she adds."

While officers might see this as an opportunity to further entrench military control over Pakistan, an alternative scenario could be that if officers feel that military domination of Pakistan is under threat because genuine democracy is in sight, they might desert Musharraf for the Taliban for pragmatic as much as ideological reasons. There are many unknowns.

Syed Saleem Shahzad writes for Asia Times Online that a Pakistani security official, who spoke to Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity, said the goal of the government's counterinsurgency is "to pacify the Waziristans once and for all". (Link 11)

Shahzad writes: "Lining up against the Pakistani Army will be the Shura (council) of Mujahideen comprising senior al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders, local clerics and leaders of the fighting clans Wazir and Mehsud (known as the Pakistani Taliban)." He quotes the Pakistani security official as saying, "If the planned battle is successful and Waziristan is pacified, the global Islamic resistance would be back where it was in 2003, when it had fighters but no centralised command or bases to carry out organised operations."

Shahzad reports: "The safety of Taliban and al-Qaeda assets in Waziristan is a matter of life and death and, therefore, the militants have devised a forward strategy to target the Pakistani cities of Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad, hoping to break the will of the Pakistani armed forces. The Pakistani military, meanwhile, is trying to break the will of the militants with ongoing bombing raids.

"Underscoring the seriousness with which the military is planning for the coming battle, it is reported that Shi'ite soldiers from northern Pakistan are being sent to the Waziristans. In the past, the Pakistani Army has been plagued by desertions of Pashtun and Sunni troops who refuse to fight fellow Pashtuns or Sunnis." [Shi'ites will supposedly have fewer problems killing Sunnis. The sectarian element could however, just introduce another layer to the conflict.]

This issue of a morally conflicted and fracturing army is without a doubt one of the greatest threats as increasingly more and more soldiers are questioning the Islamic credentials of their mission. After a major army offensive in South Waziristan in 2004 in which some 500 officers and soldiers refused to fight, "500 leading religious scholars signed a fatwa, a religious judgment, ruling that militants killed in the action are 'martyrs'. The same fatwa forbade the public to pray for the dead government soldiers." Earlier this year the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistani Army attempted to solicit a fatwa to its own advantage from the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) but was unable to do so. (Link 12) How many soldiers will heed bin Laden's call?

In July, Ayesha Siddiqa (author of 'Military Inc.') wrote an article entitled "Life after Lal Masjid" where she ominously likened the siege and storming of the Lal Masjid to the "Indian army's June 1984 attack against the Golden Temple and the dissident Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In both situations," she says, "the rebels were created by the establishment to be later killed at the government's hands. . . It is hoped, however, that the Lal Masjid operation does not result in the assassination of a leader and the killing of hundreds of innocent people like it occurred in India in October-November 1984." (Link 13)

On 18 October, Benazir Bhutto narrowly escaped assassination and more than 130 people were killed and hundreds were wounded when her motorcade was targeted by terrorists. This is doubtless only the beginning of the terror. Al-Qaeda will seek to eliminate all bulwarks against Sharia and Taliban control of Islamabad. We can expect to see terrorist incidents and assassinations proliferate in Pakistan. Christians ("cross worshippers" as bin Laden calls them) are destined to be targeted, as the militants view them not only as expendable kuffaar and stains to be removed, but as the targets most likely to attract Western attention, breast beating and pressure for more "peace deals".

Al-Qaeda's goal is nothing less than control of a nuclear-armed Islamic state, complete with intelligence services and an Islamist Army, for the purpose of administering and waging international Islamic jihad. A long and bloody battle for Pakistan has begun.

Elizabeth Kendal

Links

1) Pakistan in Crisis: Situation Critical
WEA RLC News & Analysis, 22 May 2007
By WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal

2) Pakistan: War and unprecedented persecution in NWFP
WEA RLC News & Analysis, 29 Oct 2007

3) Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban Militants
By Tarique Niazi for Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 19 (5 October 2006)
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370153

4) Pakistan Surrenders. The Taliban control the border with Afghanistan.
by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio. 2 Oct 2006. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/738ijawx.asp

5) The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and the Bajaur Tribal Region:
The Strategic Threat of Terrorist Sanctuaries. By Eric Sayers, Feb 2007
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/modules/newsmanager/center%20publication%20pdfs/waziristan.pdf

6) Pakistan signs the Bajaur Accord
By Bill Roggio (Military analyst) 17 March 2007
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/pakistan_signs_the_b.php

7) Crunch Time in Pakistan, By Bill Roggio, 23 October 2007
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/crunch_time_in_pakis.php
(Includes a map showing areas of Taliban-al-Qaeda rule and areas under threat.)

