Date: Friday 20 March 2009
Subj: Nigeria: The Battle for Shari'ah Supremacy
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
In January 2000, Governor Ahmad Sani Yarima Bakura defied the Nigerian Constitution and enacted Shari'ah Law in his north western state of Zamfara. Other northern and middle-belt Muslim-majority states soon followed and it was not long before all 12 northern states were under Shari'ah Law: the constitution of the Islamic State. In religiously mixed middle-belt states such as Kaduna and Plateau, thousands -- mostly Christians -- died in Shari'ah riots and anti-Christian pogroms.
Nigeria has a secular constitution which guarantees religious freedom and does not permit states to adopt a religion (See Link 1). Adoption of Islamic Law as the law of the state does violate the constitution. It is extremely unfortunate that the federal government did not nip the Shari'ah movement in the bud while it had the chance. Then-president Olusegun Obasanjo seriously underestimated the Shari'ah movement, believing it would fade away by itself. But of course it did not. Instead it has transformed from bud to monstrous ticking time bomb.
SHARI'AH IMPLEMENTATION
As long as the constitution of the Federation remains supreme, Shari'ah Law cannot be fully implemented because any Shari'ah ruling made in a northern Shari'ah court that conflicts with the provisions of the constitution of the Federation can be successfully appealed in a federal court on constitutional grounds. Because of this, Shari'ah courts have avoided issuing harsh penalties: the acquittal of Amina Lawal is a case point. In March 2002, Amina Lawal -- who had been charged with adultery after conceiving out of wedlock -- was sentenced by a Katsina Shari'ah Court to death by stoning. In September 2003, a Katsina Shari'ah Appeals Court acquitted her on procedural grounds. It was always understood that the death-by-stoning sentence -- which had attracted global attention -- would eventually have been overturned in the Supreme Court. (Link 2)
Subsequently, Shari'ah implementation slowed considerably.
The issue of the day is no longer Shari'ah adoption, but Shari'ah implementation. To this end, the Centre for the Promotion of Shari'ah held a three-day conference in Kano from Thursday 26 to Saturday 28 February to "brainstorm on the way forward for Shari'ah in Nigeria". (Link 3)
The Shari'ah advocates are pursuing constitutional amendments that would exempt Shari'ah Law from the constitutional provision in Article 1.3: "If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." Such an exemption would essentially give Shari'ah Law (the constitution of the Islamic State) supremacy over the constitution of the Federation.
Isa Sa'idu reports for the Daily Trust that the Centre for the Promotion of Shari'ah (CPS) convened the conference with the aim of finding solutions to the problems militating against the implementation of the Shari'ah legal system in Nigeria. The conference was chaired by Senator Ahmad Sani Yarima (former governor of Zamfara State) and funded by the Kano State Government. (Link 3)
According to Senator Ahmad Sani Yarima, the main obstacle to Shari'ah implementation is the Federal Constitution. He proposed that each state have its own independent constitution. While ignoring the fact that such a move would essentially result in the break-up of Nigeria, Senator Yarima appealed to "democracy" saying, "Democracy is a game of numbers. If we are to practice democracy vis-a-vis the Shari'ah legal system, there is the need for us to have individual states' constitutions that would be drafted and supported by the people of every state. When we have that in place, states that want to practice Shari'ah can go ahead and do it holistically without any constraint." (Link 3)
According to the Daily Trust, the CPS National President, Imam Aliyu Ibrahim Al-Tukri said, " . . . some of the problems facing Shari'ah in Nigeria are non-execution of judgments on grave offences, pressure and negative campaigns from different groups, misconception and mischief about Shari'ah. He said the legal battle between Kano State and the federal government on the legality or otherwise of establishing the Hisbah (Shari'ah implementation guards) is a vivid example of attempt to frustrate Shari'ah implementation in Nigeria." (Link 3)
THE BATTLE OVER THE LEGALITY OF HISBAH (Hasba/sharia implementation)
After comfortably winning the 2003 state elections, Kano's Governor Ibrahim Shekarau established a Hisbah (Shari'ah implementation) Board. By 2005 Kano State had a 9000-volunteer-strong Hisbah Corps essentially operating as a parallel police force tasked primarily with enforcing Shari'ah Law.
In May 2004 the Kano Assembly passed legislation banning women riding on taxi mopeds, deeming it un-Islamic. In December 2005 Hisbah Corps launched a crack down on un-Islamic transport, in particular the persistent problem of women riding on taxi mopeds. The resultant clash between taxi drivers and the Hisbah Shari'ah enforcers -- which resulted in eleven people being injured and dozens of vehicles being vandalised -- generated an uproar.
But the greatest tension was not between the Hisbah Corps and the "masses" but between the Hisbah Corps and the police with whom they frequently clashed while pulling women off moving mopeds and confiscating alcohol from hotels etc.
On or around 7 February 2006, the Inspector-General of Police, Mr Sunday Ehindero, told a press conference that the Hisbah Law and the operations of bodies created by the Hisbah Law were unconstitutional and therefore illegal. He claimed the Hisbah agencies undermined Nigeria's national security, and noted intelligence alleging the Hisbah Board was receiving assistance from Libya and Iran and that around 100 Hisbah officers had been trained abroad in the ideology and methodology of jihad and terrorism, a claim the Kano authorities denied.
On 8 February 2006, the Inspector-General of Police arrested the Chairman of the Hisbah Corps, Yahaya Faruk Chedi, and his Deputy, Abubakar Rabo Abdulkareen. The men, arrested in Kano, were immediately taken to Abudja where they were charged with conspiring to subvert the government by managing and assisting an unlawful society known as the Hisbah Board in Kano.
The Kano State Government responded by petitioning the Supreme Court of Nigeria, asking it to rule on the constitutionality of the Hisbah Law. The Federal Government then requested that the proceedings in the High Court of Abuja against the Kano Hisbah Corps Chairman and Deputy be stayed pending the determination of the suit at the apex court, because obviously the ruling of the apex court would impact the ruling of the Abuja High Court.
What Kano's Hisbah advocates were after was a Supreme Court ruling that would declare Hisbah lawful, and restrain the Inspector-General of Police from interfering in and disrupting the full implementation of the Law.
However, the Supreme Court ruled on 2 March 2007 that the case did not come under its jurisdiction as the Kano State Attorney-General's complaints were against the Inspector-General of Police and not against the Federation. Seven Chief Justices were unanimous in this and the case was struck out. (Full ruling see: Link 4)
In his ruling, Justice Mahmud Mohammed JSC notes that in 2005 the President of the Federation wrote a letter expressing concern about the Hisbah Board, to which the Governor of Kano State responded, allaying his fears. Subsequently, in July 2005 the President sent a delegation to Kano to investigate the situation. The Governor of Kano welcomed the delegation and reportedly extended full co-operation. The Governor of Kano also wrote to the President correcting the alleged misinformation being spread about the Hisbah Board.
As Justice Mohammed noted: "Not a single paragraph of the plaintiff's statement of claim accused the Federation of Nigeria or the Federal Republic of Nigeria of doing anything to the Hisbah Law of Kano State, the operation of the Hisbah Corps in Kano State or the arrest and detention of the named Commander General and Deputy Commander General of the Hisbah Corps in Kano State. On the face of the statement of claim of the plaintiff therefore, it is not difficult to see that there is no dispute whatsoever between Kano State in its status as a component unit of the Federation and the unit of the Federation itself which are the recognised parties when the original jurisdiction of this court is invoked."
In his judgment, Umaru Atu Kalgo JSC further elucidated the inaction of the Federal Government, adding that the President of the Federation "apart from writing the letter and sending a delegation on a fact finding mission to Kano, did not take or threaten to take any action against Kano State Government, or Hisbah Law, or any of its operators. There is no doubt that the President in his official capacity has the constitutional powers to address or deal with any security issue affecting or likely to affect Nigeria or any part thereof. He is the Chief Security Officer of this country and must be satisfied with any information on security before deciding whether to take action or not. In this case, the President did not take any action, apart from acquiring information from the Kano State Government, and therefore since he took no action at all, he is presumed to be satisfied with the explanation and information given to him."
In his judgment, Niki Tobi JSC noted that while there was clearly no dispute between the Kano State authorities and the Federal Government, Kano State was "asking for a declaration that the Kano State Hisbah Board Law No4 of 2003 and the Kano State Hisbah Board (Amendment) Law No 6 of 2005 are legal, lawful and constitutional", prompting Justice Tobi to ask: "Is the plaintiff not trying to jump the gun?"
And this is the point: the Federal Government has never challenged the legality of Shari'ah or Hisbah in the Supreme Court. Nor has it ever interfered with Shari'ah implementation. The Inspector-General of Police had acted in his own capacity when he made the claim that the Hisbah Corps was unconstitutional. The plaintiff's complaints were not against the Federation and so the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiff was left with the option of taking the complaint to the Federal High Court.
On 29 March 2007 the Daily Triumph reported that the presiding judge of the Abuja Court of Appeal, Justice Babs Kuewumi, had ruled the detention of Chairman of the Hisbah Corps, Yahaya Faruk Chedi, and his deputy, Abubakar Rabo Abdulkareen to be unlawful and ordered the Federal Government pay each of them the sum of N500,000 as compensation for their illegal detention. (Link 5)
RETURNING TO THE CPS CONFERENCE
The driving force behind the Centre for the Promotion of Shari'ah (CPS), Kano State Governor Malam Ibrahim Shekarau, told the Kano conference that implementation of the Shari'ah legal system gives "a higher meaning and direction to politics" (Link 3).
Using the language of human rights and religious freedom, Governor Shekarau implored the conference participants not to forget the plight of Muslims in the south. "While Muslims in the north are struggling and pushing for further expansion of Shari'ah in their respective states, those in the south have been denied the right to have their marriages, divorces, inheritance and other social activities to be officially conducted, regulated and resolved in accordance with the provision of Shari'ah Law. This is unfair and unacceptable and the kinds of this forum must find a peaceful way out for our brothers in the south, also. We all have a role to play to this predicament of our southern brothers."
The Daily Trust reports: "At the end of the conference, the participants agreed that for Shari'ah to work effectively in Nigeria, the problems of political will, constitutional constraint, disparity in the approaches adopted by the Shari'ah implementing states, attitudinal problems of some Muslims towards Shari'ah, among others, must be addressed.
"The conference therefore called for a joint effort by the Shari'ah implementing states to ensure that concerned Muslims reflected, and impediments to Shari'ah implementation are removed in the proposed constitutional review, among many other recommendations."
The fact that the conference participants lamented the "attitudinal problems of some Muslims" exposes the reality that Muslims are divided over Shari'ah. Not all Muslims want the provisions of Shari'ah forced upon them.
Abdulaziz Ahmad Abdulaziz, who reported on the CPS conference for LEADERSHIP NIGERIA (Abuja), sees the reincarnation of the Shari'ah debate as a battle for supremacy.
