In the late 1980s, President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced social and political reform to the Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) through perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). By 1990, Communism had fallen and the Cold War had ended. At that point, various megalomaniacs -- that is, men who wanted to be presidents rather than prime ministers, governors or generals -- set about exploiting ethnic nationalism in order to tear the centuries-old Russian Federation apart.
By the end of 1991, Kyrgyzstan was independent under the leadership of Askar Akayev, an intellectual and scientist appointed by Gorbachev. Kyrgyzstan was unique amongst its neighbours in that it was the only Central Asian former Soviet Republic not under the control of a former Soviet apparatchik (i.e. not a professional functionary of the Communist Party).
Akayev introduced multi-party democracy and encouraged a degree of openness unknown to Kyrgyzstan's neighbours. In 1998, Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian republic to join the World Trade Organisation.
Corruption takes over
In December 2001, America established a Transit Centre at Manas air base on the outskirts of the capital, Bishkek (also spelled Bishek), from where it could supply US troop in Afghanistan.
In an article entitled The Truth Behind The Recent Unrest in Kyrgyzstan (13 April 2010, first of a 3-part series), investment analysts with oilprice.com note: "Cozying up to the presidential administration Washington quickly allowed the administration of President Askar Akayev and its cronies to take over the lucrative refueling and provisioning rights for the bases, paying inflated prices for landing rights and fuel provided by companies under the presidential family's control." And so, as oilprice.com notes, the contracts for the US base at Manas became "a direct source of corruption", whereby Akayev's family profited "by owning the companies with exclusive rights to refuel NATO aircraft."
Repression escalates
But corruption and openness don't mix -- and so in order to allow corruption to flourish, Akayev had to roll back openness and liberty.
Akayev also learned he could play the "Cold-War-isn't-over-yet" game, pitting Russia and the US against each other for financial gain. In September 2003, he upset Washington by signing a bilateral agreement with Russia for the establishment of a Russian military base at Kant, also on the outskirts of Bishkek and only some 30km from Manus (map).
US monies however, did not benefit the Kyrgyz population. The masses remained impoverished while the Akayev clan grew very rich and very powerful. Corruption, cronyism and nepotism advanced at the expense of the impoverished and now harshly repressed masses. Discontent rose as hopes for human rights and democracy faded.
REVOLT
The March 2005 "Tulip Revolution" that ousted Akayev was not a US-sponsored "colour revolution". Rather it was a people's revolt, a coup that, despite its violence and expressions of ethnic Kyrgyz nationalism, won the support of the US which claimed it was part of the domino effect of democracy.
See :
The Tulip Revolution takes root
By Pepe Escobar, Asia Times online, 26 March 2005
KYRGYZSTAN’S REVOLUTION: BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR
A EurasiaNet Commentary, by Justin Burke, 25 March 2005
Corruption takes over
According to oilprice.com, after the "Tulip Revolution" Washington simply : "rewrote its cozy contracts with the Baikyev administration for Manas, delivered intermittent harangues on democracy and human rights, and essentially ignored the country". Subsequently, President Kurmanbek Bakiev became even more corrupt than the man he had deposed. His son, Maksim Bakiev, reportedly earned himself as much as $8 million a month monopolising the sale of fuel to the base.
See:
Kyrgyzstan: Business, Corruption and the Manas Airbase
oilprice.com 15 April 2010
Meanwhile, the masses remained impoverished with unemployment hovering around 18 percent. Discontent was growing. History was repeating itself and for all America's human rights rhetoric, it clearly saw the transit centre at Manas as a higher priority -- something not lost on the repressed and abused masses of Central Asia.
Repression escalates
As corruption, repression and hardship escalated, the masses (especially in the more devoutly Muslim south) increasing leaned towards the 'Islam-is-the-solution' message preached by the Islamic fundamentalists of the Ferghana Valley (southern Kyrgyzstan) -- specifically the jihadist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and revolutionary Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT).
To counter their influence, the Bakiev regime further escalated repression -- a strategy that only served to fuel the cycle. On 12 January 2009, a highly repressive Religion Law was enacted.
See:
Kyrgyzstan: putting the repressive religion law in context
By Elizabeth Kendal, 10 February 2009
World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
As Forum 18 reported at the time (13 January 2009): "Provisions that have caused concern to religious communities and human rights defenders include: a ban on children being involved in religious organisations; a ban on 'aggressive action aimed at proselytism'; a ban on the distribution of religious literature, print, and audio-video religious materials; and de facto compulsory re-registration of all registered religious organisations.
"The 12 January [2009] announcement on the presidential website trumpets the fact that 200 adult citizens permanently living in Kyrgyzstan will now be required before a religious community can apply for state registration, compared to 10 in the current Law. It says 10 registered religious organisations will be needed to form a 'religious association'."
While the law's primary target was the Islamic revolutionary Hizb-ut-Tahrir -- which had been provoking serious unrest in the south -- Protestant Christians (around 0.5 percent) have been caught in its anti-'new', anti-'foreign', anti-'small gatherings', anti-'religious literature', anti-'missionary' net. And because Protestant Christianity is "divisive" -- winning converts amongst Muslims and Russian Orthodox -- the regime exploited repression and persecution of Protestants as a convenient and easy means of appeasing aggrieved elements.
The last straw
In late 2009, confident that there was no organised opposition, Bakiev increased taxes and the cost of utilities. The first price hike came on 1 January 2010, the second would hit six months later. Thus in the middle winter, as temperatures dipped to minus 20 degrees Celsius, Kyrgyz citizens found their heating costs rising by at least 500 percent; electricity by 170 percent, hot water by 100 percent. Many people found themselves forced to choose between spending 80 percent of their salary of utilities, or turning off the gas, electricity and hot water.
See:
KYRGYZSTAN: UTILITY PRICE HIKE SQUEEZES CITIZENS
Liat Asman, Eurasianet, 8 February 2010
REVOLT
On 6 April 2010, anger and despair spilled into the streets. The protests escalated rapidly until the security forces, under the control of President Bakiev's brother, Zhanybek Bakiev, opened fired on the protesters, killing more than 80 and wounding hundreds more. Ultimately however, Bakiev was ousted, retreating south to his home base of Jalal-Abad.
See:
Eyewitness: Bishkek Unrest
Kyrgyz journalist recounts confrontation between protesters and government troops on the streets of Bishkek. By Urmat Imanaliev in Bishkek.
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) 10 April 10
US reaps bitter harvest from 'Tulip' revolution
By M K Bhadrakumar, Asia Times online, 10 April 2010
Stefan J Bos, in Kyrgyzstans for BosNewsLife reports that throughout the crisis churches have been active caring for the injured, visiting hospitals, holding prayer vigils, assisting with efforts to clean up the streets and repair damage to public facilities.
After fleeing south, Bakiev discovered he had little support left there either.
See: Bakiev Resigns After Support Crumbles
President leaves country, steps down following failed attempt to rally support in southern heartland. By Dina Tokbaeva in Bishkek.
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 15 April 10
(update: Bakiev has since renounced his resignation.)
While Bakiev has since found refuge in Belarus, there are calls for him to be extradited to Kyrgyzstan to stand trial for his crimes.
Heading into the future
The new inclusive interim administration led by Rosa Otunbayev will hold democratic elections and a referendum on an amended constitution later this year. This provides a wonderful opportunity for religious liberty to be restored.
See:
Kyrgyzstan: Omurbek Tekebaev speaks about draft Constitution
Ferghana.Ru 19 April 2010
Kyrgyzstan: Another Chance at Democracy
Getting it right this time will depend on new government’s efforts to overcome legacy of previous authoritarian rulers. By Pavel Dyatlenko in Bishek
Institute for War adn Peace Reporting (IWPR) 11 April 2010
Religious liberty
Forum 18 published a report on 16 April 2010 entitled: KYRGYZSTAN: "Restore religious freedom at least to the level we had before Bakiev", by Mushfig Bayram, in which various religious organisations, civil society and human rights groups express both their hopes and anxieties about the future.
Most importantly, Kanybek Imanaliyev, Head of the Press Service of the Interim Government led by Roza Otunbaeva, told Forum 18 on 15 April: "We want to establish freedom of speech and freedom of religion. We will reform the Constitution, the laws as necessary and the Religion Law."
When Forum 18 asked if religious communities would be able to carry on their normal religious activity while the laws are being changed, Imanaliyev said that "no one can answer that question at the moment. We need to first stabilize the situation. However I do not think there will be any conflicts on religious grounds in the meantime. The people of Kyrgyzstan are tolerant to different religions and confessions."
While expressing great hopes, many human rights advocates and religious leaders are adopting a "wait and see" approach, unsure about what the new administration will be able to achieve in a short time. Furthermore, they doubt that the distinction between "traditional" and "non-traditional" faiths will be able to be addressed without controversy, as this mindset is well entrenched across the whole region.
Threats emerge
After the March 2005 "Tulip Revolution", large numbers of poor southerners answered the call of Kyrgyz nationalists to exploit the chaos and seize land in Bishkek.
See:
KYRGYZ REVOLUTION: TAKING A TURN IN AN UNPREDICTABLE DIRECTION
EURASIA INSIGHT 8 April 2005
Similarly, on 19 April 2010, a violent mob of around 1000 ethnic Kyrgyz -- all well organised outsiders -- rampaged through the village of Mayevka on the outskirts of Bishek. Five were killed as the mob burned homes and seized land belonging to ethnic Russians and Turks (Maskhetian Turks: Georgian Muslims deported by Stalin). Local Kyrgyz reportedly intervened at great risk to defend their besieged neighbours.
Eurasianet reports that as a result of the pogrom, "some non-Kyrgyz residents are now saying they want to leave the Central Asian country".
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has demanded that the new administration in Kyrgyzstan take measures to protect Russian lives and properties in Kyrgyzstan.
See:
KYRGYZSTAN: INTER-ETHNIC TENSION RATTLES BISHKEK
David Trilling, Eurasinet, 20 April 2010
Kyrgyz Interim Leaders Try To Impose Order After Unrest
RFE/RL 20 April 2010
Kremlin Defends Russians Caught in ‘Infectious’ Kyrgyz Violence
Business Week, 20 April 2010
And of course in the midst of all this, Islamic forces will doubtless be viewing Kyrgyzstan's present vulnerability as their great opportunity. The March 2005 "Tulip Revolution" inspired Uzbekistan's Islamists to attempt a "people's revolution" of their own in Andijan in the Ferghana Valley in May 2005.
See:
Uzbekistan: a new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning
By Elizabeth Kendal, 22 march 2007
World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty Commission (WEA RLC)
There is considerable anxiety that Uzbek Islamists will again be closely watching events in Kyrgyzstan, taking notes on how they might engineer regime change to their advantage in Uzbekistan.
Most Kyrgyz citizens want to see their country emerge as a free and democratic state. However, with so many forces working against this outcome, Kyrgyzstan will need plenty of international support.
Showing posts with label Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
KYRGYZSTAN: putting the repressive religion law in context
Date: Tuesday 10 February 2009
Subj: Kyrgyzstan: putting the repressive religion law in context
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
---------------------------------------------------------
KYRGYZSTAN: PUTTING THE REPRESSIVE RELIGION LAW IN CONTEXT
-- Threat to Kyrgyzstan is severe but repression is not the solution.