8) Come To Jihad, To The People Of Pakistan
26 Sept 2007. Translated From Urdu By Ahmed Al-Marid | Jihad Unspun
http://www.jihadunspun.com/intheatre_internal.php?article=109033&list=/home.php

9) Pakistan's Army: Unprepared to tackle terrorism? 22 October 2007
By Mark Sappenfield , Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1022/p04s01-wosc.html

10) Militants' sway in tribal areas. 23 Oct 2007
M K Dar (Former Joint Director of Intelligence Bureau)
http://www.centralchronicle.com/20071023/2310301.htm

11) Pakistan plans all-out war on militants
By Syed Saleem Shahzad 19 Oct 2007
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ19Df01.html

12) Troop Defections Threaten Pakistan's Operations in Tribal Regions
By Tarique Niazi, for Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, Issue 4 (6 March 2007)
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370270

13) Pakistan after Lal Masjid
Ayesha Siddiqa, 17 July 2007
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jul/17guest.htm

Pakistan: War and unprecedented persecution in NWFP.

Date: Monday 29 October 2007
Subj: Pakistan: War and unprecedented persecution in NWFP.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal


Persecution of Christians has long been intense right across Pakistan's highly Islamised and Talibanised North West Frontier Province (NWFP). However Islamic zeal, tension, intolerance and belligerence has escalated dramatically over recent years as the Pakistan Army has been engaged in an unpopular war against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.

PEACE, LIBERTY AND PERSECUTION

Heavy troop losses and plummeting troop morale has led President Musharraf to strike "peace deals" with Taliban and al-Qaeda affiliates in several regions of NWFP. South Waziristan was ceded to Taliban and al-Qaeda control in February 2005 and North Waziristan was ceded in September 2006. Since then the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has had sanctuary in the "Islamic Emirate of Waziristan" -- an autonomous mini-state and terrorist sanctuary from where they have been able to freely consolidate, strategise, recruit, deploy, enforce their writ and expand their zone of influence.

This year the government signed similar "peace deals" (surrenders) in the NWFP tribal agencies of Bajaur and Mahmoud, as well as Swat district. As would be expected, in all areas under Taliban and al-Qaeda control a policy of zero tolerance towards everything "non-Islamic" is being violently imposed.

The "peace deals" have provided peace for the government, liberty for the Taliban and al-Qaeda and unprecedented persecution for Christians and all other non-Islamists.

(A detailed examination and assessment of the political and security situation in Pakistan -- a News & Analysis posting entitled "The Battle for Pakistan" -- will be released tomorrow.)

CONFLICT RESUMES

On 10 July government troops stormed the radical Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. In response, the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in Waziristan terminated its "peace agreement" with the government and resumed terrorist actions against the Pakistan Army. Further to this, the Taliban and al-Qaeda appear to be waging an insurgency that is aimed at expanding Taliban and al-Qaeda control throughout NWFP on their way to Islamabad.

The chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Asma Jahangir, told DAWN (7 Oct 2007): "The NWFP presents a disturbing picture of religious militancy that is increasingly manifesting itself in vigilante actions against the population and creating widespread fear. The government has chosen to look the other way when the militants have blown up girls' schools and video shops, threatened teachers, students, doctors, nurses, NGO workers and barbers." (Link 1)

SWAT DISTRICT

Swat district fell under Taliban control when the government struck a "peace deal" with the militants in May 2007. As noted by Hameedullah Khan in DAWN (21 September 2007), "Violence intensified in the Swat valley after the signing of the agreement."

Basically, the "peace deal" enabled the terror to be re-directed. Militants who had been consumed with battling the Pakistan Army were freed-up to wage a violent campaign of forced Islamisation across the district: destroying evidence of Swat Valley's ancient Buddhist heritage and eliminating all practice they deem non-Islamic. Swat Valley is home to around 1,000 Christians, a tiny and vulnerable minority amongst 1.5 million Muslims.