Abdulaziz reports: "Insiders confirmed to LEADERSHIP that major forces within the pro-Shari'ah camp are itching to take centre stage with the Shari'ah agenda. Apart from the need to seek more power for the Shari'ah legal code in the new constitution which some persons have expressed, others are setting out to play the Shari'ah ticket for political prominence. The cornerstone of this, LEADERSHIP gathered, is the political romance coming into the limelight between the former Zamfara State Governor, Ahmad Sani Yarima and the incumbent Kano State Governor, Ibrahim Shekarau." (Link 6)
While a dispute between the Senate and the House of Representatives over the leadership of the Joint Constitution Review Committee has thrown the constitutional review process into disarray, Shari'ah advocates are making the most of the opportunity to advance Governor Ibrahim Shekarau's presidential prospects. One such group, known as Shekarau Political Action (SHEPAC), believes that Governor Shekarau "could be a vehicle for the total emancipation of the people of Nigeria". (Link 7)
By Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria --1999
http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
Article 1. (1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(3) If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
Article 10. The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.
Article 38. (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Links cont.
2) Facing Death for Adultery, Nigerian Woman Is Acquitted
By Somini Sengupta. Published: 26 September 2003
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9900E0D9153DF935A1575AC0A9659C8B63
3) Shari'ah: Surmounting the tall obstacles
by Isa Sa'idu, Kano. 10 March 2009
http://www.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5933&Itemid=17:testset
4) Supreme Court of Nigeria. Friday 2 March 2007. S.C. 26/2006
Between Attorney-General of Kano State (Plaintiff) and Attorney-General of the Federation (Defendant).
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Attorney-General%20of%20Kano%20State%20v%20Attorney-General%20of%20the%20Federation.htm
5) Rights abuse: Court orders FG pay Chedi, Rabo N1m
From Kabiru Yusuf, Abuja. 29 March 2007
http://www.triumphnewspapers.com/archive/DT29032007/right293207.html
6) Reincarnating The Shari'ah Debate?
By Abdulaziz Ahmad Abdulaziz. 10 March 2009
http://leadershipnigeria.com/news/138/ARTICLE/7971/2009-03-10.html
7) 2011: Inside Shekarau's 'presidential project'
By Suleiman M. Bisalla, 8 March 2009
http://www.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5818&Itemid=53
Showing posts with label Hasba. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hasba. Show all posts
Friday, March 20, 2009
Monday, November 13, 2006
INDONESIA'S ACEH AS A MODEL FOR THAILAND'S SOUTH?
Date: Monday 13 November 2006
Subj: Indonesia's Aceh as a model for Thailand's south?
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
Not all Muslims want to live under Sharia Law (the constitution of political Islam). Non-Muslims definitely don't. When Jakarta granted Aceh autonomy and the right to enact Sharia Law it brought peace to Jakarta, but at the expense of the Acehnese. The implementation, subsequent expansion and impact of Sharia in Aceh is the subject of the latter part of this posting.
Now Thailand's military-appointed Prime Minister is proposing the "Aceh model" as a means of ending the Islamic insurgency in Thailand's deep south. This would doubtless bring peace to Bangkok, but it would be at the expense of the southern Thai, 20 percent of whom are Buddhist (not even "People of the Book"!). Southern Thai would pay for this "peace" with their lives as Islamic terrorism morphs into religious persecution and ethnic cleansing.
It may be relevant to note that Thailand's new interim Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont, was appointed by coup-leader and Army Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, Thailand's first Muslim Army Chief. They have a close relationship. Surayud Chulanont, a former member of King Bhumibol Adulyadej Privy Council, played a key role in the promotion of General Boonyaratkalin to position of Army Chief. The recently installed cabinet is allegedly little more than a political front for the military, and while Thailand is less than five percent Muslim, the most significant and powerful posts are now held by Muslims. The Defence Minister, Boonrawd Somtas, is a Muslim; and the Interior Minister, Aree Wongarya, is also a Muslim.
-----------------------------
THAILAND'S SOUTH
-----------------------------
Muslims count for only 4.6 percent of the 65 million population of Thailand, but are concentrated in the southern-most provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where they form majorities. According to the 2000 census, Muslims represent 69 percent of the 415,000 residents in Yala; 88 percent of the 600,000 residents of Pattani; and 82 percent of the 662,000 residents of Narathiwat. Around 90 percent of Thai Muslims are ethnic Malay and speak a Malay dialect.
While a separatist struggle has simmered in the deep south for decades, the Islamic insurgency which erupted in earnest on 4 January 2004 has now claimed more than 1,700 lives. Most Christians and Christian ministries have fled the region. Militant Islamists target Buddhist monks (who are frequently decapitated), government-run schools, karaoke bars and other
entertainment venues (which are frequently bombed), as well as Thai soldiers, police, checkpoints and other pro-government individuals or institutions. On Thursday 9 November, eight car and motorcycle showrooms were bombed almost simultaneously at noon in Yala, leaving nine wounded.
While Thai Muslims have historically been well assimilated, several factors have contributed to the growing Islamic unrest and the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Muslim-majority southern provinces.
In May 2005, International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that despite the rise in "puritanical strains of Islam", "Muslim anger at the deployment of Thai troops in Iraq" and the growth in "Islamic consciousness and a sense of persecution and solidarity with fellow Muslims", the violence in the south is not an Islamic jihad and is driven by local issues. ICG cites "historic issues" as well as discrimination, the heavy handed tactics employed by the Thai police and military, and the government's tendency to send its most inept and corrupt officials to posts in the Muslim south, frustrating the local population there, as examples of local issues driving the insurgency. (Link 1)
While these issues are definitely historic and contributing factors, the pre-eminent factor behind the present insurgency is undoubtedly radicalisation. As GlobalSecurity.org noted in mid 2004, "Authorities have known for quite some time that many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to
Islamic schools, where they came under influence of hard-line teachers. Some were reported to have joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists." (Link 2)
Yet it is well known that radicalisation does not affect all Muslims. Many Muslims, especially in south-east Asia, actively resist the introduction of radical (Wahhabi) elements and ideology. For this they are labeled "apostates" by the bearers of "true Islam", and are persecuted and sometimes killed for their efforts.
Samart Disuma is one such Muslim. Samart, a community leader, has resisted radical and separatist elements in the southern province of Yala for decades. These days he and his family live in a virtual fortress. Rungrawee C. Pinyorat writes, "While critical of government policies, a number of Muslims in the south work for reconciliation and show no desire to live in a separate nation. Although Samart's fortress has never been attacked, at least three Muslims in his village have been slain in the past two years.
"Over the years, the separatist movement has waxed and waned but never completely ceased. In January 2004 it suddenly surged, and when the government failed to ensure people's safety, more Muslims and Buddhists turned to guns for self protection." (Link 3)
According to Samart there have been sporadic clashes between separatist rebels and security forces for decades. But he says today's violence is different - it is more rampant and increasingly indiscriminate. And whereas the old-time separatist rebels used to operate from bases in the jungle, today's insurgents operate from within village communities, putting everyone at risk.
Regardless of their claims, political and militant Islamist leaders never speak for all Muslims. Clearly they are not speaking for Muslims like Samart.
THAI PM PROPOSES "ACEH" SOLUTION FOR SOUTH
Reuters reported on 22 October: "Surayud Chulanont, the former army chief appointed prime minister by the military, has said he wants a peaceful solution to the violence and offered talks with militant leaders, a policy u-turn from the days of Thaksin.
"During an official visit to Jakarta on Saturday, Surayud hailed Indonesia's Aceh peace accord signed in Helsinki last year to end a separatist insurgency which had seen more than 15,000 killed since 1979.
"'Indonesia has set a model in solving the conflict in the Aceh province successfully,' a Thai government Web site, www.thaigov.go.th, quoted Surayud as telling Indonesian media after meeting President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
"'The Aceh model is a good example to bring peace to southern Thailand,' the Web site reported on Sunday." (Link 4)
Thai News Agency reported on 8 November: "Prime Minister Surayud said that Thailand will not let go of the territory of the south, but that the government was open to negotiate various forms of polity including self-rule, autonomy and the establishment of sharia (Muslim religious) law in place of Thai civil law." (Link 5)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDONESIA'S ACEH: WHAT HAS SHARIA ACHIEVED?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Jakarta ended the insurgency in Aceh by granting the Acehnese autonomy and the right to implement Sharia Law, it was appeasing the real power-brokers behind the insurgency: the Islamists. The deal ensured that Aceh's Islamists would no longer be Jakarta's problem, only Aceh's.
International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report in July 2006 entitled "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh". (Link 6)
This is an important and valuable report because the implementation and expansion of Sharia in Aceh can serve as a model to demonstrate how Sharia not only divides Muslims, but has a tendency to expand once implemented.
The ICG report notes that the Muslim Acehnese have long been divided over Sharia. During Indonesia's battle for independence Acehnese elites clearly expressed their preference for Dutch-style secular administration. Even Aceh's ulama (religious scholars) were divided between those who favoured secular administration and those who wanted an Islamic State based on Sharia Law. ICG notes that for many, the issue had more to do with power than ideology - the elites did not want a religious bureaucracy established that could expand and threaten their authority, while the Islamists were determined to establish a formal religious bureaucracy from where they could expand and advance their influence and power.
ICG notes that the leader of the Acehnese Islamists, Daud Beureueh, led the Acehnese in jihad against the "kafir" Dutch occupier specifically with the aim of achieving an Islamic state. Sukarno courted and rewarded Beureueh with assurances that Indonesia would be built on Islamic principles and Aceh would have Sharia Law. This was radical as Sharia had no historic precedent in Aceh.
After Suharto's downfall, President Habibie offered Islamic Law to Aceh as a political solution to Acehnese unrest and disaffection, which really arose out of neglect and frustration. ICG reports that Jakarta regarded Sharia law as "something the Acehnese wanted (although how much was debatable - after the Indonesian parliament granted it, one Acehnese called it an 'unwanted gift', and he was not alone)". (ICG p 4)
Since Sharia has been legitimised and implemented in Aceh it has expanded considerably, for the religious bureaucracy tasked with codifying and implementing Sharia in Aceh is committed to "its own expansion; a focus on legislating and enforcing morality; and a quiet power struggle with secular law enforcement".
According to ICG, many Acehnese worry "that extension of Shari'a has been taken on as an agenda by conservative organisations. . . Women's organisations have been particularly active in raising questions about proposed changes to the khalwat qanun [laws on relationships between men and women] but in general, the conservatives, who support more extensive Shari'a application, are more vocal than those concerned about its consequences". (ICG p7)
The religious bureaucracy constantly extends the reach of Sharia by revising legislation and increasing the number of crimes that can be dealt with by the Sharia Courts. It has already been proposed that revisions be made to the laws covering khalwat (illicit relationships between men and women) so that any woman who alleges she was raped must follow Sharia protocols and produce four male adult Muslim eye-witnesses to support her claim in order to prove it. If she cannot, she will be found guilty of making a false accusation of rape, guilty of illicit sex, and caned accordingly.