-- A window of opportunity remains open; but not for long.
--------------------------------------------------------
On 12 January 2009 Kyrgyzstan's President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, signed a new Religion Law despite it having been widely condemned as unconstitutional and contrary to internationally accepted human rights standards. (Link 1)
The repressive new Religion Law, which passed through the parliament under a cloud of secrecy on 6 November 2008, is highly repressive. Forum 18 reports: "Provisions that have caused concern to religious communities and human rights defenders include: a ban on children being involved in religious organisations; a ban on 'aggressive action aimed at proselytism'; a ban on the distribution of religious literature, print, and audio-video religious materials; and de facto compulsory re-registration of all registered religious organisations.
"The 12 January announcement on the presidential website trumpets the fact that 200 adult citizens permanently living in Kyrgyzstan will now be required before a religious community can apply for state registration, compared to 10 in the current Law. It says 10 registered religious organisations will be needed to form a 'religious association'." (Link 1)
Such restrictions virtually guarantee that small non-"traditional" fellowships -- i.e. those outside the state-approved traditional Muslim and Russian Orthodox structures -- particularly those in small towns and remote villages, will simply be ineligible for registration.
According to another source, the law further stipulates that the Minister of Justice can only register a religious organisation/church after local authorities, and then regional authorities, have approved the membership list, and local authorities have the power to decide if a particular religious organisation is needed in their area. The ban on children being involved in religious organisations puts an end to children's ministries such as summer camps and Sunday Schools, and even means parents cannot take their children to church with them. Religious organisations are obliged to report all donations for the purpose of taxation. Police and former KGB have the right to interrupt services and conduct searches at their will.
According to Forum 18, Kyrgyzstan's Human Rights Ombudsperson, Tursunbek Akun, condemned the signing of the law and has pledged to press the government for amendments.
REACTIONARY REPRESSION
In Kyrgyzstan, as in numerous other states, the decrease in liberty is directionally proportional to the increase in corruption.
As corruption increases, enriching and empowering an elite at the expense of the disenfranchised poor, grass roots' dissatisfaction and anger mount until the state's stability is threatened.
Corrupt, dictatorial regimes react to the threat by increasing repression. If the primary source of opposition comes from religious groups or religious parties, then religious repression will intensify. However, such reactionary repression only serves to popularise and empower the opposition. Reactionary repression thus fuels an escalating cycle of violence where protest leads to repression which leads to greater protest and more intense repression and so on.
Only good governance (which lessens grievance) with liberty (which provides outlets for grievance to be lawfully expressed and ideas to be openly debated) can break the cycle. A corrupt regime that is deaf to its citizens and resistant to reform is vulnerable to revolution!
Herein lies the great threat to Kyrgyzstan. Escalating, endemic, systematic corruption is empowering the Islamic fundamentalist revolutionary group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). HuT, which has perfected the art of exploiting grievance and victimhood for its own political ends, is a legitimate threat to the peace, security and secularity of Central Asia.
HuT INCITING REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Just like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) promotes Islam as the solution and advocates the establishment of an Islamic State ruled by Sharia Law. However, while the IMU is militant and engages in terrorism, HuT is political and advocates peaceful means to Islamic revolution. According to HuT ideology, when the Caliphate is restored it will establish a conventional Islamic Army that will advance Islam globally.
Since its emergence in Central Asia in the 1990s, HuT has espoused peaceful means. Furthermore it has employed peaceful means to further its radical, Islamist ideology: literature and audio-visual distribution, proselytism and teaching in small groups. However, over recent years HuT has become not only more sophisticated (branching into humanitarian relief and development), but more aggressive. HuT has begun inciting revolutionary violence.
Two events have emboldened HuT in this regard:
1) Krygyzstan's March 2005 "Tulip Revolution",
2) the propaganda coup secured in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005.
Kyrgyzstan's 2005 "Tulip Revolution" was quite different from the so-called "colour revolutions" in Georgia (Rose, 2003) and Ukraine (Orange, 2004) as it was thuggish and violent. Furthermore, whilst the "revolutions" (regime changes) in Georgia and Ukraine were effected by genuinely pro-West (pro-NATO) forces, the "Tulip Revolution" was effected predominantly by poor HuT-incited Muslims bussed up to Bishek from the south, predominantly from Osh Province in the Fergana Valley.
Despite these glaring deficiencies, the "Tulip Revolution" was applauded in and legitimised by the West as yet another example of people-power democracy, simply because a "regime change" had occurred.
Immediately after the 14 March 2005 "Tulip Revolution", EurasiaNet's editor Justin Burke warned that it could turn out "that Islamic radicalism emerges as the ultimate winner of the Kyrgyz revolution".
Burke explained: "Allegations of vote-rigging served as the catalyst for the Kyrgyz revolution. But it was pent-up frustration among the population over persistent poverty and pervasive government corruption that packed the revolution with its explosive power. Many supporters of the revolution aren't necessarily interested in democracy; they are preoccupied simply with providing for themselves and their families.
"It is not too early to start worrying about the nightmare scenario of the Kyrgyz revolution -- one in which early hopes for a democratic transformation mutate into anxiety about the spread of Islamic radicalism. [. . .] In recent years, an extremist group that espouses non-violence tactics, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, has intensified its agit-prop activities aimed at overthrowing all the existing regimes in Central Asia and establishing an Islamic caliphate. The next few weeks are critical. If the provisional government can harness the revolutionary forces and keep political infighting to a minimum until new presidential and parliamentary elections are held, Kyrgyzstan will stand a chance of establishing Central Asia's first genuinely pluralistic political system. However, there is no guarantee at this time that the provisional government can accomplish these basic tasks. If it falters, and if Kyrgyzstan is saddled with a weak central government, Islamic radical groups may find themselves a new safe haven for international terrorist operations." (Link 2)
It was the "success" of the March 2005 "Tulip Revolution" that motivated Akramiya -- an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan -- to attempt a "colour revolution" of its own. In May 2005, Akramiya organised a peaceful rally for justice in Andijan, in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, which it then used as a cover for its violent coup d'etat attempt. When the security forces arrived to contend with the armed Islamic revolutionaries who had set fire to the court house and jail, killing guards and releasing prisoners, the militants, in an act of unspeakable betrayal and evil, used peaceful protestors as human shields, guaranteeing a high civilian death toll. While the Islamists failed to topple the government, they scored a major propaganda coup when the West, which was all too quick and eager to swallow the Islamist deception wholesale, reacted with strong one-sided condemnation of and sanctions against the Uzbek authorities.
Uzbekistan, believing its ally in the War on Terror had abandoned it, withdrew from Western rapprochement and assumed an anti-West and anti-Protestant stance. The break down in Uzbekistan-West relations had negative consequences on religious liberty. Years of slow but certain religious liberty reform were instantly undone and severe persecution returned. (For full background and analysis, see Link 3.)
Meanwhile in Kyrgystan, HuT has gone from strength to strength, popularised and empowered by escalating corruption and repression.
A "DECEPTIVE CALM" INDEED
On 14 August 2008, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report entitled "Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm". (Link 4)
ICG describes a government lurching towards totalitarianism over a sidelined and increasingly apathetic opposition. ICG remarks: "A superficial calm has overtaken the usually boisterous political scene. This calm may, however, prove deceptive, given worsening corruption, increasing disillusionment with politics and a series of major economic crises that could strike before year's end."
The ICG report goes to great lengths to paint a picture of Krygyzstan: a power-hungry government; rising HIV/AIDS due primarily to drug trafficking (from Afghanistan, through Osh to Russia and the West) and soaring drug addiction; growing north-south tensions; endemic and systematic corruption; looming food and energy crises; and widespread poverty -- around 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line while the standard "basket" of goods and commodities costs ten times the minimum wage. Yet, for all this excellent background, the ICG report makes not one single mention of Hizb ut-Tahrir -- or even "Islam".
On 1 October 2008, only six weeks after ICG reported on Kyrgyzstan's "deceptive calm", a reported 1000 Muslims rioted in the strongly Muslim southern Fergana Valley town of Nookat in Osh province.
(Whilst Kyrgyzstan's capital of Bishek and the rest of the north comprises largely Russiafied Kyrgyz, the south has a large ethnic Uzbek minority and is increasingly staunchly Muslim.)
Nookat Muslims had asked the local authorities to sponsor the Muslim community's Eid al Fitr celebrations -- which traditionally mark the end of Ramadan -- in the city centre. When the local authorities refused and offered a local sports stadium as an alternative venue, a riot ensued. (Note: most human rights groups say "protest".)
With incitement from elements of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a reported 1000 Muslims rioted, throwing stones at police and smashing the windows and doors of the local government offices. Five police were injured and riot police had to be brought in from Osh city to disperse the mob with tear gas.
Numerous reports, including Kyrgyz ones, blame the riot on "government insensitivity" towards Muslim needs, as if destructive, violent rioting can ever be justified. (Link 5)
Thirty-two Uzbek and Kyrgyz Muslims, all reportedly members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, were arrested and subsequently charged with incitement to cause mass unrest, overthrow the authorities and create ethnic or religious strife. They were sentenced to long, harsh prison terms which advocates hope will be reduced upon appeal, particularly in the case of minors. (Link 6)
The local, provincial and central authorities should all have seen this coming. Indeed they should have spent the year preparing for Eid 2008, building relationships and negotiating, with the aim of marginalising HuT and circumventing a repeat of the debacle of Eid 2007.
In October 2007 Nookat's local authorities supported the community's Eid al Fitr celebrations in the town centre until it became clear that some 300 HuT members had "hijacked" the event.
Abdygany Aliev, head of the Nookat district administration told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): "At first, we welcomed the initiative to hold a big celebration of the Muslim feast. But Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists started using this event for their own ends." According to IWPR: "Before the Eid festival, about 1,000 people signed a petition calling on the [secular] government to fund the celebrations, and also to pay for a new state school for girls who want to follow the Muslim dress code. Hizb-ut-Tahrir members told IWPR they helped with logistical arrangements for the party." (Link 7)
The Nookat authorities reacted to the HuT "hijacking" of the Eid event by moving in and cracking down harshly, disrupting the peaceful, joyous celebration; dispersing the crowds and confiscating equipment used in food preparation. Several of those arrested were severely beaten by police. IWPR reported: "Hizb-ut-Tahrir says the authorities' actions caused widespread discontent among Nookat residents, and the event transformed into a demonstration involving some 15,000 people." (Link 7)
The 1 October 2008 Nookat riot (especially when seen in the light of the October 2007 Eid al Fitr debacle) goes some way to explaining why the draconian Religion Law passed so easily through the parliament on 6 November 2008 and was subsequently signed into law by the President on 12 January 2009 despite protests from the "international" community. While being profoundly short-sighted and self-defeating, increasing repression is just so much easier than dealing with complex systemic problems that require profound government reform.