Asma Jahangir (HRCP) told DAWN that in Swat Valley the education department has asked girls to comply with Taliban demands and wear burqas to school after threats from militants. Jahangir adds that the only Christian missionary school in the area had shut down after receiving threats. Jahangir also reports that security forces have been abandoning their posts after coming under consistent militant attack, leaving people at the mercy of the militants.

A Compass Direct (CD) news release entitled "PAKISTAN: Taliban militants force burqa on Christian women's school", details the persecution on the above mentioned Catholic-run Public High School and exposes the shocking intensity of the persecution being directed at the Christian community as the Taliban works to subjugate or even eradicate Christianity from their turf. (Link 2)

"PEACE" ENDS

The "peace deal" signed in Swat in May was scrapped on Friday 21 September when the "caliph" of the parallel religious government in NWFP, Taliban and al-Qaeda-linked cleric Maulana Fazlullah, announced he was terminating his agreement with the government. Fazlullah's army of some 4,500 militants immediately resumed violence and terrorism (including suicide bombings) against the Pakistan Army.

On Wednesday 24 October, the interim caretaker government of the NWFP deployed more than 2,000 paramilitary troops, police and helicopter gunships into Swat Valley "to provide security to the people" and "negotiate" with the militants. (Link 3)

On 25 October a powerful bomb blast destroyed an army vehicle travelling through Mingora, Swat's main town, killing around 30 people including 17 soldiers. The militants are not negotiating.

Fazlullah's madrassa-stronghold came under heavy attack on Friday 26 October. Fazlullah retaliated by kidnapping six security personnel (3 soldiers and 3 police) and seven civilians whom he accused of being government spies. While some remain missing, others were publicly executed and their decapitated heads were reportedly put on display in a local bazaar. (Link 4)

According to government-issued Pashtu-language leaflets reportedly dropped from a government helicopter on Saturday 27 October, the government intends to "eliminate extremism and terrorism from the Swat valley". However, in a shameful betrayal of the people, the government attempted to appease the militants with the words: "You must remember that establishing Islamic courts, implementation of Shariah (Islamic law) and bringing peace is the first priority of the government." (Links 4&5)

ISLAMISATION, TERROR AND WAR MAKE FOR A TENUOUS FUTURE

In those areas of NWFP where the government has ceded control to the Taliban (South and North Waziristan, as well as Bajaur and Mahmoud agencies and Swat district) Christians are not only facing unprecedented persecution and forced Islamisation, they are now on the frontline of a battle for Pakistan -- a life and death battle with high-stakes, being waged between the government and the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance. This will push persecution amidst insecurity to unprecedented levels. Thousands are reportedly fleeing the area.

The battle for Pakistan commenced with the government conquest of the Lal Masjid on 10 July 2007. The al-Qaeda insurgency, which is administered from the Waziristans and aimed at Islamabad, is casting a very dark shadow over NWFP and sending ill winds sweeping across all Pakistan. Religious liberty and the security of Pakistan's Christians hangs in the balance. Short and medium-term prospects are bleak. Please pray for the Christians of Pakistan.

Elizabeth Kendal

Links

1) Militants targeting civilians
http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/08/top3.htm

2) Compass Direct News, 27 Sept 2007
PAKISTAN: Taliban militants force burqa on Christian women's school
- Extremists violently enforce Islamization in unruly northern district.
http://www.compassdirect.org/content/index.php?id=27 (search: Pakistan)

3) Swat cleric 'ends' peace deal
By Hameedullah Khan, 21 Sept 2007
http://www.dawn.com/2007/09/22/top9.htm
AND
Editorial: Recapturing Swat from Fazlullah
Daily Times, Pakistan, Friday 26 October 2007
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C10%5C26%5Cstory_26-10-2007_pg3_1

4) 11 men kidnapped were executed in Pak, militants claim
SWAT (Pakistan) (AP) 27 Oct 2007
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200710271522.htm

5) Leaflets urge Malakand people to help govt
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\10\29\story_29-10-2007_pg7_5