In 2004, Aceh established the highly unpopular vice and virtue patrol, the wilayatul hisbah (WH) (hasba/sharia implementaion), which is responsible for monitoring compliance with Islamic law. Not only has Aceh's WH already grown from 13 members to 33 in one year, its powers are constantly increasing. What's more, the very presence of the WH is fueling the rise of hard-line Islamic vigilantism.
ICG also notes that as the religious bureaucracy expands it will rely more and more on young recruits who are motivated primarily by their contacts with intolerant radical foreign elements, in particular Wahhabis, jihadists, and groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
-------------------
CONCLUSION
-------------------
Appeasing Islamist terrorists by granting them the right to enforce Sharia Law is a betrayal of all non-Islamist citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
Employing the "Aceh model" in southern Thailand would doubtless bring peace to Bangkok, but it would also close southern Thailand off to Christian ministry and mission; and it would strip all southern Thai of their right live with security under Thai civil law and under the Thai Constitution which guarantees religious liberty. It could also result in southern Thailand becoming a haven and base for terrorists.
Most immediately and seriously, it would involved abandoning up to 400,000 Buddhists to their fate in an Islamic State. Ethnic-religious cleansing is already underway. Escalating Islamic terror directed at local Buddhist civilians recently forced all the Buddhist living in the districts of Than To and Bannang Sata, Yala province, to flee their homes. These Buddhist, amounting to 122 people, or 52 families, have taken refuge in the nearby Buddhist temple of Nirotsangkha-ram in Yala's Muang district and are awaiting humanitarian assistance. (Link 7)
Links
1) Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad
Asia Report No 98. 18 May 2005
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3436&l=1
2) Thailand Islamic Insurgency
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm
3) Thai Muslim village leader builds fortress against rebels
By Rungrawee C. Pinyorat KRONG PINANG, Thailand, AP, 30 Oct 2006
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asiapacific/detail.asp?ID=94005&GRP=C
4) Bomb kills soldier, wounds monks in Thai south. 22 Oct 206
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20061022/wl_nm/security_thailand_dc
5) Thai PM presents Thai road to democracy to world media
BANGKOK, Nov 8 (TNA) http://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=25844
6) Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh
(Asia Report No 117 - 31 July 2006)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/117-islamic-law-and-criminal-justice-in-aceh.aspx
7) Exodus of Buddhists. The Nation, Thailand. 10 Nov 2006
http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/10/headlines/headlines_30018555.php
ALSO: Thailand: Buddhist flee from majority Muslim villages.10 Nov 2006 (AKI)
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.358783100&par=0
AND: Monks in Narathiwat to cease daily alms (dpa) 12 Nov 2006
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=114154
Subj: Indonesia's Aceh as a model for Thailand's south?
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
Not all Muslims want to live under Sharia Law (the constitution of political Islam). Non-Muslims definitely don't. When Jakarta granted Aceh autonomy and the right to enact Sharia Law it brought peace to Jakarta, but at the expense of the Acehnese. The implementation, subsequent expansion and impact of Sharia in Aceh is the subject of the latter part of this posting.
Now Thailand's military-appointed Prime Minister is proposing the "Aceh model" as a means of ending the Islamic insurgency in Thailand's deep south. This would doubtless bring peace to Bangkok, but it would be at the expense of the southern Thai, 20 percent of whom are Buddhist (not even "People of the Book"!). Southern Thai would pay for this "peace" with their lives as Islamic terrorism morphs into religious persecution and ethnic cleansing.
It may be relevant to note that Thailand's new interim Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont, was appointed by coup-leader and Army Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, Thailand's first Muslim Army Chief. They have a close relationship. Surayud Chulanont, a former member of King Bhumibol Adulyadej Privy Council, played a key role in the promotion of General Boonyaratkalin to position of Army Chief. The recently installed cabinet is allegedly little more than a political front for the military, and while Thailand is less than five percent Muslim, the most significant and powerful posts are now held by Muslims. The Defence Minister, Boonrawd Somtas, is a Muslim; and the Interior Minister, Aree Wongarya, is also a Muslim.
-----------------------------
THAILAND'S SOUTH
-----------------------------
Muslims count for only 4.6 percent of the 65 million population of Thailand, but are concentrated in the southern-most provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where they form majorities. According to the 2000 census, Muslims represent 69 percent of the 415,000 residents in Yala; 88 percent of the 600,000 residents of Pattani; and 82 percent of the 662,000 residents of Narathiwat. Around 90 percent of Thai Muslims are ethnic Malay and speak a Malay dialect.
While a separatist struggle has simmered in the deep south for decades, the Islamic insurgency which erupted in earnest on 4 January 2004 has now claimed more than 1,700 lives. Most Christians and Christian ministries have fled the region. Militant Islamists target Buddhist monks (who are frequently decapitated), government-run schools, karaoke bars and other
entertainment venues (which are frequently bombed), as well as Thai soldiers, police, checkpoints and other pro-government individuals or institutions. On Thursday 9 November, eight car and motorcycle showrooms were bombed almost simultaneously at noon in Yala, leaving nine wounded.
While Thai Muslims have historically been well assimilated, several factors have contributed to the growing Islamic unrest and the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Muslim-majority southern provinces.
In May 2005, International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that despite the rise in "puritanical strains of Islam", "Muslim anger at the deployment of Thai troops in Iraq" and the growth in "Islamic consciousness and a sense of persecution and solidarity with fellow Muslims", the violence in the south is not an Islamic jihad and is driven by local issues. ICG cites "historic issues" as well as discrimination, the heavy handed tactics employed by the Thai police and military, and the government's tendency to send its most inept and corrupt officials to posts in the Muslim south, frustrating the local population there, as examples of local issues driving the insurgency. (Link 1)
While these issues are definitely historic and contributing factors, the pre-eminent factor behind the present insurgency is undoubtedly radicalisation. As GlobalSecurity.org noted in mid 2004, "Authorities have known for quite some time that many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to
Islamic schools, where they came under influence of hard-line teachers. Some were reported to have joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists." (Link 2)
Yet it is well known that radicalisation does not affect all Muslims. Many Muslims, especially in south-east Asia, actively resist the introduction of radical (Wahhabi) elements and ideology. For this they are labeled "apostates" by the bearers of "true Islam", and are persecuted and sometimes killed for their efforts.
Samart Disuma is one such Muslim. Samart, a community leader, has resisted radical and separatist elements in the southern province of Yala for decades. These days he and his family live in a virtual fortress. Rungrawee C. Pinyorat writes, "While critical of government policies, a number of Muslims in the south work for reconciliation and show no desire to live in a separate nation. Although Samart's fortress has never been attacked, at least three Muslims in his village have been slain in the past two years.
"Over the years, the separatist movement has waxed and waned but never completely ceased. In January 2004 it suddenly surged, and when the government failed to ensure people's safety, more Muslims and Buddhists turned to guns for self protection." (Link 3)
According to Samart there have been sporadic clashes between separatist rebels and security forces for decades. But he says today's violence is different - it is more rampant and increasingly indiscriminate. And whereas the old-time separatist rebels used to operate from bases in the jungle, today's insurgents operate from within village communities, putting everyone at risk.
Regardless of their claims, political and militant Islamist leaders never speak for all Muslims. Clearly they are not speaking for Muslims like Samart.
THAI PM PROPOSES "ACEH" SOLUTION FOR SOUTH
Reuters reported on 22 October: "Surayud Chulanont, the former army chief appointed prime minister by the military, has said he wants a peaceful solution to the violence and offered talks with militant leaders, a policy u-turn from the days of Thaksin.
"During an official visit to Jakarta on Saturday, Surayud hailed Indonesia's Aceh peace accord signed in Helsinki last year to end a separatist insurgency which had seen more than 15,000 killed since 1979.
"'Indonesia has set a model in solving the conflict in the Aceh province successfully,' a Thai government Web site, www.thaigov.go.th, quoted Surayud as telling Indonesian media after meeting President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
"'The Aceh model is a good example to bring peace to southern Thailand,' the Web site reported on Sunday." (Link 4)
Thai News Agency reported on 8 November: "Prime Minister Surayud said that Thailand will not let go of the territory of the south, but that the government was open to negotiate various forms of polity including self-rule, autonomy and the establishment of sharia (Muslim religious) law in place of Thai civil law." (Link 5)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDONESIA'S ACEH: WHAT HAS SHARIA ACHIEVED?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Jakarta ended the insurgency in Aceh by granting the Acehnese autonomy and the right to implement Sharia Law, it was appeasing the real power-brokers behind the insurgency: the Islamists. The deal ensured that Aceh's Islamists would no longer be Jakarta's problem, only Aceh's.
International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report in July 2006 entitled "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh". (Link 6)
This is an important and valuable report because the implementation and expansion of Sharia in Aceh can serve as a model to demonstrate how Sharia not only divides Muslims, but has a tendency to expand once implemented.
The ICG report notes that the Muslim Acehnese have long been divided over Sharia. During Indonesia's battle for independence Acehnese elites clearly expressed their preference for Dutch-style secular administration. Even Aceh's ulama (religious scholars) were divided between those who favoured secular administration and those who wanted an Islamic State based on Sharia Law. ICG notes that for many, the issue had more to do with power than ideology - the elites did not want a religious bureaucracy established that could expand and threaten their authority, while the Islamists were determined to establish a formal religious bureaucracy from where they could expand and advance their influence and power.
ICG notes that the leader of the Acehnese Islamists, Daud Beureueh, led the Acehnese in jihad against the "kafir" Dutch occupier specifically with the aim of achieving an Islamic state. Sukarno courted and rewarded Beureueh with assurances that Indonesia would be built on Islamic principles and Aceh would have Sharia Law. This was radical as Sharia had no historic precedent in Aceh.
After Suharto's downfall, President Habibie offered Islamic Law to Aceh as a political solution to Acehnese unrest and disaffection, which really arose out of neglect and frustration. ICG reports that Jakarta regarded Sharia law as "something the Acehnese wanted (although how much was debatable - after the Indonesian parliament granted it, one Acehnese called it an 'unwanted gift', and he was not alone)". (ICG p 4)
Since Sharia has been legitimised and implemented in Aceh it has expanded considerably, for the religious bureaucracy tasked with codifying and implementing Sharia in Aceh is committed to "its own expansion; a focus on legislating and enforcing morality; and a quiet power struggle with secular law enforcement".
According to ICG, many Acehnese worry "that extension of Shari'a has been taken on as an agenda by conservative organisations. . . Women's organisations have been particularly active in raising questions about proposed changes to the khalwat qanun [laws on relationships between men and women] but in general, the conservatives, who support more extensive Shari'a application, are more vocal than those concerned about its consequences". (ICG p7)
The religious bureaucracy constantly extends the reach of Sharia by revising legislation and increasing the number of crimes that can be dealt with by the Sharia Courts. It has already been proposed that revisions be made to the laws covering khalwat (illicit relationships between men and women) so that any woman who alleges she was raped must follow Sharia protocols and produce four male adult Muslim eye-witnesses to support her claim in order to prove it. If she cannot, she will be found guilty of making a false accusation of rape, guilty of illicit sex, and caned accordingly.