PROTESTANTS CAUGHT IN THE LAW'S NET
There is little doubt that Kyrgyzstan's new repressive Religion Law is designed to curtail the very real and serious threat posed by an ascendant Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to Eurasianet, on 28 January 2008 Prime Minister Viktor Chudinov announced as much when ordered into action a plan to combat the "spread of religious extremism" over the next three years. The only group identified by name was the "religious extremist party Hizb-ut Tahrir". (Link 8)
However, not the Muslims nor the Russian Orthodox nor the government seems concerned that Protestants and other small religious groups, who do not threaten or harm anyone, are going to be unjustly and unconstitutionally caught up in the Law's net.
The situation is complicated by two other issues that need to be addressed in the context of religious liberty advocacy:
1) the adversarial and detrimental nature of "New Cold War" geopolitics combined with the complicity of the (Protestant) West in the so-called "Colour Revolutions" that have brought regime change (but not necessarily stability or improved governance) to several former-Soviet states;
2) the fact that the region's "traditional" religions -- state-approved "traditional" Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church -- are more interested in securing hegemony than supporting religious liberty or expressing solidarity with their brethren, whom they refuse to recognise as such.
The adversarial and detrimental nature of "New Cold War" geopolitics not only negatively impacts religious liberty, it also has a serious, detrimental effect of regional and global security. The Taliban has strangled NATO's primary supply-line into Afghanistan (Peshawar to Kabul/Bagram via the Khyber Pass). So NATO is now is seeking to establish a new supply-line coming into Afghanistan from Central Asia in the north. But Kyrgyzstan has just expelled the US from the Manas air base, not primarily because Kyrgyzstan is anti-American, but because it knew it could play Russia and the US against each other for its own gain. Russia won, not because it wants the Taliban to win in Afghanistan, but because it wants the US to negotiate with Russia on Russia's terms. The US may also have to consider making deals with Iran for the use of Chabahar port on the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile the Taliban are preparing a cataclysmic Spring offensive.
Local security is also threatened by a repression of religious liberty. So as to be clear to Kyrgyzstan's southern Muslims that a Sharia-enforcing Caliphate is not the solution, the government must provide solutions -- practical and ideological.
Whilst the Institute for War and Peace Reporting did blame the Noorkat riot on "official insensitivity" (instead of official negligence combined with Islamic belligerence), it did quote several analysts who understood that the government needs to do more to stop Islamic radicals channelling grass-roots discontent.
Among them was Miroslav Niazov, a former government official. "Niazov believes that support for Hizb ut Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan is growing not because people espouse radical ideologies, but because they are profoundly unhappy with government policies and lack of responsiveness."
Another was Kadyr Malikov, an academic who specialises in Islamic studies.
"According to Malikov, the government and its allies need to tackle Hizb ut-Tahrir head on by addressing the same issues that it highlights -- among them poverty -- and setting out arguments to counter its extreme views.
"Malikov said influential Muslim religious leaders had a large role to play in changing popular attitudes to Hizb ut-Tahrir. They must do more than talk, he said, recommending instead 'practical grassroots work to tackle poverty, supported by local government'. 'This conflict [in Nookat] is the first serious alarm-bell signalling a need to change the strategy and methods for countering Hizb ut-Tahrir,' he said." (Link 5)
Protestants too could have a part to play to play in this, but that would require complete religious liberty including the right to convert and the right to criticise or scrutinise religion.
Without profound reform, Krygyzstan will remain stuck in a destructive cycle that is destined to further popularise and empower HuT.
Such a scenario leaves all religious liberty advocates concerned that Kyrgyzstan's next "revolution" -- a virtual certainty unless there is reform -- might be the Islamic revolution HuT is seeking.
If HuT does make a serious attempt at Islamic revolution it could trigger civil war and regional jihad. If Islam is victorious then all hopes of religious liberty reform will be crushed for the foreseeable future.
These are critical, pivotal days for religious liberty and advocacy of good governance in Kyrgyzstan. It is possible that only a small window of opportunity remains.
Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) KYRGYZSTAN: President's signing of restrictive Religion Law condemned
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service; 13 Jan 2009
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1240
2) KYRGYZSTAN'S REVOLUTION: Be careful what you wish for.
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Justin Burke, 25 March 2005
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032505.shtml
ALSO for more on the Tulip Revolution SEE:
The Tulip Revolution takes root
By Pepe Escobar 26 March 2005
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GC26Ag03.html
3) Uzbekistan: a new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning
WEA Religious Liberty News & Analysis 23 March 2007
http://www.worldevangelicals.org/news/article.htm?id=984&cat=main
4) Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm
Asia Briefing No.79, 14 August 2008
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5627&CFID=58794820&CFTOKEN=16075927
5) Kyrgyzstan: Islamic Protest Sparked by Official Insensitivity
Analysts say government needs to do more to stop Islamic radicals channelling grassroots discontent.
By Yrys Kadykeev in Bishkek (RCA No. 551, 14-Oct-08)
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=347137&apc_state=henfrca347131
6) Controversy Over Kyrgyz Protest Sentences
Sentences of up to 20 years seen as warning to other protesters, rather than justice.
By Mirgul Akimova and Ayday Tokonova in Bishkek and Regina Kalpanazar in Osh. (RCA No. 558, 12-Dec-08)
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=l=EN&p=rca&s=f&o=348494
7) Islamic Group Quietly Builds Support in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyz government seems to be unable to stop the growth of popular support for Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the south.
By Abdumomun Mamaraimov in Jalalabad (RCA No. 516, 16-Nov-07)
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=340673&apc_state=henh
8) KYRGYZSTAN: New effort aggressively counters Hizb ut-Tahrir, religious extremism.
By Bruce Pannier, 15 Feb 2008
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp021508.shtml
Subj: Kyrgyzstan: putting the repressive religion law in context
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
---------------------------------------------------------
KYRGYZSTAN: PUTTING THE REPRESSIVE RELIGION LAW IN CONTEXT
-- Threat to Kyrgyzstan is severe but repression is not the solution.
-- A window of opportunity remains open; but not for long.
--------------------------------------------------------
On 12 January 2009 Kyrgyzstan's President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, signed a new Religion Law despite it having been widely condemned as unconstitutional and contrary to internationally accepted human rights standards. (Link 1)
The repressive new Religion Law, which passed through the parliament under a cloud of secrecy on 6 November 2008, is highly repressive. Forum 18 reports: "Provisions that have caused concern to religious communities and human rights defenders include: a ban on children being involved in religious organisations; a ban on 'aggressive action aimed at proselytism'; a ban on the distribution of religious literature, print, and audio-video religious materials; and de facto compulsory re-registration of all registered religious organisations.
"The 12 January announcement on the presidential website trumpets the fact that 200 adult citizens permanently living in Kyrgyzstan will now be required before a religious community can apply for state registration, compared to 10 in the current Law. It says 10 registered religious organisations will be needed to form a 'religious association'." (Link 1)
Such restrictions virtually guarantee that small non-"traditional" fellowships -- i.e. those outside the state-approved traditional Muslim and Russian Orthodox structures -- particularly those in small towns and remote villages, will simply be ineligible for registration.
According to another source, the law further stipulates that the Minister of Justice can only register a religious organisation/church after local authorities, and then regional authorities, have approved the membership list, and local authorities have the power to decide if a particular religious organisation is needed in their area. The ban on children being involved in religious organisations puts an end to children's ministries such as summer camps and Sunday Schools, and even means parents cannot take their children to church with them. Religious organisations are obliged to report all donations for the purpose of taxation. Police and former KGB have the right to interrupt services and conduct searches at their will.
According to Forum 18, Kyrgyzstan's Human Rights Ombudsperson, Tursunbek Akun, condemned the signing of the law and has pledged to press the government for amendments.
REACTIONARY REPRESSION
In Kyrgyzstan, as in numerous other states, the decrease in liberty is directionally proportional to the increase in corruption.
As corruption increases, enriching and empowering an elite at the expense of the disenfranchised poor, grass roots' dissatisfaction and anger mount until the state's stability is threatened.
Corrupt, dictatorial regimes react to the threat by increasing repression. If the primary source of opposition comes from religious groups or religious parties, then religious repression will intensify. However, such reactionary repression only serves to popularise and empower the opposition. Reactionary repression thus fuels an escalating cycle of violence where protest leads to repression which leads to greater protest and more intense repression and so on.
Only good governance (which lessens grievance) with liberty (which provides outlets for grievance to be lawfully expressed and ideas to be openly debated) can break the cycle. A corrupt regime that is deaf to its citizens and resistant to reform is vulnerable to revolution!
Herein lies the great threat to Kyrgyzstan. Escalating, endemic, systematic corruption is empowering the Islamic fundamentalist revolutionary group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). HuT, which has perfected the art of exploiting grievance and victimhood for its own political ends, is a legitimate threat to the peace, security and secularity of Central Asia.
HuT INCITING REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Just like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) promotes Islam as the solution and advocates the establishment of an Islamic State ruled by Sharia Law. However, while the IMU is militant and engages in terrorism, HuT is political and advocates peaceful means to Islamic revolution. According to HuT ideology, when the Caliphate is restored it will establish a conventional Islamic Army that will advance Islam globally.
Since its emergence in Central Asia in the 1990s, HuT has espoused peaceful means. Furthermore it has employed peaceful means to further its radical, Islamist ideology: literature and audio-visual distribution, proselytism and teaching in small groups. However, over recent years HuT has become not only more sophisticated (branching into humanitarian relief and development), but more aggressive. HuT has begun inciting revolutionary violence.
Two events have emboldened HuT in this regard:
1) Krygyzstan's March 2005 "Tulip Revolution",
2) the propaganda coup secured in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005.
Kyrgyzstan's 2005 "Tulip Revolution" was quite different from the so-called "colour revolutions" in Georgia (Rose, 2003) and Ukraine (Orange, 2004) as it was thuggish and violent. Furthermore, whilst the "revolutions" (regime changes) in Georgia and Ukraine were effected by genuinely pro-West (pro-NATO) forces, the "Tulip Revolution" was effected predominantly by poor HuT-incited Muslims bussed up to Bishek from the south, predominantly from Osh Province in the Fergana Valley.
Despite these glaring deficiencies, the "Tulip Revolution" was applauded in and legitimised by the West as yet another example of people-power democracy, simply because a "regime change" had occurred.
Immediately after the 14 March 2005 "Tulip Revolution", EurasiaNet's editor Justin Burke warned that it could turn out "that Islamic radicalism emerges as the ultimate winner of the Kyrgyz revolution".
Burke explained: "Allegations of vote-rigging served as the catalyst for the Kyrgyz revolution. But it was pent-up frustration among the population over persistent poverty and pervasive government corruption that packed the revolution with its explosive power. Many supporters of the revolution aren't necessarily interested in democracy; they are preoccupied simply with providing for themselves and their families.