In 2004, Aceh established the highly unpopular vice and virtue patrol, the wilayatul hisbah (WH) (hasba/sharia implementaion), which is responsible for monitoring compliance with Islamic law. Not only has Aceh's WH already grown from 13 members to 33 in one year, its powers are constantly increasing. What's more, the very presence of the WH is fueling the rise of hard-line Islamic vigilantism.
ICG also notes that as the religious bureaucracy expands it will rely more and more on young recruits who are motivated primarily by their contacts with intolerant radical foreign elements, in particular Wahhabis, jihadists, and groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
-------------------
CONCLUSION
-------------------
Appeasing Islamist terrorists by granting them the right to enforce Sharia Law is a betrayal of all non-Islamist citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
Employing the "Aceh model" in southern Thailand would doubtless bring peace to Bangkok, but it would also close southern Thailand off to Christian ministry and mission; and it would strip all southern Thai of their right live with security under Thai civil law and under the Thai Constitution which guarantees religious liberty. It could also result in southern Thailand becoming a haven and base for terrorists.
Most immediately and seriously, it would involved abandoning up to 400,000 Buddhists to their fate in an Islamic State. Ethnic-religious cleansing is already underway. Escalating Islamic terror directed at local Buddhist civilians recently forced all the Buddhist living in the districts of Than To and Bannang Sata, Yala province, to flee their homes. These Buddhist, amounting to 122 people, or 52 families, have taken refuge in the nearby Buddhist temple of Nirotsangkha-ram in Yala's Muang district and are awaiting humanitarian assistance. (Link 7)
Links
1) Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad
Asia Report No 98. 18 May 2005
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3436&l=1
2) Thailand Islamic Insurgency
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm
3) Thai Muslim village leader builds fortress against rebels
By Rungrawee C. Pinyorat KRONG PINANG, Thailand, AP, 30 Oct 2006
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asiapacific/detail.asp?ID=94005&GRP=C
4) Bomb kills soldier, wounds monks in Thai south. 22 Oct 206
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20061022/wl_nm/security_thailand_dc
5) Thai PM presents Thai road to democracy to world media
BANGKOK, Nov 8 (TNA) http://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=25844
6) Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh
(Asia Report No 117 - 31 July 2006)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/117-islamic-law-and-criminal-justice-in-aceh.aspx
7) Exodus of Buddhists. The Nation, Thailand. 10 Nov 2006
http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/10/headlines/headlines_30018555.php
ALSO: Thailand: Buddhist flee from majority Muslim villages.10 Nov 2006 (AKI)
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.358783100&par=0
AND: Monks in Narathiwat to cease daily alms (dpa) 12 Nov 2006
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=114154
Thursday, May 13, 2004
Nigeria: Christians die in Kano after Muslims die in Plateau.
Date: Thursday 13 May 2004
Subj: Nigeria: Christians die in Kano after Muslims die in Plateau.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
Readers of WEA RLC News & Analysis will be very familiar with the consequences of Christian minorities being scapegoated and demonised for political gain through the playing of ethnic and religio-nationalist politics. The situation in Plateau state central Nigeria is the same as that, except in reverse, and this has led eventually to the appalling massacre of between 200 and 600 Muslims by "Christian" militiamen in Yelwa on 1-2 May.
In recent years Nigeria has seen some radical and devastating retaliatory attacks and rioting by northern Muslims in response to trivial "Christian" infractions, usually accusations of insulting Islam, the prophet Mohammad or the Qur'an. A prime example is the November 2002 Muslim riot in Kaduna, triggered by a journalist's comment concerning Nigeria's hosting of the Miss World contest. Muslims deemed her comment offensive and the ensuing riot left 200 dead, 1,000 injured, 11,000 homeless and 20 churches destroyed. Unfortunately these riots have become a feature of life in northern Nigeria, ensuring that the Christian minority lives in a perpetual state of fear-induced submission.
It therefore beggars the imagination to contemplate what might be in store for the Christians of Northern Nigeria after the appalling and devastating massacre in Yelwa, unless of course the government can restore calm.
On 11 May 04, in the northern state of Kano, a Muslim demonstration to protest the Yelwa deaths descended into chaos and rioting, leaving at least 11 Christians dead and two churches torched. Rioting continued on 12 May and the death toll rose to about 30 with some 50 injured and much property destruction. A dusk to dawn curfew has been imposed. Thousands of Christians have fled the city.
Even before the Yelwa massacre, Zamfara state had ordered the destruction of all churches in accordance with its implementation of "Sharia Phase 2". (Link 1) It is possible that the Yelwa massacre will be used to justify all manner of repression and persecution being unleashed upon an already besieged Christian minority. Security has been tightened in the northern city of Bauchi after leaflets were found calling on Muslims to avenge the Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave the region. Security has also been increased in Kaduna as tensions are running high.
On 11 May President Obasanjo held a crisis meeting with Muslim clerics in Abuja and implored them to be patient and give him time to deal with the matter. "I will appeal to you to restrain our Muslim brothers... because if you go for an eye for an eye, this country will be bloody."
------------------------------------------
PLATEAU: THE YELWA MASSACRE - HOW DID IT GET TO THIS?
Plateau State in central Nigeria is majority Christian. Before democracy came to Nigeria in 1999, the nation had been ruled almost exclusively by northern Muslims through a succession of military dictatorships. During those years, the Hausa Muslim minority of Plateau state gained privileges, and dominated politics, business and wealth. The poverty and marginalisation experienced by the Christian majority generated feelings of resentment.
When democracy did come to Nigeria in 1999, Christian political figures in Plateau discovered that ethnic politics could work for them, winning votes by feeding Christian resentment of Hausa Muslim domination and wealth. Hence there has developed in recent years a culture of "us and them" or of "indigene and stranger". The indigenes are Christian, poor and oppressed, while the strangers are Hausa, wealthy and dominating. People became political pawns - either majority vote-cattle to be appeased, or minority scapegoats to be demonised. This forms the backdrop to what has happened in Plateau in recent months.
Many Hausa-Fulani, though Muslims, have returned to or immigrated into Plateau state in recent years to escape the deteriorating conditions and harsh imposition of Sharia law in the northern states. There has been tit-for-tat conflict over land between the Hausa-Fulani cattle herders and the "Christian" Tarok crop farmers ever since.
The most recent cycle of violence, which has created the present crisis, began with Fulani cattle trampling Tarok crops. This is a real problem and needs to be addressed, as the crops are the Tarok's means of livelihood. Unfortunately the Tarok took the situation into their own hands and stole and killed Fulani cattle. This is also serious as the cattle are the Fulani's livelihood. This should have been addressed. Unfortunately the Fulani took matters into their own hands and on 24 February 2004 they, along with hired Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, killed 90 Tarok in Yelwa, including 48 who were axed to death as they sought refuge in a Church of Christ in Nigeria church, which was then torched.
Two days later Christians in Gerkawa town in the Shendam district of Plateau state turned on their Muslim neighbours to avenge the Yelwa killings. At least 40 Muslims were killed with swords or cutlasses and their bodies burned. The army evacuated some 3,000 Muslims from Gerkawa to Yelwa as Christians fled Yelwa out of fear of further attacks.
These tit-for-tat attacks have been occurring across Plateau and escalating, taking on the dimensions of a religious war. The Muslims are recruiting Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, while the "Christian" militia that attacked Yelwa was allegedly armed and supported by retired generals, further escalating the violence. The state government seems to have made little effort to stop the violence.
In the most recent attack, the "Christian" militia that attacked Yelwa on 1-2 May used high-powered automatic assault rifles mounted on jeeps. There are rumours circulating that the "Christians" were aiming to inflict a final solution and rid the region of Hausa-Fulani "once and for all".
Nigerian Red Cross staff told an AFP reporter that at least 630 people had been killed. A spokesperson for the National Emergency Management Agency, Ibrahim Farinloye, said however that a government team had visited Yelwa and put the death toll at between 200-300. Yelwa residents talk of a mass grave. However the National Emergency Management Agency investigated the grave and said that it had been in use for some time and that not all the bodies were recent. While the death toll is disputable and may possibly never be known, even 200 dead is a massacre of unacceptable and shocking proportions. (Link 2)
The Yelwa massacre has led to an exodus of Muslims from the region, further entrenching the religious polarisation of Nigerian society. The Plateau state government, which has fed ethnic and religious tensions for its own political gain, and has been totally ineffective in dealing with the crisis, must shoulder much of the blame.
KANO BOILS AND CHRISTIANS DIE
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano's governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro-Sharia platform. Christians suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don't have much choice. On the night of Shekarau's election (21 May 2003), pastor Chikezie (Sunday) Madumere and his whole family were burned to death in their home in "No Man's Land" Kano city, by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau's win.
Kano has recently introduced a Mobile Court to monitor and deal with people selling and screening foreign films or videos, and selling or playing foreign audio CDs. The Mobile Court will be guided by Sharia law and is charged to work toward the institutionalisation of Islamic norms in all spheres of life. (Link 3)
In early May, Sheik Kabo informed Kano's Sharia Enforcement enforcers (HISBA) that the Kano State Sharia Commission would no longer permit any area or any person to be exempt from Sharia. He recommended that anyone who is not willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state. (Link 4)
Reports that Christians had massacred more than 600 Muslims in Yelwa, Plateau state, quickly reach Kano. On Tuesday 11 May, Muslim leaders led a protest march that started off peacefully but degenerated into a violent riot.
Associated Press writer Oloche Samuel reports that angry Muslims hunted for "nonbelievers" whom they then killed with machetes before burning the bodies. "The violence came hours after thousands of Muslim protesters - some carrying daggers, sickles and clubs - marched from the main mosque in the northern city of Kano, traditionally a hotbed of religious tensions.
"Amina Usman, a 19-year-old university student, recounted seeing two mutilated bodies next to a makeshift checkpoint where young Muslim Hausa-speaking men armed with sticks, knives and clubs were searching cars for Christians and animists and asking passengers to recite Muslim prayers.
"An Associated Press reporter saw youths at a makeshift checkpoint of burning tires strike three young women with machetes after accusing them of being 'nonbelievers' for wearing Western-style skirts and blouses. The women escaped with bleeding head wounds after several motorcycle taxi drivers intervened."
Oloche Samuel reports that Umar Ibrahim Kabo, the most senior Muslim cleric in Kano, told protesters, some of whom burned U.S. and Israeli flags, 'This violence is a calculated global Western war against Muslims, just like in Afghanistan and Iraq. Muslims are in grief'."
According to Samuel, "Kabo issued a seven-day ultimatum to Obasanjo to apprehend the Yelwa killers 'or be blamed for whatever happens' afterward." (Link 5)
-------------------------------------------------------
Genuine followers of Jesus Christ are paying a heavy price for this ethnic and religious conflict. Obed Minchakpu reported for Compass Direct on 2 April that the violence in Plateau in late March had resulted in the deaths of 8 pastors and 1,500 Christian believers, and the destruction of 173 churches. Reverend Dr Alexander Mamdip Lar, President of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), reports concerning the Plateau crisis (2 May), "We [COCIN] lost two ordained ministers in Jos and Rim [and] 117 of our churches were destroyed, while six pastors, one ordained minister and hundreds of members were killed in Wase, thus completely obliterating the church there." As he says, the Church in Plateau is "under siege".
While genuine followers of Christ are not likely to be involved in atrocities, they will be (and are) hit first and most savagely in any retaliation.
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) Zamfara Launches Sharia Phase II. 24 April 2004
http://allafrica.com/stories/200404260559.html
2) Death toll in Nigerian 'massacre' revised. 10 May 2004
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=86&art_id=qw1084184820267N26
5&set_id=1
3) Kano Establishes Mobile Court to Preserve Culture, Beliefs
Vanguard (Lagos) 20 April 2004. By Tina Anthony in Kano
http://allafrica.com/stories/200404200985.html
4) Sharia: No Part of Kano is Exempted --Kabo
Vanguard (Lagos) 3 May 2004. By Tina Anthony in Kano
http://allafrica.com/stories/200405040076.html
5) Nigerian Muslim protest turns violent in wake of sectarian
killings. By Oloche Samuel, Associated Press, 11 May 2004
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20040511-1240-nigeria-viole
nce.html
FURTHER REPORT ON PLATEAU & KANO VIOLENCE
Shoot-on-sight order in Kano as death toll hits 30
By Tina Anthony, Taye Obateru, Charles Ozoemena & agency report
Vanguard (Lagos). 13 May 2004
http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/headline/f113052004.html
----------------------------------
PLUS - FURTHER ANALYSIS
----------------------------------
Bigotry and avarice fuel Nigerian conflicts.
By Dave Clark, 8 May 2004
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=68&art_id=qw1084030920351B252&set_id=1
AND
Tears for Plateau (Daily Trust, Abuja)
OPINION Ujudud Shariff. 11 May 2004
http://allafrica.com/stories/200405110306.html
Subj: Nigeria: Christians die in Kano after Muslims die in Plateau.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
Readers of WEA RLC News & Analysis will be very familiar with the consequences of Christian minorities being scapegoated and demonised for political gain through the playing of ethnic and religio-nationalist politics. The situation in Plateau state central Nigeria is the same as that, except in reverse, and this has led eventually to the appalling massacre of between 200 and 600 Muslims by "Christian" militiamen in Yelwa on 1-2 May.
In recent years Nigeria has seen some radical and devastating retaliatory attacks and rioting by northern Muslims in response to trivial "Christian" infractions, usually accusations of insulting Islam, the prophet Mohammad or the Qur'an. A prime example is the November 2002 Muslim riot in Kaduna, triggered by a journalist's comment concerning Nigeria's hosting of the Miss World contest. Muslims deemed her comment offensive and the ensuing riot left 200 dead, 1,000 injured, 11,000 homeless and 20 churches destroyed. Unfortunately these riots have become a feature of life in northern Nigeria, ensuring that the Christian minority lives in a perpetual state of fear-induced submission.
It therefore beggars the imagination to contemplate what might be in store for the Christians of Northern Nigeria after the appalling and devastating massacre in Yelwa, unless of course the government can restore calm.
On 11 May 04, in the northern state of Kano, a Muslim demonstration to protest the Yelwa deaths descended into chaos and rioting, leaving at least 11 Christians dead and two churches torched. Rioting continued on 12 May and the death toll rose to about 30 with some 50 injured and much property destruction. A dusk to dawn curfew has been imposed. Thousands of Christians have fled the city.
Even before the Yelwa massacre, Zamfara state had ordered the destruction of all churches in accordance with its implementation of "Sharia Phase 2". (Link 1) It is possible that the Yelwa massacre will be used to justify all manner of repression and persecution being unleashed upon an already besieged Christian minority. Security has been tightened in the northern city of Bauchi after leaflets were found calling on Muslims to avenge the Yelwa killings and on Christians to leave the region. Security has also been increased in Kaduna as tensions are running high.
On 11 May President Obasanjo held a crisis meeting with Muslim clerics in Abuja and implored them to be patient and give him time to deal with the matter. "I will appeal to you to restrain our Muslim brothers... because if you go for an eye for an eye, this country will be bloody."
------------------------------------------
PLATEAU: THE YELWA MASSACRE - HOW DID IT GET TO THIS?
Plateau State in central Nigeria is majority Christian. Before democracy came to Nigeria in 1999, the nation had been ruled almost exclusively by northern Muslims through a succession of military dictatorships. During those years, the Hausa Muslim minority of Plateau state gained privileges, and dominated politics, business and wealth. The poverty and marginalisation experienced by the Christian majority generated feelings of resentment.
When democracy did come to Nigeria in 1999, Christian political figures in Plateau discovered that ethnic politics could work for them, winning votes by feeding Christian resentment of Hausa Muslim domination and wealth. Hence there has developed in recent years a culture of "us and them" or of "indigene and stranger". The indigenes are Christian, poor and oppressed, while the strangers are Hausa, wealthy and dominating. People became political pawns - either majority vote-cattle to be appeased, or minority scapegoats to be demonised. This forms the backdrop to what has happened in Plateau in recent months.
Many Hausa-Fulani, though Muslims, have returned to or immigrated into Plateau state in recent years to escape the deteriorating conditions and harsh imposition of Sharia law in the northern states. There has been tit-for-tat conflict over land between the Hausa-Fulani cattle herders and the "Christian" Tarok crop farmers ever since.
The most recent cycle of violence, which has created the present crisis, began with Fulani cattle trampling Tarok crops. This is a real problem and needs to be addressed, as the crops are the Tarok's means of livelihood. Unfortunately the Tarok took the situation into their own hands and stole and killed Fulani cattle. This is also serious as the cattle are the Fulani's livelihood. This should have been addressed. Unfortunately the Fulani took matters into their own hands and on 24 February 2004 they, along with hired Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, killed 90 Tarok in Yelwa, including 48 who were axed to death as they sought refuge in a Church of Christ in Nigeria church, which was then torched.
Two days later Christians in Gerkawa town in the Shendam district of Plateau state turned on their Muslim neighbours to avenge the Yelwa killings. At least 40 Muslims were killed with swords or cutlasses and their bodies burned. The army evacuated some 3,000 Muslims from Gerkawa to Yelwa as Christians fled Yelwa out of fear of further attacks.
These tit-for-tat attacks have been occurring across Plateau and escalating, taking on the dimensions of a religious war. The Muslims are recruiting Islamic mercenaries from Chad and Niger, while the "Christian" militia that attacked Yelwa was allegedly armed and supported by retired generals, further escalating the violence. The state government seems to have made little effort to stop the violence.
In the most recent attack, the "Christian" militia that attacked Yelwa on 1-2 May used high-powered automatic assault rifles mounted on jeeps. There are rumours circulating that the "Christians" were aiming to inflict a final solution and rid the region of Hausa-Fulani "once and for all".
Nigerian Red Cross staff told an AFP reporter that at least 630 people had been killed. A spokesperson for the National Emergency Management Agency, Ibrahim Farinloye, said however that a government team had visited Yelwa and put the death toll at between 200-300. Yelwa residents talk of a mass grave. However the National Emergency Management Agency investigated the grave and said that it had been in use for some time and that not all the bodies were recent. While the death toll is disputable and may possibly never be known, even 200 dead is a massacre of unacceptable and shocking proportions. (Link 2)
The Yelwa massacre has led to an exodus of Muslims from the region, further entrenching the religious polarisation of Nigerian society. The Plateau state government, which has fed ethnic and religious tensions for its own political gain, and has been totally ineffective in dealing with the crisis, must shoulder much of the blame.
KANO BOILS AND CHRISTIANS DIE
Islamic zeal is strong in the northern state of Kano. Kano's governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, was elected on a radical, hardline, pro-Sharia platform. Christians suffer intense persecution in Kano, their schools and churches having been closed and burned. It is compulsory for all public-school girls to wear Islamic hijab, and as the Christian schools have been closed Christians don't have much choice. On the night of Shekarau's election (21 May 2003), pastor Chikezie (Sunday) Madumere and his whole family were burned to death in their home in "No Man's Land" Kano city, by Muslim mobs celebrating Shekarau's win.
Kano has recently introduced a Mobile Court to monitor and deal with people selling and screening foreign films or videos, and selling or playing foreign audio CDs. The Mobile Court will be guided by Sharia law and is charged to work toward the institutionalisation of Islamic norms in all spheres of life. (Link 3)
In early May, Sheik Kabo informed Kano's Sharia Enforcement enforcers (HISBA) that the Kano State Sharia Commission would no longer permit any area or any person to be exempt from Sharia. He recommended that anyone who is not willing to adhere to Sharia should leave the state. (Link 4)
Reports that Christians had massacred more than 600 Muslims in Yelwa, Plateau state, quickly reach Kano. On Tuesday 11 May, Muslim leaders led a protest march that started off peacefully but degenerated into a violent riot.
Associated Press writer Oloche Samuel reports that angry Muslims hunted for "nonbelievers" whom they then killed with machetes before burning the bodies. "The violence came hours after thousands of Muslim protesters - some carrying daggers, sickles and clubs - marched from the main mosque in the northern city of Kano, traditionally a hotbed of religious tensions.
"Amina Usman, a 19-year-old university student, recounted seeing two mutilated bodies next to a makeshift checkpoint where young Muslim Hausa-speaking men armed with sticks, knives and clubs were searching cars for Christians and animists and asking passengers to recite Muslim prayers.
"An Associated Press reporter saw youths at a makeshift checkpoint of burning tires strike three young women with machetes after accusing them of being 'nonbelievers' for wearing Western-style skirts and blouses. The women escaped with bleeding head wounds after several motorcycle taxi drivers intervened."
Oloche Samuel reports that Umar Ibrahim Kabo, the most senior Muslim cleric in Kano, told protesters, some of whom burned U.S. and Israeli flags, 'This violence is a calculated global Western war against Muslims, just like in Afghanistan and Iraq. Muslims are in grief'."
According to Samuel, "Kabo issued a seven-day ultimatum to Obasanjo to apprehend the Yelwa killers 'or be blamed for whatever happens' afterward." (Link 5)
-------------------------------------------------------
Genuine followers of Jesus Christ are paying a heavy price for this ethnic and religious conflict. Obed Minchakpu reported for Compass Direct on 2 April that the violence in Plateau in late March had resulted in the deaths of 8 pastors and 1,500 Christian believers, and the destruction of 173 churches. Reverend Dr Alexander Mamdip Lar, President of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), reports concerning the Plateau crisis (2 May), "We [COCIN] lost two ordained ministers in Jos and Rim [and] 117 of our churches were destroyed, while six pastors, one ordained minister and hundreds of members were killed in Wase, thus completely obliterating the church there." As he says, the Church in Plateau is "under siege".