"It is not too early to start worrying about the nightmare scenario of the Kyrgyz revolution -- one in which early hopes for a democratic transformation mutate into anxiety about the spread of Islamic radicalism. [. . .] In recent years, an extremist group that espouses non-violence tactics, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, has intensified its agit-prop activities aimed at overthrowing all the existing regimes in Central Asia and establishing an Islamic caliphate. The next few weeks are critical. If the provisional government can harness the revolutionary forces and keep political infighting to a minimum until new presidential and parliamentary elections are held, Kyrgyzstan will stand a chance of establishing Central Asia's first genuinely pluralistic political system. However, there is no guarantee at this time that the provisional government can accomplish these basic tasks. If it falters, and if Kyrgyzstan is saddled with a weak central government, Islamic radical groups may find themselves a new safe haven for international terrorist operations." (Link 2)
It was the "success" of the March 2005 "Tulip Revolution" that motivated Akramiya -- an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan -- to attempt a "colour revolution" of its own. In May 2005, Akramiya organised a peaceful rally for justice in Andijan, in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, which it then used as a cover for its violent coup d'etat attempt. When the security forces arrived to contend with the armed Islamic revolutionaries who had set fire to the court house and jail, killing guards and releasing prisoners, the militants, in an act of unspeakable betrayal and evil, used peaceful protestors as human shields, guaranteeing a high civilian death toll. While the Islamists failed to topple the government, they scored a major propaganda coup when the West, which was all too quick and eager to swallow the Islamist deception wholesale, reacted with strong one-sided condemnation of and sanctions against the Uzbek authorities.
Uzbekistan, believing its ally in the War on Terror had abandoned it, withdrew from Western rapprochement and assumed an anti-West and anti-Protestant stance. The break down in Uzbekistan-West relations had negative consequences on religious liberty. Years of slow but certain religious liberty reform were instantly undone and severe persecution returned. (For full background and analysis, see Link 3.)
Meanwhile in Kyrgystan, HuT has gone from strength to strength, popularised and empowered by escalating corruption and repression.
A "DECEPTIVE CALM" INDEED
On 14 August 2008, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report entitled "Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm". (Link 4)
ICG describes a government lurching towards totalitarianism over a sidelined and increasingly apathetic opposition. ICG remarks: "A superficial calm has overtaken the usually boisterous political scene. This calm may, however, prove deceptive, given worsening corruption, increasing disillusionment with politics and a series of major economic crises that could strike before year's end."
The ICG report goes to great lengths to paint a picture of Krygyzstan: a power-hungry government; rising HIV/AIDS due primarily to drug trafficking (from Afghanistan, through Osh to Russia and the West) and soaring drug addiction; growing north-south tensions; endemic and systematic corruption; looming food and energy crises; and widespread poverty -- around 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line while the standard "basket" of goods and commodities costs ten times the minimum wage. Yet, for all this excellent background, the ICG report makes not one single mention of Hizb ut-Tahrir -- or even "Islam".
On 1 October 2008, only six weeks after ICG reported on Kyrgyzstan's "deceptive calm", a reported 1000 Muslims rioted in the strongly Muslim southern Fergana Valley town of Nookat in Osh province.
(Whilst Kyrgyzstan's capital of Bishek and the rest of the north comprises largely Russiafied Kyrgyz, the south has a large ethnic Uzbek minority and is increasingly staunchly Muslim.)
Nookat Muslims had asked the local authorities to sponsor the Muslim community's Eid al Fitr celebrations -- which traditionally mark the end of Ramadan -- in the city centre. When the local authorities refused and offered a local sports stadium as an alternative venue, a riot ensued. (Note: most human rights groups say "protest".)
With incitement from elements of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a reported 1000 Muslims rioted, throwing stones at police and smashing the windows and doors of the local government offices. Five police were injured and riot police had to be brought in from Osh city to disperse the mob with tear gas.
Numerous reports, including Kyrgyz ones, blame the riot on "government insensitivity" towards Muslim needs, as if destructive, violent rioting can ever be justified. (Link 5)
Thirty-two Uzbek and Kyrgyz Muslims, all reportedly members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, were arrested and subsequently charged with incitement to cause mass unrest, overthrow the authorities and create ethnic or religious strife. They were sentenced to long, harsh prison terms which advocates hope will be reduced upon appeal, particularly in the case of minors. (Link 6)
The local, provincial and central authorities should all have seen this coming. Indeed they should have spent the year preparing for Eid 2008, building relationships and negotiating, with the aim of marginalising HuT and circumventing a repeat of the debacle of Eid 2007.
In October 2007 Nookat's local authorities supported the community's Eid al Fitr celebrations in the town centre until it became clear that some 300 HuT members had "hijacked" the event.
Abdygany Aliev, head of the Nookat district administration told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): "At first, we welcomed the initiative to hold a big celebration of the Muslim feast. But Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists started using this event for their own ends." According to IWPR: "Before the Eid festival, about 1,000 people signed a petition calling on the [secular] government to fund the celebrations, and also to pay for a new state school for girls who want to follow the Muslim dress code. Hizb-ut-Tahrir members told IWPR they helped with logistical arrangements for the party." (Link 7)
The Nookat authorities reacted to the HuT "hijacking" of the Eid event by moving in and cracking down harshly, disrupting the peaceful, joyous celebration; dispersing the crowds and confiscating equipment used in food preparation. Several of those arrested were severely beaten by police. IWPR reported: "Hizb-ut-Tahrir says the authorities' actions caused widespread discontent among Nookat residents, and the event transformed into a demonstration involving some 15,000 people." (Link 7)
The 1 October 2008 Nookat riot (especially when seen in the light of the October 2007 Eid al Fitr debacle) goes some way to explaining why the draconian Religion Law passed so easily through the parliament on 6 November 2008 and was subsequently signed into law by the President on 12 January 2009 despite protests from the "international" community. While being profoundly short-sighted and self-defeating, increasing repression is just so much easier than dealing with complex systemic problems that require profound government reform.
PROTESTANTS CAUGHT IN THE LAW'S NET
There is little doubt that Kyrgyzstan's new repressive Religion Law is designed to curtail the very real and serious threat posed by an ascendant Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to Eurasianet, on 28 January 2008 Prime Minister Viktor Chudinov announced as much when ordered into action a plan to combat the "spread of religious extremism" over the next three years. The only group identified by name was the "religious extremist party Hizb-ut Tahrir". (Link 8)
However, not the Muslims nor the Russian Orthodox nor the government seems concerned that Protestants and other small religious groups, who do not threaten or harm anyone, are going to be unjustly and unconstitutionally caught up in the Law's net.
The situation is complicated by two other issues that need to be addressed in the context of religious liberty advocacy:
1) the adversarial and detrimental nature of "New Cold War" geopolitics combined with the complicity of the (Protestant) West in the so-called "Colour Revolutions" that have brought regime change (but not necessarily stability or improved governance) to several former-Soviet states;
2) the fact that the region's "traditional" religions -- state-approved "traditional" Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church -- are more interested in securing hegemony than supporting religious liberty or expressing solidarity with their brethren, whom they refuse to recognise as such.
The adversarial and detrimental nature of "New Cold War" geopolitics not only negatively impacts religious liberty, it also has a serious, detrimental effect of regional and global security. The Taliban has strangled NATO's primary supply-line into Afghanistan (Peshawar to Kabul/Bagram via the Khyber Pass). So NATO is now is seeking to establish a new supply-line coming into Afghanistan from Central Asia in the north. But Kyrgyzstan has just expelled the US from the Manas air base, not primarily because Kyrgyzstan is anti-American, but because it knew it could play Russia and the US against each other for its own gain. Russia won, not because it wants the Taliban to win in Afghanistan, but because it wants the US to negotiate with Russia on Russia's terms. The US may also have to consider making deals with Iran for the use of Chabahar port on the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile the Taliban are preparing a cataclysmic Spring offensive.
Local security is also threatened by a repression of religious liberty. So as to be clear to Kyrgyzstan's southern Muslims that a Sharia-enforcing Caliphate is not the solution, the government must provide solutions -- practical and ideological.
Whilst the Institute for War and Peace Reporting did blame the Noorkat riot on "official insensitivity" (instead of official negligence combined with Islamic belligerence), it did quote several analysts who understood that the government needs to do more to stop Islamic radicals channelling grass-roots discontent.
Among them was Miroslav Niazov, a former government official. "Niazov believes that support for Hizb ut Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan is growing not because people espouse radical ideologies, but because they are profoundly unhappy with government policies and lack of responsiveness."
Another was Kadyr Malikov, an academic who specialises in Islamic studies.
"According to Malikov, the government and its allies need to tackle Hizb ut-Tahrir head on by addressing the same issues that it highlights -- among them poverty -- and setting out arguments to counter its extreme views.
"Malikov said influential Muslim religious leaders had a large role to play in changing popular attitudes to Hizb ut-Tahrir. They must do more than talk, he said, recommending instead 'practical grassroots work to tackle poverty, supported by local government'. 'This conflict [in Nookat] is the first serious alarm-bell signalling a need to change the strategy and methods for countering Hizb ut-Tahrir,' he said." (Link 5)
Protestants too could have a part to play to play in this, but that would require complete religious liberty including the right to convert and the right to criticise or scrutinise religion.
Without profound reform, Krygyzstan will remain stuck in a destructive cycle that is destined to further popularise and empower HuT.
Such a scenario leaves all religious liberty advocates concerned that Kyrgyzstan's next "revolution" -- a virtual certainty unless there is reform -- might be the Islamic revolution HuT is seeking.
If HuT does make a serious attempt at Islamic revolution it could trigger civil war and regional jihad. If Islam is victorious then all hopes of religious liberty reform will be crushed for the foreseeable future.
These are critical, pivotal days for religious liberty and advocacy of good governance in Kyrgyzstan. It is possible that only a small window of opportunity remains.
Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) KYRGYZSTAN: President's signing of restrictive Religion Law condemned
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service; 13 Jan 2009
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1240
2) KYRGYZSTAN'S REVOLUTION: Be careful what you wish for.
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Justin Burke, 25 March 2005
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032505.shtml
ALSO for more on the Tulip Revolution SEE:
The Tulip Revolution takes root
By Pepe Escobar 26 March 2005
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GC26Ag03.html
3) Uzbekistan: a new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning
WEA Religious Liberty News & Analysis 23 March 2007
http://www.worldevangelicals.org/news/article.htm?id=984&cat=main
4) Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm
Asia Briefing No.79, 14 August 2008
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5627&CFID=58794820&CFTOKEN=16075927
5) Kyrgyzstan: Islamic Protest Sparked by Official Insensitivity
Analysts say government needs to do more to stop Islamic radicals channelling grassroots discontent.
By Yrys Kadykeev in Bishkek (RCA No. 551, 14-Oct-08)
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=347137&apc_state=henfrca347131
6) Controversy Over Kyrgyz Protest Sentences
Sentences of up to 20 years seen as warning to other protesters, rather than justice.
By Mirgul Akimova and Ayday Tokonova in Bishkek and Regina Kalpanazar in Osh. (RCA No. 558, 12-Dec-08)
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=l=EN&p=rca&s=f&o=348494
7) Islamic Group Quietly Builds Support in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyz government seems to be unable to stop the growth of popular support for Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the south.
By Abdumomun Mamaraimov in Jalalabad (RCA No. 516, 16-Nov-07)
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=340673&apc_state=henh
8) KYRGYZSTAN: New effort aggressively counters Hizb ut-Tahrir, religious extremism.