While genuine followers of Christ are not likely to be involved in atrocities, they will be (and are) hit first and most savagely in any retaliation.
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) Zamfara Launches Sharia Phase II. 24 April 2004
http://allafrica.com/stories/200404260559.html
2) Death toll in Nigerian 'massacre' revised. 10 May 2004
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=86&art_id=qw1084184820267N26
5&set_id=1
3) Kano Establishes Mobile Court to Preserve Culture, Beliefs
Vanguard (Lagos) 20 April 2004. By Tina Anthony in Kano
http://allafrica.com/stories/200404200985.html
4) Sharia: No Part of Kano is Exempted --Kabo
Vanguard (Lagos) 3 May 2004. By Tina Anthony in Kano
http://allafrica.com/stories/200405040076.html
5) Nigerian Muslim protest turns violent in wake of sectarian
killings. By Oloche Samuel, Associated Press, 11 May 2004
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20040511-1240-nigeria-viole
nce.html
FURTHER REPORT ON PLATEAU & KANO VIOLENCE
Shoot-on-sight order in Kano as death toll hits 30
By Tina Anthony, Taye Obateru, Charles Ozoemena & agency report
Vanguard (Lagos). 13 May 2004
http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/headline/f113052004.html
----------------------------------
PLUS - FURTHER ANALYSIS
----------------------------------
Bigotry and avarice fuel Nigerian conflicts.
By Dave Clark, 8 May 2004
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=68&art_id=qw1084030920351B252&set_id=1
AND
Tears for Plateau (Daily Trust, Abuja)
OPINION Ujudud Shariff. 11 May 2004
http://allafrica.com/stories/200405110306.html
Monday, January 26, 2004
Islamisation, extremism and the Christians of Pakistan
Date: Monday 26 January 2004
Subj: Islamisation, extremism and the Christians of Pakistan
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
---------------------------------------------------------------
ISLAMISATION, EXTREMISM AND THE CHRISTIANS OF PAKISTAN
---------------------------------------------------------------
QUID PRO QUO
On 6 June 2003, the WEA RLC produced a News & Analysis posting entitled "Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?" That posting examined the relationship between Pakistan's President Musharraf and the Majlis Muttahida-e-Amal (MMA) - an alliance of six anti-West, pro-Taliban, pro-sharia, Islamic parties that hold the balance of power in Pakistan.
In August 2002, Musharraf amended the Constitution by decree (the Legal Framework Order) to give himself vastly increased powers. The October 2002 elections however, resulted in a hung parliament. Musharraf's military-backed Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won the most seats, but all opposition parties opposed Musharraf's constitutional amendments.
During 2003 the MMA managed to strike a deal with Musharraf; to support the LFO in exchange for his acceptance of their Islamisation package. That package contains 17 points - seven are modifications of the LFO, ten relate to the Islamisation of society. (Link 1)
THE DEAL IS DONE
In late December 2003 the Pakistan Parliament passed the Seventeenth Amendment Bill, which asserts the validity of the Legal Framework Order (LFO), modified in accordance with the demands of the MMA. The amendments made by the Seventeenth Amendment Act and the modified Legal Framework Order, have now been incorporated into the text of the Constitution.
On 1 January 2004, General Musharraf secured a vote of confidence in both houses of parliament and four provincial assemblies, meaning he will remain in power until late 2007, and as military chief until the end of 2004.
Musharraf's success on both counts was due to the support of the MMA. So what has this cost in terms of quid pro quo with the MMA? Details of any deal are proving extremely difficult to find. However, some things are self-evident. President Musharraf's dependence upon the MMA severely limits his ability to deal with Islamist extremism and terrorism, and this puts Musharraf in a hard place. He must appease the U.S. for military aid, and he must appease the mullahs and the MMA for regime survival. This seriously compromises security for Christians in Pakistan. Ultimately it also compromises Musharraf's own security.
RESURGENT EXTREMISM
Reuters reported on 16 January 2004 that the car bomb that exploded outside the Holy Trinity Cathedral/Bible Society complex in Karachi on 15 January "was a fertiliser bomb very much similar to what was used in the U.S consulate". The U.S. Consulate in Karachi (1 km from the Holy Trinity Cathedral) was bombed in June 2002. That attack was attributed to Al-Almi, a splinter faction of Harkat-ul Mujahideen, a group fighting in Kashmir. (Link 2)
TIME magazine reported in the 26 January issue that the militant Islamist group Jaish-e-Muhammad (also fighting in Kashmir) was behind the 25 December 2003 assassination attempt on Musharraf, and that this group is also linked to the June 2002 bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi.
Regarding the assassination attempt, TIME magazine comments (and we can apply this to the Bible Society bombing as well), "That Jaish-e-Muhammad has the capacity to launch sophisticated attacks on the President, possibly with insider help, is a situation partly of Musharraf's making. The government in Islamabad has long coddled militant Islamic groups, encouraging them first to help drive the Soviets out of neighboring Afghanistan and later to torment Indian troops in the part of the disputed state of Kashmir that is under Indian control.
"Under pressure from Washington, he (Musharraf) banned various militant organizations in January 2002, but he left their leaders largely unfettered and allowed the organizations to reconstitute under new names. Pakistan's intelligence services, which had helped build up the ground and infiltrate its fighters into Indian-controlled Kashmir, were hesitant to crack down, even after Jaish-e-Muhammad began unleashing religious terrorism within Pakistan." (Link 3)
Compass Direct (http://www.compassdirect.org ) reported on 23 January that Pakistani Christian teenager, Zeeshan Gill (16), was kidnapped for more than two weeks in November 2003 by Islamist militants training fighters for jihad in Kashmir. Zeeshan was taken to Jamia al Qasim al Aloom Islamic school (madrasa), beaten, forced to recite the Islamic creed, and threatened with death. He escaped home to his mother and they have fled into hiding.
Compass Direct reports, "According to Joseph Francis of the Lahore-based Center for Legal Aid and Assistance Settlement (CLAAS), the Gill family's dilemma is not unusual among Pakistan's tiny Christian minority." Joseph Francis told Compass Direct that CLAAS lawyers represented another boy who had been kidnapped as a minor. It was ordered that he be released from the madrasa. Shortly after his return to his mother, he was re-kidnapped and sent straight to Kashmir. No one knows his whereabouts.
Until the Pakistan government stops supporting the Kashmir jihad, dismantles the terror networks and cuts off their lifelines - madrasas and funds - the Christian community will remain at great risk.
---------------------------------------------
REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism
16 January 2004
The International Crisis Group has released a detailed report analysing and condemning Pakistan's lack of action against extremist Islamist organisations and madrasas. (Link 4)
The ICG report notes that the Pakistan government appears to be "more concerned about appeasing a valuable ally [MMA] than tackling the threats of terrorism and extremism in earnest."
The ICG accuses the government of refusing to invoke anti-terrorism laws against the leaders and members of banned militant Islamist organisations or dismantle their infrastructure. Hence when these groups are banned, they simply re-surface with new names and continue operations.
The government's failure to reform the jihadi madrasas is rooted in two issues - government support for the Kashmir jihad, and government dependence on MMA support for regime survival.
MADRASA REFORM & SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
The ICG reports details the links between the mullahs, the MMA and the madrasas and comments that "to appease the clergy and to gain the religious parties' support for the LFO, President Musharraf placed madrasa reform on the backburner".
"President Musharraf's MMA allies have categorically rejected, with a public campaign, government reforms of madrasas and any proposed laws to regulate their functioning, including curricula and finances." (ICG p 9)
Not only has madrasa reform gone on the backburner, but the issue of terrorist financing has been sidestepped altogether.
ICG reports, "Within Pakistan, the jihadi madrasa also continues to play a central role in promoting sectarian hatred and violence." And, "Sectarian tensions are bound to increase so long as the jihadi madrasa is allowed to preach religious intolerance." (ICG p 10)
HAMSTRUNG
Excerpts from ICG report page 16, under the heading "Strategies of Regime Survival" and subheading "Appeasing the Mullahs": "President Musharraf's pledges in 2002 to confront and eliminate Islamist extremism were compromised by his desire to obtain MMA support for controversial constitutional amendments and indeed his presidency. Now that the MMA has played a pivotal role in giving the LFO constitutional cover and helping Musharraf gain a vote of confidence to extend his presidency until 2007, the military-run government may be even less likely to risk taking effective action against the religious alliance and its many extremist offshoots.
"The quid pro quo for Musharraf's deal with the mullahs might never be officially revealed but can be gauged, at least partially, through the MMA's demands. Even prior to the December 2003 agreement, it had insisted upon official support for Islamisation in return for acceptance of the LFO and Musharraf's dual hats of president and chief of army staff. In June 2003, PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain admitted that the government had accepted ten MMA demands for Islamisation, in addition to pledging government funding to 8,000 madrasas. The ten included legislation in accordance with the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology; restructuring the economy, education and media along Islamic lines; ensuring rights for women in accordance with Islamic injunctions; and giving Islamic subjects equal importance with other fields of study in all educational institutions."
MMA's MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN
On Sunday 18 January the MMA launched a "mass contact campaign" for the enforcement of its 17-point Islamisation programme, which it describes as "the only solution to the country's many problems".
MMA chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that Pakistan had to come out from under American influence, that "Kashmir Solidarity Day" should be celebrated nationwide on 5 February. Ahmad read out the MMA 17-point Islamisation package and said, "We want to enforce true Islamic system in the country and the 17 points covers all aspects of Nizam-i-Shariat [Islamic law] whose implementation would establish Nizam-i-Mustafa [Islamic system] in the country." (Link 5)
INCREMENTAL ISLAMISATION (ICG p 19)
The ICG report comments on the shari'a bill passed by the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Assembly in June 2003, which pledges to impose "Allah's rule on earth through His pious men".
"Under another proposed law, yet to be presented to the provincial parliament, the MMA government intends to set up a hasba (accountability) department and ombudsman's offices at the provincial, district and local levels to ensure the enforcement of Islamic laws. Each ombudsman will have under his command a hasba force, a Pakistani version of the Taliban's vice and virtue police."
The ICG notes that, "The MMA's policies in the NWFP have encouraged extremists in other provinces and at the centre to follow suit." The report then details cases of Islamist groups in Baluchistan, the Punjab, Lahore, and Karachi, illegally enforcing elements of Islamic law, primarily in relation to depictions women in advertising, not only with impunity, but support from the national government.
"After the MMA's support for the Seventeenth Amendment, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali emphasised that his party, the PML-QA [Musharraf's military-backed party], and the MMA are 'natural allies', and that both 'favour...implementing [a] complete Islamic system in the country'."
Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) "Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?"
WEA RLC News & Analysis, Elizabeth Kendal, 6 June 03
2) Police link Karachi church bomb, consulate blast.