By Bruce Pannier, 15 Feb 2008
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp021508.shtml
Friday, March 23, 2007
Uzbekistan: why Andijan changed everything
Date: Friday 23 March 2007
Subj: Uzbekistan: a new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UZBEKISTAN: A NEW WAVE OF SERIOUS PERSECUTION MAY BE JUST BEGINNING
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The religious liberty situation for Protestant Christians in Uzbekistan has deteriorated markedly since May 2005. There are two reasons for this and while one is well understood, the other is not.
Reason One: HOLDING ON TO POWER
As is well understood, the era of the Soviet-era dictators running post-Soviet states is coming to an end. Uzbekistan's President Karimov has been watching as post-Soviet states have turned West-ward and embraced democracy and liberty; and as corrupt, repressive pro-Russian, Soviet-era Communist dictators have been driven from power in "colour revolutions": Georgia (Rose, 2003), Ukraine (Orange, 2004) and Kyrzygstan (Tulip, 2005). Then in December 2006 the Soviet-era strongman Saparmurat Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan, died aged 66yrs.
Karimov is keen to hold on to power and so he is quick to repress anything that could threaten the status quo, including threatening non-traditional religions. Radical Islam (largely foreign influenced) is clearly a serious threat to Central Asia. However, because Protestant Christianity is perceived as being essentially Western, anti-corruption and pro-democracy, Karimov regards it as equally threatening.
While Karimov's repression and violence have hurt the Church, they have enabled the Islamist revolutionary and militant groups that feed off social anger to grow. Karimov has been perpetuating a vicious reactionary cycle and Christians are caught up in the slipstream.
Reason Two: LETTING GO OF THE WEST
The other reason why the religious liberty situation for Protestants has deteriorated over recent years is actually more important but less understood.
In 1998 when the US State Department passed its Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (HR 2431), Uzbekistan had several Protestant pastors serving long prison sentences with hard labour on bogus drugs charges. To avoid incurring US sanctions as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), Uzbek leaders negotiated with the US and then released their religious prisoners. In November 2006, after two years of escalating religious repression, the US State Department added Uzbekistan to its list of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC). On 9 March 2007 Uzbekistan sentenced one of its leading registered Protestant pastors to four years in a penal colony after a sham trial. Clearly Uzbekistan doesn't care about the US or CPC status any more. (Link 1)
There is no doubt that the critical turning point was the May 2005 uprising in Andjian.
After the May 2005 Andjian incident WEA RLC News & Analysis wrote (19 July 2005) that Karimov was fighting a war for the status quo against radical Islam, and it was anticipated that "non-traditional" Protestant Christians would doubtless be caught up in the ensuing crackdown. (Link 2)
However, immediately after the May 2005 Andijan uprising, another factor entered the equation and it is this factor that has caused the most serious damage to the religious liberty and human rights situation in Uzbekistan.
In May 2005, the West was in the midst of a "War on Terror" and Uzbekistan, a key ally in the War on Terror, was struggling with serious issues regarding Islamic revolutionary and al-Qaeda linked terrorist organisations. (Forty-seven people were killed in March and July 2004 in a series of well planned and well facilitated terrorist attacks that targeted Uzbek police, private and commercial facilities, and the US and Israeli Embassies.)
Despite this, after the May 2005 incident in Andijan, Western media, human rights monitors and governments were exceedingly quick to reject the Uzbek government's assertion that Islamic radicals and militants had attempted a coup d'etat. Western groups preferred rather to accept (even passionately embrace) narrative coming from Andijan that alleged that a repressive and violent government had, for no reason at all, massacred hundreds of innocent peaceful protesters as they gathered to decry their poverty and the lack of justice, liberty and democracy under the Karimov regime.
The US, too quick to pass judgment, enacted reactionary policies including sanctions. From this point onwards, President Karimov no longer viewed the US as a partner and ally in the "War on Terror". Two months later, in July 2005, President Karimov officially evicted the US military base from Uzbekistan. The Karshi-Kanabad (K2) Airbase had been established in the wake of 9/11 to serve as a hub for combat and humanitarian missions into Afghanistan.
Along with this, Karimov turned increasingly towards Russia, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, which Uzbekistan joined in 2001) which is committed security and "non-interference" and to reducing US influence in Central Asia.
US influence in Uzbekistan has been dealt a serious blow. Not only has the US lost its ability to exert positive influence over Uzbekistan in terms of religious liberty, but due to the souring of relations the West has lost its ability to influence Uzbekistan's secular government towards reform and openness.
SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN ANDJIAN?
A most comprehensive and useful piece on the May 2005 Andijan incident comes from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center based in Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, DC, and Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
Their paper (herein referred to as the Silk Road paper) entitled: "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: implications for the EU" by Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, published in July 2006, is extremely helpful in many ways. (Link 3)
This paper examines the nature, in terms of history and evolution, of both Islam and secularism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It looks at how the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have affected the region, and how a proliferation of foreign Islamic missionaries (mostly of the "Wahhabi" brand), who have arrived during and since perestroika, has radicalised elements over recent decades. It also examines the ideology and methodology of the main radical Islamic groups of the region.
One particularly interesting thing in this paper is that it shows how Islamist groups use, adopt or exploit other causes (ie poverty, or nationalism), and how they have become extremely sophisticated in manipulating (and sacrificing) people and employing propaganda and Western slogans, all for their own political ends. The same patterns of exploitation, manipulation (of people and media), lies and propaganda are seen in all conflicts where militant and revolutionary Islamists are present and seeking to co-opt Western support for their agenda (for example, in the Middle East and the Balkans).
The Silk Road paper devotes pages 33-40 to the re-emergence of terrorism in Uzbekistan. Pages 35-50 deal with the May 2005 Andijan incident.
According to the authors, Baran, Starr and Cornell, radical Islamist and terrorist activity in Central Asia increased markedly from early 2004. After the March and July 2004 terror attacks in Uzbekistan the US criticised Uzbekistan's human rights while doing little to assist it in its investigations or response to the terror attacks. According to the authors, "Overall, the terrorists were greatly emboldened, concluding that Western opinion would allow them literally to get away with murder." (p 34)
The Silk Road paper claims that the Islamist organisations had also been watching the "colour revolutions". They too knew the days of corrupt Soviet-era (secular) dictators were coming to an end, and they were determined to be the ones to take power in the event of any regime change. The event that most impacted them was the November 2004 "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan. This was different to the previous "colour revolutions" as it was violent - yet the West accepted it anyway. The Tulip Revolution (see link 4) gave the Uzbek Islamists their precedent.
One of the most difficult things for human rights groups has been the fact that the overwhelming majority of protestors in Babur Square in Andijan on 13 May 2005 were not armed militant Islamist ideologues. Rather they were family people, women and children, humble citizens just wanting a better life. As Human Rights Watch reported: "The Uzbek government has stated that
the Andijan protests were organized by 'religious fundamentalists.' 'Protesters grievances, however, appeared to focus on a wide range of issues, including poverty and corruption."
The fact is both are true. The rally that brought several thousand citizens into Babur Square in Andijan was organised by Islamist groups. They promoted the event as Uzbekistan's chance for a "colour revolution". The repressed, poor and fearful of Andijan came out in their thousands to protest repression and stage their people's revolution. They were unarmed and unaware that their peaceful people's revolution was going to be used as a cover for a violent Islamic coup d'etat. The citizens of Andijan were also unaware that those who organised the rally would eventually exploit them as human shields.
As a little bit of background: in the section entitled, "Radical Groups: A Survey" (commences on page 19) the Silk Road paper reports (p24-25) that "Akramiya" (the group that organised the uprising - an Andijan based off-shoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir) has been committed to establishing "Islamic socialism" in Andijan. One strategy has been for wealthier followers to set up small business and employ young men who then must attend ideological study-groups after work. Around one-fifth of the profits of those businesses go into a fund for Akramiya, which is committed (like Hizb ut-Tahrir) to the overthrow of the secular government and the enactment of Sharia law and Islamic rule through the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Their work has won hearts as it has helped alleviate poverty in the region.
This is how the Silk Road paper describes what happened in Andijan in May 2005 (page 36).
"In June, 2004, 23 businessmen, followers of Akramiya, were arrested and in February 2005 they were put on trial. Peaceful demonstrations in support of the defendants went on for several weeks. According to reports from the region, Akramiya organized the uprising in a carefully planned way: the accused businessmen promised to pay their staff a full day's salary if they attended the protests. Moreover, their relatives organized transport for others to come from more distant regions. The protesters were orderly and asking merely for 'justice' for their relatives and friends. By May 12th, the presumed final week of the trial, there were already several thousand peaceful demonstrators.
"That night, the Uzbek government arrested some demonstrators. This arrest marked the start of the uprising. On the morning of May 13, armed militants first seized a police station, then a military post, and then a high-security prison, collecting weaponry in each place and killing officials and others along the way. Negotiations between the government and the militants broke down, in part because the release of Akram Yuldashev [founder of Akramiya, in prison for involvement in terrorist bombings in 1999] was the main demand of the insurgents. Expecting a harsh reaction from the government, the insurgents then formed human shields with women and children." [This point is backed up by footnotes that include a Forum 18 release that reports that the insurgents took hostages and abused them: ". . several hostages received severe beatings. The hostages had wire tied round their necks and were placed at the perimeter of the square as human shields. Therefore the first to die from the shots fired by Uzbek government forces were the hostages." Link 5]
The Silk Road paper continues: "While it is yet to be determined who shot first, by the end of the day, some two hundred persons were dead, most killed by government troops but a large number killed by the armed insurgents."
This picture is confirmed by other investigating groups, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (see report: "Documenting Andijan", link 5), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see report: "The Andijan Uprising, Akramiya and Akram Yuldashev", link 6, which includes a 69 minute video of the 13 May 2005 Andijan incident filmed by two locals who believed they were filming a historic event - a people's revolution in Uzbekistan). This film, which is also referred to in the CFR report "Documenting Andijan", shows buildings in flames and thousands of peaceful protesters listening to speeches, encircled by armed Islamic militants, some of whom are making Molotov cocktails. The militants are clearly preparing for armed conflict - for a violent Islamic coup d'etat.
The Silk Road paper comments: "Radical Islamist groups have won the information war. While the insurgency was an attempted coup d'etat, international media framed the story as the massacre of innocent civilians comparable to the Tiananmen Square incident". (page 38)
"The end result of Andijan is that the U.S. military lost its base in Uzbekistan, a major setback for essential intelligence and counterterrorism work. No less significant, the West lost whatever possibility it previously had to influence the Uzbek government to reform or open up the system. Its precipitous condemnation of the government's actions, without corresponding attention to the insurgents, effectively discredited whatever reformist currents had existed earlier within the Uzbek government. Instead, Uzbekistan now leans on Russian and Chinese guidance, which gives carte blanche to the most repressive forces within the Uzbek government. Indeed, the pro-Western liberal forces that had slowly strengthened their positions within the Uzbek elite over that past decade have now been almost completely purged and marginalized." (page 39)
A NEW WAVE OF PERSECUTION MAY BE JUST BEGINING
There is no doubt that persecution against Uzbekistan's Protestant Church has escalated since the May 2005 Andijan incident. And it is clear that the US can no longer influence Uzbek policy concerning religious liberty, as the US, a former ally, is now an enemy.
Furthermore, the Islamists are emboldened by the fact that the West is more interested in the prison conditions and civil liberties of radical Islamists (HRW calls this "independent Islam") than in the terror they inflict and the repression and persecution they intend. And the Uzbek government is emboldened by SCO support to repress anything it wants to repress in any way it wants to repress it.
A new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning.
-------------------------------------------
The Silk Road paper gives recommendations for a European response. These include gaining an improved understanding the ideological framework of radical and terrorist Islamic groups; engaging with reform-minded officials within governments (not just within opposition groups); support the counter-narcotics efforts that can cut the main source of funding to extremist and terrorist Islamic groups; engage in the region and shatter the isolation that only benefits extremists; foster educational and cultural exchanges - and more.
The future of Uzbekistan hangs in the balance.
Elizabeth Kendal WEA RLC
Links
1) Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin | No. 421 | Wed 21 Mar 2007
UZBEKISTAN: PASTOR SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS
http://www.worldevangelicalalliance.com/news/view.htm?id=977
Uzbekistan: Internal exile for Protestant Pastor.
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service. 9 March 2007
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=928
See also http://compassdirect.org
For the Russian version:
Leader of illegal religious organization convicted in Uzbekistan
5 March 2007 http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=2739
2) Uzbekistan: Karimov's war for the status quo.
WEA RLC News & Analysis. 19 July 2005
WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
3) Silk Road Paper. July 2006
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: implications for the EU
by Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell.
4) The Tulip Revolution takes root
By Pepe Escobar. 26 March 2007
5) UZBEKISTAN: What is known about Akramia and the uprising?
By Igor Rotar, Forum 18 News Service 16 June 2005
6) Documenting Andijan
By Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer. 26 June 2006
7) The Andijan Uprising, Akramiya and Akram Yuldashev
By Martha brill Olcott, Marina Barnett Web Commentary, June 22, 2006
"69 minutes of video were taken by two cameramen in the Babur Square in Andijan on May 13, 2005. We are providing the complete version of the film."
Subj: Uzbekistan: a new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UZBEKISTAN: A NEW WAVE OF SERIOUS PERSECUTION MAY BE JUST BEGINNING
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The religious liberty situation for Protestant Christians in Uzbekistan has deteriorated markedly since May 2005. There are two reasons for this and while one is well understood, the other is not.
Reason One: HOLDING ON TO POWER
As is well understood, the era of the Soviet-era dictators running post-Soviet states is coming to an end. Uzbekistan's President Karimov has been watching as post-Soviet states have turned West-ward and embraced democracy and liberty; and as corrupt, repressive pro-Russian, Soviet-era Communist dictators have been driven from power in "colour revolutions": Georgia (Rose, 2003), Ukraine (Orange, 2004) and Kyrzygstan (Tulip, 2005). Then in December 2006 the Soviet-era strongman Saparmurat Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan, died aged 66yrs.
Karimov is keen to hold on to power and so he is quick to repress anything that could threaten the status quo, including threatening non-traditional religions. Radical Islam (largely foreign influenced) is clearly a serious threat to Central Asia. However, because Protestant Christianity is perceived as being essentially Western, anti-corruption and pro-democracy, Karimov regards it as equally threatening.
While Karimov's repression and violence have hurt the Church, they have enabled the Islamist revolutionary and militant groups that feed off social anger to grow. Karimov has been perpetuating a vicious reactionary cycle and Christians are caught up in the slipstream.
Reason Two: LETTING GO OF THE WEST
The other reason why the religious liberty situation for Protestants has deteriorated over recent years is actually more important but less understood.
In 1998 when the US State Department passed its Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (HR 2431), Uzbekistan had several Protestant pastors serving long prison sentences with hard labour on bogus drugs charges. To avoid incurring US sanctions as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), Uzbek leaders negotiated with the US and then released their religious prisoners. In November 2006, after two years of escalating religious repression, the US State Department added Uzbekistan to its list of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC). On 9 March 2007 Uzbekistan sentenced one of its leading registered Protestant pastors to four years in a penal colony after a sham trial. Clearly Uzbekistan doesn't care about the US or CPC status any more. (Link 1)
There is no doubt that the critical turning point was the May 2005 uprising in Andjian.
After the May 2005 Andjian incident WEA RLC News & Analysis wrote (19 July 2005) that Karimov was fighting a war for the status quo against radical Islam, and it was anticipated that "non-traditional" Protestant Christians would doubtless be caught up in the ensuing crackdown. (Link 2)
However, immediately after the May 2005 Andijan uprising, another factor entered the equation and it is this factor that has caused the most serious damage to the religious liberty and human rights situation in Uzbekistan.
In May 2005, the West was in the midst of a "War on Terror" and Uzbekistan, a key ally in the War on Terror, was struggling with serious issues regarding Islamic revolutionary and al-Qaeda linked terrorist organisations. (Forty-seven people were killed in March and July 2004 in a series of well planned and well facilitated terrorist attacks that targeted Uzbek police, private and commercial facilities, and the US and Israeli Embassies.)
Despite this, after the May 2005 incident in Andijan, Western media, human rights monitors and governments were exceedingly quick to reject the Uzbek government's assertion that Islamic radicals and militants had attempted a coup d'etat. Western groups preferred rather to accept (even passionately embrace) narrative coming from Andijan that alleged that a repressive and violent government had, for no reason at all, massacred hundreds of innocent peaceful protesters as they gathered to decry their poverty and the lack of justice, liberty and democracy under the Karimov regime.
The US, too quick to pass judgment, enacted reactionary policies including sanctions. From this point onwards, President Karimov no longer viewed the US as a partner and ally in the "War on Terror". Two months later, in July 2005, President Karimov officially evicted the US military base from Uzbekistan. The Karshi-Kanabad (K2) Airbase had been established in the wake of 9/11 to serve as a hub for combat and humanitarian missions into Afghanistan.
Along with this, Karimov turned increasingly towards Russia, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, which Uzbekistan joined in 2001) which is committed security and "non-interference" and to reducing US influence in Central Asia.
US influence in Uzbekistan has been dealt a serious blow. Not only has the US lost its ability to exert positive influence over Uzbekistan in terms of religious liberty, but due to the souring of relations the West has lost its ability to influence Uzbekistan's secular government towards reform and openness.
SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN ANDJIAN?
A most comprehensive and useful piece on the May 2005 Andijan incident comes from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center based in Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, DC, and Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
Their paper (herein referred to as the Silk Road paper) entitled: "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: implications for the EU" by Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, published in July 2006, is extremely helpful in many ways. (Link 3)
This paper examines the nature, in terms of history and evolution, of both Islam and secularism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It looks at how the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have affected the region, and how a proliferation of foreign Islamic missionaries (mostly of the "Wahhabi" brand), who have arrived during and since perestroika, has radicalised elements over recent decades. It also examines the ideology and methodology of the main radical Islamic groups of the region.
One particularly interesting thing in this paper is that it shows how Islamist groups use, adopt or exploit other causes (ie poverty, or nationalism), and how they have become extremely sophisticated in manipulating (and sacrificing) people and employing propaganda and Western slogans, all for their own political ends. The same patterns of exploitation, manipulation (of people and media), lies and propaganda are seen in all conflicts where militant and revolutionary Islamists are present and seeking to co-opt Western support for their agenda (for example, in the Middle East and the Balkans).
The Silk Road paper devotes pages 33-40 to the re-emergence of terrorism in Uzbekistan. Pages 35-50 deal with the May 2005 Andijan incident.
According to the authors, Baran, Starr and Cornell, radical Islamist and terrorist activity in Central Asia increased markedly from early 2004. After the March and July 2004 terror attacks in Uzbekistan the US criticised Uzbekistan's human rights while doing little to assist it in its investigations or response to the terror attacks. According to the authors, "Overall, the terrorists were greatly emboldened, concluding that Western opinion would allow them literally to get away with murder." (p 34)
The Silk Road paper claims that the Islamist organisations had also been watching the "colour revolutions". They too knew the days of corrupt Soviet-era (secular) dictators were coming to an end, and they were determined to be the ones to take power in the event of any regime change. The event that most impacted them was the November 2004 "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan. This was different to the previous "colour revolutions" as it was violent - yet the West accepted it anyway. The Tulip Revolution (see link 4) gave the Uzbek Islamists their precedent.
One of the most difficult things for human rights groups has been the fact that the overwhelming majority of protestors in Babur Square in Andijan on 13 May 2005 were not armed militant Islamist ideologues. Rather they were family people, women and children, humble citizens just wanting a better life. As Human Rights Watch reported: "The Uzbek government has stated that
the Andijan protests were organized by 'religious fundamentalists.' 'Protesters grievances, however, appeared to focus on a wide range of issues, including poverty and corruption."
The fact is both are true. The rally that brought several thousand citizens into Babur Square in Andijan was organised by Islamist groups. They promoted the event as Uzbekistan's chance for a "colour revolution". The repressed, poor and fearful of Andijan came out in their thousands to protest repression and stage their people's revolution. They were unarmed and unaware that their peaceful people's revolution was going to be used as a cover for a violent Islamic coup d'etat. The citizens of Andijan were also unaware that those who organised the rally would eventually exploit them as human shields.
As a little bit of background: in the section entitled, "Radical Groups: A Survey" (commences on page 19) the Silk Road paper reports (p24-25) that "Akramiya" (the group that organised the uprising - an Andijan based off-shoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir) has been committed to establishing "Islamic socialism" in Andijan. One strategy has been for wealthier followers to set up small business and employ young men who then must attend ideological study-groups after work. Around one-fifth of the profits of those businesses go into a fund for Akramiya, which is committed (like Hizb ut-Tahrir) to the overthrow of the secular government and the enactment of Sharia law and Islamic rule through the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Their work has won hearts as it has helped alleviate poverty in the region.
This is how the Silk Road paper describes what happened in Andijan in May 2005 (page 36).
"In June, 2004, 23 businessmen, followers of Akramiya, were arrested and in February 2005 they were put on trial. Peaceful demonstrations in support of the defendants went on for several weeks. According to reports from the region, Akramiya organized the uprising in a carefully planned way: the accused businessmen promised to pay their staff a full day's salary if they attended the protests. Moreover, their relatives organized transport for others to come from more distant regions. The protesters were orderly and asking merely for 'justice' for their relatives and friends. By May 12th, the presumed final week of the trial, there were already several thousand peaceful demonstrators.