By Aamir Ashraf , KARACHI (Reuters), 16 Jan 2004
http://www.reuters.com/locales/newsArticle.jsp?type=worldNews&locale
=en_IN&storyID=4139006
3) TIME. 26 Jan 2004
The Monster Within. By Tim McGirk in Islamabad
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040126-578991,0
0.html
4) Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism
Asia Report N°73
16 January 2004
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2472
5) MMA launches mass contact campaign
HiPakistan 18 January 2004
http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en51266&F_catID=&f_ty
pe=source
Subj: Islamisation, extremism and the Christians of Pakistan
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
---------------------------------------------------------------
ISLAMISATION, EXTREMISM AND THE CHRISTIANS OF PAKISTAN
---------------------------------------------------------------
QUID PRO QUO
On 6 June 2003, the WEA RLC produced a News & Analysis posting entitled "Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?" That posting examined the relationship between Pakistan's President Musharraf and the Majlis Muttahida-e-Amal (MMA) - an alliance of six anti-West, pro-Taliban, pro-sharia, Islamic parties that hold the balance of power in Pakistan.
In August 2002, Musharraf amended the Constitution by decree (the Legal Framework Order) to give himself vastly increased powers. The October 2002 elections however, resulted in a hung parliament. Musharraf's military-backed Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won the most seats, but all opposition parties opposed Musharraf's constitutional amendments.
During 2003 the MMA managed to strike a deal with Musharraf; to support the LFO in exchange for his acceptance of their Islamisation package. That package contains 17 points - seven are modifications of the LFO, ten relate to the Islamisation of society. (Link 1)
THE DEAL IS DONE
In late December 2003 the Pakistan Parliament passed the Seventeenth Amendment Bill, which asserts the validity of the Legal Framework Order (LFO), modified in accordance with the demands of the MMA. The amendments made by the Seventeenth Amendment Act and the modified Legal Framework Order, have now been incorporated into the text of the Constitution.
On 1 January 2004, General Musharraf secured a vote of confidence in both houses of parliament and four provincial assemblies, meaning he will remain in power until late 2007, and as military chief until the end of 2004.
Musharraf's success on both counts was due to the support of the MMA. So what has this cost in terms of quid pro quo with the MMA? Details of any deal are proving extremely difficult to find. However, some things are self-evident. President Musharraf's dependence upon the MMA severely limits his ability to deal with Islamist extremism and terrorism, and this puts Musharraf in a hard place. He must appease the U.S. for military aid, and he must appease the mullahs and the MMA for regime survival. This seriously compromises security for Christians in Pakistan. Ultimately it also compromises Musharraf's own security.
RESURGENT EXTREMISM
Reuters reported on 16 January 2004 that the car bomb that exploded outside the Holy Trinity Cathedral/Bible Society complex in Karachi on 15 January "was a fertiliser bomb very much similar to what was used in the U.S consulate". The U.S. Consulate in Karachi (1 km from the Holy Trinity Cathedral) was bombed in June 2002. That attack was attributed to Al-Almi, a splinter faction of Harkat-ul Mujahideen, a group fighting in Kashmir. (Link 2)
TIME magazine reported in the 26 January issue that the militant Islamist group Jaish-e-Muhammad (also fighting in Kashmir) was behind the 25 December 2003 assassination attempt on Musharraf, and that this group is also linked to the June 2002 bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi.
Regarding the assassination attempt, TIME magazine comments (and we can apply this to the Bible Society bombing as well), "That Jaish-e-Muhammad has the capacity to launch sophisticated attacks on the President, possibly with insider help, is a situation partly of Musharraf's making. The government in Islamabad has long coddled militant Islamic groups, encouraging them first to help drive the Soviets out of neighboring Afghanistan and later to torment Indian troops in the part of the disputed state of Kashmir that is under Indian control.
"Under pressure from Washington, he (Musharraf) banned various militant organizations in January 2002, but he left their leaders largely unfettered and allowed the organizations to reconstitute under new names. Pakistan's intelligence services, which had helped build up the ground and infiltrate its fighters into Indian-controlled Kashmir, were hesitant to crack down, even after Jaish-e-Muhammad began unleashing religious terrorism within Pakistan." (Link 3)
Compass Direct (http://www.compassdirect.org ) reported on 23 January that Pakistani Christian teenager, Zeeshan Gill (16), was kidnapped for more than two weeks in November 2003 by Islamist militants training fighters for jihad in Kashmir. Zeeshan was taken to Jamia al Qasim al Aloom Islamic school (madrasa), beaten, forced to recite the Islamic creed, and threatened with death. He escaped home to his mother and they have fled into hiding.
Compass Direct reports, "According to Joseph Francis of the Lahore-based Center for Legal Aid and Assistance Settlement (CLAAS), the Gill family's dilemma is not unusual among Pakistan's tiny Christian minority." Joseph Francis told Compass Direct that CLAAS lawyers represented another boy who had been kidnapped as a minor. It was ordered that he be released from the madrasa. Shortly after his return to his mother, he was re-kidnapped and sent straight to Kashmir. No one knows his whereabouts.
Until the Pakistan government stops supporting the Kashmir jihad, dismantles the terror networks and cuts off their lifelines - madrasas and funds - the Christian community will remain at great risk.
---------------------------------------------
REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism
16 January 2004
The International Crisis Group has released a detailed report analysing and condemning Pakistan's lack of action against extremist Islamist organisations and madrasas. (Link 4)
The ICG report notes that the Pakistan government appears to be "more concerned about appeasing a valuable ally [MMA] than tackling the threats of terrorism and extremism in earnest."
The ICG accuses the government of refusing to invoke anti-terrorism laws against the leaders and members of banned militant Islamist organisations or dismantle their infrastructure. Hence when these groups are banned, they simply re-surface with new names and continue operations.
The government's failure to reform the jihadi madrasas is rooted in two issues - government support for the Kashmir jihad, and government dependence on MMA support for regime survival.
MADRASA REFORM & SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
The ICG reports details the links between the mullahs, the MMA and the madrasas and comments that "to appease the clergy and to gain the religious parties' support for the LFO, President Musharraf placed madrasa reform on the backburner".
"President Musharraf's MMA allies have categorically rejected, with a public campaign, government reforms of madrasas and any proposed laws to regulate their functioning, including curricula and finances." (ICG p 9)
Not only has madrasa reform gone on the backburner, but the issue of terrorist financing has been sidestepped altogether.
ICG reports, "Within Pakistan, the jihadi madrasa also continues to play a central role in promoting sectarian hatred and violence." And, "Sectarian tensions are bound to increase so long as the jihadi madrasa is allowed to preach religious intolerance." (ICG p 10)
HAMSTRUNG
Excerpts from ICG report page 16, under the heading "Strategies of Regime Survival" and subheading "Appeasing the Mullahs": "President Musharraf's pledges in 2002 to confront and eliminate Islamist extremism were compromised by his desire to obtain MMA support for controversial constitutional amendments and indeed his presidency. Now that the MMA has played a pivotal role in giving the LFO constitutional cover and helping Musharraf gain a vote of confidence to extend his presidency until 2007, the military-run government may be even less likely to risk taking effective action against the religious alliance and its many extremist offshoots.
"The quid pro quo for Musharraf's deal with the mullahs might never be officially revealed but can be gauged, at least partially, through the MMA's demands. Even prior to the December 2003 agreement, it had insisted upon official support for Islamisation in return for acceptance of the LFO and Musharraf's dual hats of president and chief of army staff. In June 2003, PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain admitted that the government had accepted ten MMA demands for Islamisation, in addition to pledging government funding to 8,000 madrasas. The ten included legislation in accordance with the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology; restructuring the economy, education and media along Islamic lines; ensuring rights for women in accordance with Islamic injunctions; and giving Islamic subjects equal importance with other fields of study in all educational institutions."
MMA's MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN
On Sunday 18 January the MMA launched a "mass contact campaign" for the enforcement of its 17-point Islamisation programme, which it describes as "the only solution to the country's many problems".
MMA chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that Pakistan had to come out from under American influence, that "Kashmir Solidarity Day" should be celebrated nationwide on 5 February. Ahmad read out the MMA 17-point Islamisation package and said, "We want to enforce true Islamic system in the country and the 17 points covers all aspects of Nizam-i-Shariat [Islamic law] whose implementation would establish Nizam-i-Mustafa [Islamic system] in the country." (Link 5)
INCREMENTAL ISLAMISATION (ICG p 19)
The ICG report comments on the shari'a bill passed by the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Assembly in June 2003, which pledges to impose "Allah's rule on earth through His pious men".
"Under another proposed law, yet to be presented to the provincial parliament, the MMA government intends to set up a hasba (accountability) department and ombudsman's offices at the provincial, district and local levels to ensure the enforcement of Islamic laws. Each ombudsman will have under his command a hasba force, a Pakistani version of the Taliban's vice and virtue police."
The ICG notes that, "The MMA's policies in the NWFP have encouraged extremists in other provinces and at the centre to follow suit." The report then details cases of Islamist groups in Baluchistan, the Punjab, Lahore, and Karachi, illegally enforcing elements of Islamic law, primarily in relation to depictions women in advertising, not only with impunity, but support from the national government.
"After the MMA's support for the Seventeenth Amendment, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali emphasised that his party, the PML-QA [Musharraf's military-backed party], and the MMA are 'natural allies', and that both 'favour...implementing [a] complete Islamic system in the country'."
Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) "Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?"
WEA RLC News & Analysis, Elizabeth Kendal, 6 June 03
2) Police link Karachi church bomb, consulate blast.
By Aamir Ashraf , KARACHI (Reuters), 16 Jan 2004
http://www.reuters.com/locales/newsArticle.jsp?type=worldNews&locale
=en_IN&storyID=4139006
3) TIME. 26 Jan 2004
The Monster Within. By Tim McGirk in Islamabad
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040126-578991,0
0.html
4) Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism
Asia Report N°73
16 January 2004
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2472
5) MMA launches mass contact campaign
HiPakistan 18 January 2004
http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en51266&F_catID=&f_ty
pe=source
Friday, June 6, 2003
Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?
Date: Friday 6 June 2003
Subj: Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty E-mail Conference
From: Elizabeth Kendal, Conference Moderator
Pakistan's central government and the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six pro-Sharia, pro-Taliban Islamist parties who rule the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and hold the balance of power in the National Assembly, are on a collision course. However, President Musharraf and the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) need MMA support in order to break the political deadlock, over President Musharraf's 'Legal Framework Order' (LFO) that President Musharraf issued in by decree before that last election. The situation opens the door for the MMA to use their own Islamisation and Constitutional amendments package as political leverage.
--------------------------------------------------
THE MMA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER
On 21 August 2002, before the 10 October 2002 elections, President Musharraf announced that he had issued a decree - the Legal Framework Order - that amended the constitution, giving him sweeping powers to sack a prime minister, dissolve parliament and set up a National Security Council, on which four military chiefs and eight civilian political leaders would sit, and which he, as president, would head, giving the armed forces a permanent role in the country's governance.
All opposition parties, including the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), opposed the Legal Framework Order (LFO). However, the October 2002 election resulted in the pro-Musharraf party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) winning the largest number of seats. The opposition accuses Musharraf of manipulating the poll by passing laws blocking Mr Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N and his fellow exiled former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of the PPP, from returning to power on the grounds they have served twice before as prime minister.
In spite of the fact that the Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won the most seats, they did not win enough to govern outright. The result was a hung parliament. Of the 324 seats in the National Assembly, Musharraf's PML-Q now holds 118, Bhutto's PPP holds 81 and the MMA secured an astonishing 60 seats enabling the MMA to hold the balance of power.
By early November, a coalition had formed between all those parties opposed to Musharraf's constitutional changes (the LFO). On 11 November however, Musharraf met with the MMA vice president, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, for over two hours. Mr Ahmed told President Musharraf that the MMA was ready to accept him as president if he took back his constitutional package (LFO) and left the post of the Chief of the Army. Musharraf would not accept. Yet - by 13 November 2002, the MMA and the pro-Musharraf PML-Q had "narrowed their differences" and the MMA was agreeing to be "flexible". This paved the way for a PML-Q / MMA coalition government to be formed.
THE VALUE OF LEVERAGE
To this day however, the constitutional issues have not been resolved and there is debate about whether the constitutional amendments made by the Legal Framework Order (LFO) are valid. On top of this, the MMA, which rules the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in its own right (holding 68 of the 124 seats) has, as of Monday 2 June, officially adopted Sharia law in NWFP. They have also passed the Hasba Act that enables them to establish a Department of Vice and Virtue, Taliban-style. Militant youths are pulling down billboards, trashing music stores and wreaking havoc across the NWFP. All 24 local governors - 'nazims' - have handed in their resignations to President Musharraf. Musharraf has responded by sacking the NWFP's chief secretary and inspector general of police over their enforcement of Sharia. This has put the NWFP, MMA government on a collision course with the pro-West central government.
All the meanwhile, the PML-Q president, Chaudry Shujaat Hussain, was trying to strike a deal with the MMA, to convince the MMA to co-operate with the PML-Q and break the political deadlock over the Legal Framework Order.
The strategic hour had arrived for the MAA to bring out its greatest weapon - its political leverage. The MMA has agreed to an about-face on the LFO, saying they will be willing to relax their opposition to the LFO and accept Musharraf as President, in Army uniform, provided the government is willing to accept the MMA's Islamisation package.
THE MMA'S ISLAMISATION PACKAGE.
This Islamisation package extends beyond the NWFP. The MMA's Islamisation package contains 17 demands - 7 are related to the LFO, and 10 are related to Islamisation. These demands include: a revision of media policy to bring it in line with Islamic values, the setting up of commissions and institutions to streamline the education system and economy according to Islamic teaching, the promotion of the shalwar kameez, (long smock with lose-fitting trousers) as the "national uniform" (to be made compulsory in all schools and colleges), Friday to be a weekly public holiday, and that Musharraf's Madrassa Ordinance be repealed and madrassa's be removed from the "watch list".
Another demand of the MMA is an amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution - "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan", to include that all laws will be in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah as per the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology, to ensure that no legislation contrary to the Sharia is carried out in the future. (The Council of Islamic Ideology was set up in the 1970s to ensure that all laws would be in accordance with Sharia, but it has always had a limited role.) The MMA also demands that all recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology be discussed in the parliament and amendments be made in the constitution accordingly to ensure the supremacy of Sharia in the country.
A further MMA demand is the removal of the President's power to pardon a person sentenced by the High Court in Hadood (or Hudood) cases. The Hadood Ordinance criminalizes non-marital rape, extramarital sex, and several alcohol, gambling, and property offenses. The Hadood Ordinance however, makes it necessary for a woman who has been raped to produce four adult male Muslim eye-witnesses to the crime who are willing to testify in her favour or else she, the rape victim, is imprisoned until the courts determine her fate.
The PML-Q president, Chaudry Shujaat Hussain, claims that while 10 of the MMA demands have been already agreed to, the rights of women and minorities will be ensured.
President Musharraf has summonsed the National Assembly to meet in Islamabad on 7 June 03 for the announcement of the national budget. Security will be high as disturbances from those opposed to the LFO are expected.
President Musharraf has two options - to rule by dictatorial decree and reign in the MMA, or to yield and be manipulated by the MMA.
-----------------------
After the October 2002 elections Benazir Bhutto said, "The military want to hold a red rag up to the West and say 'Look West, you need a military dictatorship, because if there's not, then pro-Taliban parties are going to come to power'. The MMA is a frightening scenario because when you create genies, genies get out of hand. What we have seen in the MMA is a genie of frightening proportions." (AFP 13 October 2002).
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links: here are two articles that, together, cover the issue
reasonably well.
"Standoff Paralyzes Pakistan Parliament" by Paul Haven
Associated Press, 4 June 2003
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-2748717,00.html
"MMA proposes 17-point agenda to settle LFO issue"
Paktribune. Islamabad, 31 May 2003
http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=27050
Subj: Pakistan: Islamisation or dictatorship or both?
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty E-mail Conference
From: Elizabeth Kendal, Conference Moderator
Pakistan's central government and the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six pro-Sharia, pro-Taliban Islamist parties who rule the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and hold the balance of power in the National Assembly, are on a collision course. However, President Musharraf and the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) need MMA support in order to break the political deadlock, over President Musharraf's 'Legal Framework Order' (LFO) that President Musharraf issued in by decree before that last election. The situation opens the door for the MMA to use their own Islamisation and Constitutional amendments package as political leverage.
--------------------------------------------------
THE MMA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER
On 21 August 2002, before the 10 October 2002 elections, President Musharraf announced that he had issued a decree - the Legal Framework Order - that amended the constitution, giving him sweeping powers to sack a prime minister, dissolve parliament and set up a National Security Council, on which four military chiefs and eight civilian political leaders would sit, and which he, as president, would head, giving the armed forces a permanent role in the country's governance.
All opposition parties, including the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), opposed the Legal Framework Order (LFO). However, the October 2002 election resulted in the pro-Musharraf party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) winning the largest number of seats. The opposition accuses Musharraf of manipulating the poll by passing laws blocking Mr Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N and his fellow exiled former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of the PPP, from returning to power on the grounds they have served twice before as prime minister.
In spite of the fact that the Pakistan Muslim League-Quid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won the most seats, they did not win enough to govern outright. The result was a hung parliament. Of the 324 seats in the National Assembly, Musharraf's PML-Q now holds 118, Bhutto's PPP holds 81 and the MMA secured an astonishing 60 seats enabling the MMA to hold the balance of power.
By early November, a coalition had formed between all those parties opposed to Musharraf's constitutional changes (the LFO). On 11 November however, Musharraf met with the MMA vice president, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, for over two hours. Mr Ahmed told President Musharraf that the MMA was ready to accept him as president if he took back his constitutional package (LFO) and left the post of the Chief of the Army. Musharraf would not accept. Yet - by 13 November 2002, the MMA and the pro-Musharraf PML-Q had "narrowed their differences" and the MMA was agreeing to be "flexible". This paved the way for a PML-Q / MMA coalition government to be formed.
THE VALUE OF LEVERAGE
To this day however, the constitutional issues have not been resolved and there is debate about whether the constitutional amendments made by the Legal Framework Order (LFO) are valid. On top of this, the MMA, which rules the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in its own right (holding 68 of the 124 seats) has, as of Monday 2 June, officially adopted Sharia law in NWFP. They have also passed the Hasba Act that enables them to establish a Department of Vice and Virtue, Taliban-style. Militant youths are pulling down billboards, trashing music stores and wreaking havoc across the NWFP. All 24 local governors - 'nazims' - have handed in their resignations to President Musharraf. Musharraf has responded by sacking the NWFP's chief secretary and inspector general of police over their enforcement of Sharia. This has put the NWFP, MMA government on a collision course with the pro-West central government.
All the meanwhile, the PML-Q president, Chaudry Shujaat Hussain, was trying to strike a deal with the MMA, to convince the MMA to co-operate with the PML-Q and break the political deadlock over the Legal Framework Order.
The strategic hour had arrived for the MAA to bring out its greatest weapon - its political leverage. The MMA has agreed to an about-face on the LFO, saying they will be willing to relax their opposition to the LFO and accept Musharraf as President, in Army uniform, provided the government is willing to accept the MMA's Islamisation package.
THE MMA'S ISLAMISATION PACKAGE.
This Islamisation package extends beyond the NWFP. The MMA's Islamisation package contains 17 demands - 7 are related to the LFO, and 10 are related to Islamisation. These demands include: a revision of media policy to bring it in line with Islamic values, the setting up of commissions and institutions to streamline the education system and economy according to Islamic teaching, the promotion of the shalwar kameez, (long smock with lose-fitting trousers) as the "national uniform" (to be made compulsory in all schools and colleges), Friday to be a weekly public holiday, and that Musharraf's Madrassa Ordinance be repealed and madrassa's be removed from the "watch list".
Another demand of the MMA is an amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution - "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan", to include that all laws will be in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah as per the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology, to ensure that no legislation contrary to the Sharia is carried out in the future. (The Council of Islamic Ideology was set up in the 1970s to ensure that all laws would be in accordance with Sharia, but it has always had a limited role.) The MMA also demands that all recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology be discussed in the parliament and amendments be made in the constitution accordingly to ensure the supremacy of Sharia in the country.
A further MMA demand is the removal of the President's power to pardon a person sentenced by the High Court in Hadood (or Hudood) cases. The Hadood Ordinance criminalizes non-marital rape, extramarital sex, and several alcohol, gambling, and property offenses. The Hadood Ordinance however, makes it necessary for a woman who has been raped to produce four adult male Muslim eye-witnesses to the crime who are willing to testify in her favour or else she, the rape victim, is imprisoned until the courts determine her fate.
The PML-Q president, Chaudry Shujaat Hussain, claims that while 10 of the MMA demands have been already agreed to, the rights of women and minorities will be ensured.
President Musharraf has summonsed the National Assembly to meet in Islamabad on 7 June 03 for the announcement of the national budget. Security will be high as disturbances from those opposed to the LFO are expected.
President Musharraf has two options - to rule by dictatorial decree and reign in the MMA, or to yield and be manipulated by the MMA.
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After the October 2002 elections Benazir Bhutto said, "The military want to hold a red rag up to the West and say 'Look West, you need a military dictatorship, because if there's not, then pro-Taliban parties are going to come to power'. The MMA is a frightening scenario because when you create genies, genies get out of hand. What we have seen in the MMA is a genie of frightening proportions." (AFP 13 October 2002).
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links: here are two articles that, together, cover the issue
reasonably well.
"Standoff Paralyzes Pakistan Parliament" by Paul Haven
Associated Press, 4 June 2003
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-2748717,00.html
"MMA proposes 17-point agenda to settle LFO issue"
Paktribune. Islamabad, 31 May 2003
http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=27050