"That night, the Uzbek government arrested some demonstrators. This arrest marked the start of the uprising. On the morning of May 13, armed militants first seized a police station, then a military post, and then a high-security prison, collecting weaponry in each place and killing officials and others along the way. Negotiations between the government and the militants broke down, in part because the release of Akram Yuldashev [founder of Akramiya, in prison for involvement in terrorist bombings in 1999] was the main demand of the insurgents. Expecting a harsh reaction from the government, the insurgents then formed human shields with women and children." [This point is backed up by footnotes that include a Forum 18 release that reports that the insurgents took hostages and abused them: ". . several hostages received severe beatings. The hostages had wire tied round their necks and were placed at the perimeter of the square as human shields. Therefore the first to die from the shots fired by Uzbek government forces were the hostages." Link 5]
The Silk Road paper continues: "While it is yet to be determined who shot first, by the end of the day, some two hundred persons were dead, most killed by government troops but a large number killed by the armed insurgents."
This picture is confirmed by other investigating groups, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (see report: "Documenting Andijan", link 5), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see report: "The Andijan Uprising, Akramiya and Akram Yuldashev", link 6, which includes a 69 minute video of the 13 May 2005 Andijan incident filmed by two locals who believed they were filming a historic event - a people's revolution in Uzbekistan). This film, which is also referred to in the CFR report "Documenting Andijan", shows buildings in flames and thousands of peaceful protesters listening to speeches, encircled by armed Islamic militants, some of whom are making Molotov cocktails. The militants are clearly preparing for armed conflict - for a violent Islamic coup d'etat.
The Silk Road paper comments: "Radical Islamist groups have won the information war. While the insurgency was an attempted coup d'etat, international media framed the story as the massacre of innocent civilians comparable to the Tiananmen Square incident". (page 38)
"The end result of Andijan is that the U.S. military lost its base in Uzbekistan, a major setback for essential intelligence and counterterrorism work. No less significant, the West lost whatever possibility it previously had to influence the Uzbek government to reform or open up the system. Its precipitous condemnation of the government's actions, without corresponding attention to the insurgents, effectively discredited whatever reformist currents had existed earlier within the Uzbek government. Instead, Uzbekistan now leans on Russian and Chinese guidance, which gives carte blanche to the most repressive forces within the Uzbek government. Indeed, the pro-Western liberal forces that had slowly strengthened their positions within the Uzbek elite over that past decade have now been almost completely purged and marginalized." (page 39)
A NEW WAVE OF PERSECUTION MAY BE JUST BEGINING
There is no doubt that persecution against Uzbekistan's Protestant Church has escalated since the May 2005 Andijan incident. And it is clear that the US can no longer influence Uzbek policy concerning religious liberty, as the US, a former ally, is now an enemy.
Furthermore, the Islamists are emboldened by the fact that the West is more interested in the prison conditions and civil liberties of radical Islamists (HRW calls this "independent Islam") than in the terror they inflict and the repression and persecution they intend. And the Uzbek government is emboldened by SCO support to repress anything it wants to repress in any way it wants to repress it.
A new wave of serious persecution may be just beginning.
-------------------------------------------
The Silk Road paper gives recommendations for a European response. These include gaining an improved understanding the ideological framework of radical and terrorist Islamic groups; engaging with reform-minded officials within governments (not just within opposition groups); support the counter-narcotics efforts that can cut the main source of funding to extremist and terrorist Islamic groups; engage in the region and shatter the isolation that only benefits extremists; foster educational and cultural exchanges - and more.
The future of Uzbekistan hangs in the balance.
Elizabeth Kendal WEA RLC
Links
1) Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin | No. 421 | Wed 21 Mar 2007
UZBEKISTAN: PASTOR SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS
http://www.worldevangelicalalliance.com/news/view.htm?id=977
Uzbekistan: Internal exile for Protestant Pastor.
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service. 9 March 2007
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=928
See also http://compassdirect.org
For the Russian version:
Leader of illegal religious organization convicted in Uzbekistan
5 March 2007 http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=2739
2) Uzbekistan: Karimov's war for the status quo.
WEA RLC News & Analysis. 19 July 2005
WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
3) Silk Road Paper. July 2006
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: implications for the EU
by Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell.
4) The Tulip Revolution takes root
By Pepe Escobar. 26 March 2007
5) UZBEKISTAN: What is known about Akramia and the uprising?
By Igor Rotar, Forum 18 News Service 16 June 2005
6) Documenting Andijan
By Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer. 26 June 2006
7) The Andijan Uprising, Akramiya and Akram Yuldashev
By Martha brill Olcott, Marina Barnett Web Commentary, June 22, 2006
"69 minutes of video were taken by two cameramen in the Babur Square in Andijan on May 13, 2005. We are providing the complete version of the film."
Tuesday, July 19, 2005
Uzbekistan: Karimov's war for the status quo.
Date: Tuesday 19 July 2005
Subj: Uzbekistan: Karimov's war for the status quo.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
Uzbekistan is poised on the brink of disaster. President Islam Karimov is fighting a war for the status quo. The status quo however, involves government corruption and repression, resulting in poverty and absolutely misery for most of Uzbekistan's 88% Muslim population. Meanwhile, radical Islamic groups, both socialist and jihadist, entice disgruntled, disenfranchised, poverty-stricken Uzbeks with the promise that an Islamic state would provide them with justice. In the absence of any other option – there is no viable secular political opposition – Uzbek citizens are increasingly aligning themselves with radical political and militant Islamic groups which they see as their only hope as they rise up against their government. This is fast becoming a war between Islam and the status quo.
The only path likely to circumvent an Islamic revolution or a drawn-out and bloody civil war, the path of reform, is not on the agenda. While Uzbekistan's Islamic groups have demonstrated that they are prepared to use lethal force to advance their agenda, the Karimov regime has likewise demonstrated that it is prepared to use lethal force to crush dissent. (Link 1)
None of this bodes well for Uzbekistan's Christian minority who are unfortunately caught up on the edge of the whirlwind as Karimov represses all religion indiscriminately.
In 1999, the USA used its Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (which links religious liberty to trade and aid) to positive effect in Uzbekistan. Today however, Karimov's regime is finding support for its indiscriminate heavy-handed repression in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) which was formed in 2001 to enable Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan to co-ordinate activities, in particular security. The SCO has since extended observer status to India, Pakistan and Iran. So why should Karimov be concerned with Western condemnation of its lack of transparent democracy, openness, free media, human rights and religious liberty? The SCO, which one commentator describes as "a huddling of harried elites", will support Karimov as he represses religion as violently and pervasively as he sees fit.
Christians in Uzbekistan are experiencing escalating persecution due to increasing Islamic zeal and increasing government repression of religion. Forum 18 has extensive coverage of the escalating persecution of the Church in Uzbekistan.
As the totalitarian Karimov finds supportive allies in Russia and China, Uzbekistan's Christians may find that their allies, Western advocates of religious liberty, are increasingly without leverage.
---------------------------------------------
THE POST-SOVIET STATUS QUO
Adolat Najimova, a EurasiaNet partner from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) writes, "The lives of ordinary Uzbeks are extremely difficult, with high unemployment, particularly in rural areas; there are villages in the country that are virtually devoid of males, in part a result of forced migration in pursuit of wages. Local observers cite widespread corruption, accusing government officials of enriching themselves at the expense of the public.
"The majority of Uzbeks try hard to make ends meet despite Uzbekistan's huge potential; it is among the largest producers of cotton and gold in the world. Meanwhile, most sectors of the economy are controlled by a small circle of people who might best be categorized into clan-like structures. The middle class has all but disappeared in Uzbekistan over the course of the past decade."
Najimova writes that human rights abuses are widespread, torture is systematic, and there is "no secular opposition in the country, and international observers have dismissed last December's parliamentary elections as a farce. The country's parliament remains firmly subordinate to the president. There is no truly independent media..." (Link 2)
Uzbekistan has clearly not yet lifted its roots out of the Soviet system.
UZBEKISTAN'S ISLAMIST THREAT: ISLAM vs STATUS QUO
The two main Islamic movements threatening the status quo in Uzbekistan are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; which is linked to al-Qaeda and fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (which blends Wahhabi theology with Leninist structures and strategy).
The IMU, which has waged considerable terror in Uzbekistan, enacted its first suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, in the capital Tashkent, in March 2004. While Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be non-violent, its strategy does aim to culminate in Islamic revolution. Some socialist Islamists have grown impatient with Hizb ut-Tahrir and have split to follow jihadist methods.
The finer details of Uzbekistan's Islamist movements are intensely complicated and information is conflicting. But the Islamist threat is not to be underestimated. These groups aim to establish an Islamic state across Central Asia and they thrive on instability and discontent. President Karimov is within reason to fear an Islamic revolution or a IMU coup in Tashkent. However, at the same time he is doing much to accelerate the likelihood of such an event.
President Karimov refuses to acknowledge (or does not care) that his policies are fueling social anger. In the absence of any openness or liberty, there is no opportunity to discuss, let alone vent. The regime's injustices, corruption, elitism, brutality and repression are catalysts for radicalisation within the majority Muslim population.
Reporter Adolat Najimova told EurasiaNet, "Some observers assert that the lack of avenues for grievances or participation in political and social life pushes many young Uzbek men and women to join the ranks of radical Islamic groups; the result can be a vicious circle: increasing numbers of people attracted to such religious groups promising to deliver justice, and increasingly harsh responses by the government." (Link 2)
REFORM IS THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION
Only reform, in particular openness and economic reform that eases social pain, offers any hope that civil war or Islamic revolution can be prevented in Uzbekistan. It is widely believed that that the genuine pro-Western reforms implemented in Kyrgyzstan after the "Tulip Revolution" (24 March 2005) will circumvent the Islamist threat there.
But unlike Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan was ripe for "revolution" (regime change). As Christopher Walker writes in a EurasiaNet Commentary (14 July 2005), "Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in many ways represent the region's 'low hanging fruit' for political change. Each featured a comparatively open political environment, in which opposition parties could build popular support and agitate against the respective governments. In comparison, other states in the region -- most notably Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have stifled all forms of domestic dissent -- present far stiffer challenges for those seeking change." (Link 3)
This is why the situation in Uzbekistan is so diabolical. Uzbeks are highly agitated by increasing totalitarianism, repression and entrenched corruption, and by the lack of justice, human rights, freedoms, employment, information and well being. Uzbeks are desperate for change, but there is no viable secular opposition, only radical Islamists who are actively winning hearts and escalating their efforts.
Tanya Malcolm, a Central Asia analyst with the Eurasia Group, and Ganijon Kholmatov, an independent political analyst based in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) both told RFE/RL that escalating authoritarianism is fueling the extremism in Central Asia. Kholmatov believes a lessening of religious restrictions, and an opening up of public debate has lessened the appeal of banned, extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan. (Link 4)
Unfortunately, while Karimov needs to implement economic reforms in Uzbekistan urgently to circumvent civil war or Islamic revolution, it appears he is determined to wage his war for the status quo. Karimov is bolstered by the fact that he has found Russia's President Vladamir Putin and China's President Hu Jintao (both using similar methods to fight the same war in their own nations) to be strong allies.
And Russia and China are bolstered by having the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan as an ally. As NATO has expanded to incorporate the Baltic states, and as the US has set up bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to fight the "War on Terror", Russia has become encircled. Russia and China are both unhappy about Washington's presence in their backyard. There will probably be some quid pro quo here – Russian and Chinese support for Karimov's authoritarian, human rights-abusing regime in exchange for Uzbek pressure to remove US bases and influence from Central Asia. And Uzbekistan does not need to fear that a US withdrawal from the region might leave a power vacuum for Islamists; Uzbekistan will appeal to the Shangai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) for support or assistance in dealing with any problem stemming from religion.
Most analysts believe that Karimov cannot win this war, as the protests will eventually get beyond the scope of government control. Chris Seiple writes for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, "If these demonstrations [as in Andijan, 12-13 May] were coordinated, possibly by extremists, they would be almost impossible for the government to put down. It required the presence of both the president and the interior minister to restore order in Andijan, and they cannot be everywhere at once." (Link 5)
The question is, how far will Russia or China go to preserve the status quo in Uzbekistan?
Uzbekistan is poised on the brink of disaster. A worst case scenario could have the Ferghana Valley looking like Chechnya. The stage is set for Christians in Uzbekistan to be facing an increasingly difficult season. We must pray for the Church, and pray for God to intervene and keep Uzbekistan from going over the edge.
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) 'I don't know why they opened fire. They killed the unarmed citizens of Andijan'
Rustam Iskhakov in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 16 May 2005
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1484703,00.html
2) UZBEKISTAN: PRESIDENT KARIMOV’S LIMITED OPTIONS
EURASIA INSIGHT. By Adolat Najimova, 21 May 2005 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp052105.shtml
3) THE FORMER SOVIET UNION’S NEXT WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Christopher Walker 14 July 2005, A EurasiaNet Commentary
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav071405.shtml
4) Kyrgyzstan: Banned Hizb ut-Tahrir Faces Dwindling Appeal, Internal Divisions
By Gulnoza Saidazimova, Prague, 27 April 2005 (RFE/RL)
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/4/E01B2B2F-007E-4941A983-404CC2CA3D8D.html
5) UNDERSTANDING UZBEKISTAN
by Chris Seiple, 1 June 2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050601.centralasia.seiple.uzbekistan.html
SEE ALSO
Uzbekistan: Is The Country Headed For Regime Change?
By Jeffrey Donovan, RFE/RL, 30 June 2005
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/06/5f2fb89e-7b80-469e-826d-3e6956c475f4.html
Subj: Uzbekistan: Karimov's war for the status quo.
To: World Evangelical Alliance Religious Liberty News & Analysis
From: WEA RLC Principal Researcher and Writer, Elizabeth Kendal.
Uzbekistan is poised on the brink of disaster. President Islam Karimov is fighting a war for the status quo. The status quo however, involves government corruption and repression, resulting in poverty and absolutely misery for most of Uzbekistan's 88% Muslim population. Meanwhile, radical Islamic groups, both socialist and jihadist, entice disgruntled, disenfranchised, poverty-stricken Uzbeks with the promise that an Islamic state would provide them with justice. In the absence of any other option – there is no viable secular political opposition – Uzbek citizens are increasingly aligning themselves with radical political and militant Islamic groups which they see as their only hope as they rise up against their government. This is fast becoming a war between Islam and the status quo.
The only path likely to circumvent an Islamic revolution or a drawn-out and bloody civil war, the path of reform, is not on the agenda. While Uzbekistan's Islamic groups have demonstrated that they are prepared to use lethal force to advance their agenda, the Karimov regime has likewise demonstrated that it is prepared to use lethal force to crush dissent. (Link 1)
None of this bodes well for Uzbekistan's Christian minority who are unfortunately caught up on the edge of the whirlwind as Karimov represses all religion indiscriminately.
In 1999, the USA used its Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (which links religious liberty to trade and aid) to positive effect in Uzbekistan. Today however, Karimov's regime is finding support for its indiscriminate heavy-handed repression in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) which was formed in 2001 to enable Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan to co-ordinate activities, in particular security. The SCO has since extended observer status to India, Pakistan and Iran. So why should Karimov be concerned with Western condemnation of its lack of transparent democracy, openness, free media, human rights and religious liberty? The SCO, which one commentator describes as "a huddling of harried elites", will support Karimov as he represses religion as violently and pervasively as he sees fit.
Christians in Uzbekistan are experiencing escalating persecution due to increasing Islamic zeal and increasing government repression of religion. Forum 18 has extensive coverage of the escalating persecution of the Church in Uzbekistan.
As the totalitarian Karimov finds supportive allies in Russia and China, Uzbekistan's Christians may find that their allies, Western advocates of religious liberty, are increasingly without leverage.
---------------------------------------------
THE POST-SOVIET STATUS QUO
Adolat Najimova, a EurasiaNet partner from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) writes, "The lives of ordinary Uzbeks are extremely difficult, with high unemployment, particularly in rural areas; there are villages in the country that are virtually devoid of males, in part a result of forced migration in pursuit of wages. Local observers cite widespread corruption, accusing government officials of enriching themselves at the expense of the public.
"The majority of Uzbeks try hard to make ends meet despite Uzbekistan's huge potential; it is among the largest producers of cotton and gold in the world. Meanwhile, most sectors of the economy are controlled by a small circle of people who might best be categorized into clan-like structures. The middle class has all but disappeared in Uzbekistan over the course of the past decade."
Najimova writes that human rights abuses are widespread, torture is systematic, and there is "no secular opposition in the country, and international observers have dismissed last December's parliamentary elections as a farce. The country's parliament remains firmly subordinate to the president. There is no truly independent media..." (Link 2)
Uzbekistan has clearly not yet lifted its roots out of the Soviet system.
UZBEKISTAN'S ISLAMIST THREAT: ISLAM vs STATUS QUO
The two main Islamic movements threatening the status quo in Uzbekistan are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; which is linked to al-Qaeda and fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (which blends Wahhabi theology with Leninist structures and strategy).
The IMU, which has waged considerable terror in Uzbekistan, enacted its first suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, in the capital Tashkent, in March 2004. While Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be non-violent, its strategy does aim to culminate in Islamic revolution. Some socialist Islamists have grown impatient with Hizb ut-Tahrir and have split to follow jihadist methods.
The finer details of Uzbekistan's Islamist movements are intensely complicated and information is conflicting. But the Islamist threat is not to be underestimated. These groups aim to establish an Islamic state across Central Asia and they thrive on instability and discontent. President Karimov is within reason to fear an Islamic revolution or a IMU coup in Tashkent. However, at the same time he is doing much to accelerate the likelihood of such an event.
President Karimov refuses to acknowledge (or does not care) that his policies are fueling social anger. In the absence of any openness or liberty, there is no opportunity to discuss, let alone vent. The regime's injustices, corruption, elitism, brutality and repression are catalysts for radicalisation within the majority Muslim population.
Reporter Adolat Najimova told EurasiaNet, "Some observers assert that the lack of avenues for grievances or participation in political and social life pushes many young Uzbek men and women to join the ranks of radical Islamic groups; the result can be a vicious circle: increasing numbers of people attracted to such religious groups promising to deliver justice, and increasingly harsh responses by the government." (Link 2)
REFORM IS THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION
Only reform, in particular openness and economic reform that eases social pain, offers any hope that civil war or Islamic revolution can be prevented in Uzbekistan. It is widely believed that that the genuine pro-Western reforms implemented in Kyrgyzstan after the "Tulip Revolution" (24 March 2005) will circumvent the Islamist threat there.
But unlike Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan was ripe for "revolution" (regime change). As Christopher Walker writes in a EurasiaNet Commentary (14 July 2005), "Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in many ways represent the region's 'low hanging fruit' for political change. Each featured a comparatively open political environment, in which opposition parties could build popular support and agitate against the respective governments. In comparison, other states in the region -- most notably Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have stifled all forms of domestic dissent -- present far stiffer challenges for those seeking change." (Link 3)
This is why the situation in Uzbekistan is so diabolical. Uzbeks are highly agitated by increasing totalitarianism, repression and entrenched corruption, and by the lack of justice, human rights, freedoms, employment, information and well being. Uzbeks are desperate for change, but there is no viable secular opposition, only radical Islamists who are actively winning hearts and escalating their efforts.
Tanya Malcolm, a Central Asia analyst with the Eurasia Group, and Ganijon Kholmatov, an independent political analyst based in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) both told RFE/RL that escalating authoritarianism is fueling the extremism in Central Asia. Kholmatov believes a lessening of religious restrictions, and an opening up of public debate has lessened the appeal of banned, extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan. (Link 4)
Unfortunately, while Karimov needs to implement economic reforms in Uzbekistan urgently to circumvent civil war or Islamic revolution, it appears he is determined to wage his war for the status quo. Karimov is bolstered by the fact that he has found Russia's President Vladamir Putin and China's President Hu Jintao (both using similar methods to fight the same war in their own nations) to be strong allies.
And Russia and China are bolstered by having the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan as an ally. As NATO has expanded to incorporate the Baltic states, and as the US has set up bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to fight the "War on Terror", Russia has become encircled. Russia and China are both unhappy about Washington's presence in their backyard. There will probably be some quid pro quo here – Russian and Chinese support for Karimov's authoritarian, human rights-abusing regime in exchange for Uzbek pressure to remove US bases and influence from Central Asia. And Uzbekistan does not need to fear that a US withdrawal from the region might leave a power vacuum for Islamists; Uzbekistan will appeal to the Shangai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) for support or assistance in dealing with any problem stemming from religion.
Most analysts believe that Karimov cannot win this war, as the protests will eventually get beyond the scope of government control. Chris Seiple writes for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, "If these demonstrations [as in Andijan, 12-13 May] were coordinated, possibly by extremists, they would be almost impossible for the government to put down. It required the presence of both the president and the interior minister to restore order in Andijan, and they cannot be everywhere at once." (Link 5)
The question is, how far will Russia or China go to preserve the status quo in Uzbekistan?
Uzbekistan is poised on the brink of disaster. A worst case scenario could have the Ferghana Valley looking like Chechnya. The stage is set for Christians in Uzbekistan to be facing an increasingly difficult season. We must pray for the Church, and pray for God to intervene and keep Uzbekistan from going over the edge.
- Elizabeth Kendal
Links
1) 'I don't know why they opened fire. They killed the unarmed citizens of Andijan'
Rustam Iskhakov in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 16 May 2005
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1484703,00.html
2) UZBEKISTAN: PRESIDENT KARIMOV’S LIMITED OPTIONS
EURASIA INSIGHT. By Adolat Najimova, 21 May 2005 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp052105.shtml
3) THE FORMER SOVIET UNION’S NEXT WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Christopher Walker 14 July 2005, A EurasiaNet Commentary
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav071405.shtml
4) Kyrgyzstan: Banned Hizb ut-Tahrir Faces Dwindling Appeal, Internal Divisions
By Gulnoza Saidazimova, Prague, 27 April 2005 (RFE/RL)
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/4/E01B2B2F-007E-4941A983-404CC2CA3D8D.html
5) UNDERSTANDING UZBEKISTAN
by Chris Seiple, 1 June 2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050601.centralasia.seiple.uzbekistan.html
SEE ALSO
Uzbekistan: Is The Country Headed For Regime Change?
By Jeffrey Donovan, RFE/RL, 30 June 2005
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/06/5f2fb89e-7b80-469e-826d-3e6956c475f4.html